Transformations at the Dawn of Verbal Language.

In this essay the author describes some of the transformations that occur as one moves from preverbal functioning to verbally symbolic language. In preverbal experience, there is a direct connection between the sign and what is signified. An infant or child signifies displeasure by throwing his food or other objects to the floor. Much of the emotional tie between mother and infant and patient and analyst is communicated in this way. When a transformation occurs from preverbal to verbally symbolic language, as occurs in early development and as one interprets a dream, meaning is not merely translated, meaning is created. On acquiring verbally symbolic language, a "space" mediated by an interpreting subject opens between the symbol (for instance, the word guilt) and the symbolized (the experience of guilt) and a new subjectivity is created. On entry into verbally symbolic language, one becomes able to experience oneself in a qualitatively different way; one becomes both subject and object, I and me; one becomes able to experience a far broader range of feelings and types of thinking. Helen Keller's account of her experience of acquiring verbally symbolic language is drawn upon.

Ontological Psychoanalysis in Clinical Practice.

The author describes and then clinically illustrates what he terms the ontological dimension of psychoanalysis (having to do with coming into being) and the epistemological dimension of psychoanalysis (having to do with coming to know and understand). Neither of these dimensions of psychoanalysis exists in pure form; they are inextricably intertwined. Epistemological psychoanalysis, for which Freud and Klein are the principal architects, involves the work of arriving at understandings of play, dreams, and associations; while ontological psychoanalysis, for which Winnicott and Bion are the principal architects, involves creating conditions in which the patient might become more fully alive and real to him- or herself. The author provides clinical illustrations of the ontological dimension of psychoanalysis in which the process of the patient's coming more fully into being is facilitated by the experiences in which the patient feels recognized for the individual he is and is becoming. This occurs in an analysis in which the analyst and patient invent a form of psychoanalysis that is uniquely their own.

Like the belly of a bird breathing: On Winnicott's "Mind and its Relation to the Psyche-soma".

In "Mind and its relation to the psyche-soma," Winnicott reinvents the concept of psyche-soma by viewing it as a set of experiences located neither in the body nor in the brain, and in fact, not located anywhere. Psyche, in health, is understood to be the imaginative functioning of mental processes, and soma is understood to be the experience of physical realness and aliveness. Winnicott offers a clinical illustration of work with a patient who feels unreal to herself. He describes a juncture in the analysis in which the patient's somatic functioning is everything, while Winnicott, by feeling his own breathing and watching the patient breathe, knows that she is alive. This is the beginning of her becoming able to experience her breathing (soma) and imagining (psyche) as real, alive, and her own.Among the concepts Winnicott alludes to, and that I develop, are (1) the idea that in his clinical work Winnicott not only lives an experience with the patient, he also brings an unspoken structure of meaning to the experience, and the two are inseparable; and (2) the idea that Winnicott introduces a set of terms and a way of thinking that is independent of the differentiation of conscious and unconscious mind (Freud's topographic model). These ideas include aliveness and deadness, realness and unrealness, being and disruption of being.

What alive means: On Winnicott's "transitional objects and transitional phenomena".

In his reading of Winnicott's "Transitional objects and transitional phenomena," the author views Winnicott as engaged in offering a way of conceiving of the fundamentally human task of creating states of being in which the individual's ideas, feelings, and bodily sensations come to feel alive and real to him or her. The author proposes that the concept of paradox captures something of both the idea and the experience of transitional objects and phenomena. The author then looks closely at the new clinical illustration that Winnicott presents in the fourth and final version of his paper. He discusses what he views as Winnicott's most evolved form of clinical practice. The author also takes up Winnicott's idea of "the negative," a state of being in which the gap, the amnesia, the death is all that feels real, while the presence or memory of the object feels unreal. The author offers an illustration of clinical work in which a significant alteration of the analytic frame provides a context in which the patient is able to begin to experience feelings that feel real and alive to him.

Rumo a uma forma revisada de pensamento e prática psicanalíticos: a evolução da teoria analítica da mente / Toward a revised form of analytic thinking and practice: the evolution of analytic theory of mind / Hacia una forma revisada de pensamiento y práctica psicoanalíticos: la evolución de la teoría analítica de la mente / Vers une forme révisée de la pensée et de la pratique psychanalytiques: l'évolution de la théorie analytique de l'esprit

RESUMO O autor descreve o nascimento da psique conforme cinco teóricos da psicanálise: Freud, Klein, Fairbairn, Winnicott e Bion. Vê isso como fundamental para que possa evoluir uma nova e fértil forma de pensamento e clínica psicanalíticos. A concepção de mente apresentada por cada um desses autores se desenvolve: começa como aparelho para o pensamento (em Freud, Klein e Fairbairn) e torna-se um processo localizado na experiência (em Winnicott e Bion). O trabalho deles inaugura e transforma radicalmente tanto o pensamento daqueles que os precederam como dos que os sucederam. Ao contar essas "histórias" do surgimento da mente, e descrever esse conceito na obra de cada um daqueles teóricos, o autor oferece não apenas sua estrutura narrativa e esclarecimentos acerca do trabalho deles, mas também suas próprias interpretações e extensões dessas ideias.

ABSTRACT The author describes the start of psyche according to five of the psychoanalytic theoreticians: Freud, Klein, Fairbairn, Winnicott and Bion. This is seen as fundamental so there can be a new and fruitful way of thinking and psychoanalytical clinic. The concept of mind presented by each of these authors is developed: it starts as means to the thoughts (Freud, Klein and Fairbairn) and becomes a process found in experience (Winnicott and Bion). Their work completely unveils and transforms both the way of thinking of those coming before them as well as those who came after them. When telling this 'stories' on the origin of the mind, and describing this concept from each of the work of these theoreticians, the author offers, not only his narrative and clarification on their work, but also his own interpretations and scope on these ideas.

RESUMEN El autor describe el nacimiento de la psique según cinco teóricos del psicoanálisis: Freud, Klein, Fairbairn, Winnicott y Bion. Considera fundamental para que pueda evolucionar una nueva y fértil forma de pensamiento y clínica psicoanalíticos. La concepción de la mente presentada por cada uno de esos autores se desarrolla: empieza como aparato para el pensamiento (en Freud, Klein y Fairbairn) y se convierte en un proceso situado en la experiencia (en Winnicott Bion). Ese trabajo inaugura y trasforma radicalmente tanto el pensamiento de aquellos que los precedieron como de los que los sucedieron. Al contar esas "historias" del origen de la mente, y describir ese concepto en la obra de cada uno de aquellos teóricos, el autor ofrece no solamente su estructura narrativa y explicaciones sobre su trabajo, sino también sus propias interpretaciones y extensiones de esas ideas.

RÉSUMÉ L'auteur décrit la naissance de la psyché selon cinq théoriciens de la psychanalyse : Freud, Klein, Fairbairn, Winnicott et Bion. Il considère ce fait fondamental pour qu'une manière neuve et fertile de pensée et de clinique psychanalytiques puisse évoluer. La conception d'esprit présentée par chacun de ces auteurs se développe : elle commence comme un appareil pour la pensée (chez Freud, Klein et Fairbairn) et devient un processus situé dans l'expérience (chez Winnicott et Bion). Leur travail inaugure et transforme radicalement aussi bien la pensée de ceux que les ont précédés, que celle de ceux que les ont succédé. Lorsqu'il raconte ces « histoires ¼ de l'apparition de l'esprit et décrive ce concept chez l'œuvre de chacun de ces théoriques, l'auteur offre non seulement sa structure narrative et les éclaircissements concernant leur travail, mais aussi ses propres interprétations et les extensions de ces idées.

Psicanálise ontológica ou "O que você quer ser quando crescer?" / Ontological psychoanalysis or "What do you want to be when you grow up?" / Psicoanálisis ontológico o "¿Qué quieres ser cuando crezcas?" / Psychanalyse ontologique ou « Que voulez-vous devenir quand vous serez grand ? ¼

O autor discute as diferenças entre o que chama de psicanálise epistemológica - relacionada ao conhecimento e à compreensão, tendo como principais autores Freud e Klein - e o que chama de psicanálise ontológica - relacionada ao ser e ao tornar-se, tomando nesse caso como principais referências Winnicott e Bion. Argumenta que, com Winnicott, a psicanálise deixa de estar centrada no sentido simbólico do brincar, que passa a ser visto como experiência. Já com Bion a psicanálise deixa de estar centrada no sentido simbólico dos sonhos, e a experiência de sonhar passa a ser considerada em todas as suas formas. A ideia é que a psicanálise epistemológica envolve sobretudo a busca por compreender sentidos inconscientes. Por sua vez, o objetivo da psicanálise ontológica é permitir que o paciente descubra sentidos de maneira criativa e que, nesse processo, se torne mais plenamente vivo.

The author discusses the difference between what is called epistemological psychoanalysis-related to knowledge and understanding, having Freud and Klein as main authors - and ontological psychoanalysis, related to being and becoming, having Winnicott and Bion as main articulators in this case. The author says that, with Winnicott, psychoanalysis is not centered in symbolic meanings for playing and playing becomes an experience. According to Bion, psychoanalysis is not centered in symbolic meanings from dreams and the dreaming experience is then considered in all ways. The idea is that epistemological psychoanalysis mainly includes the search for understanding unconscious meanings. On the other hand, the objective of the ontological psychoanalysis is to allow the patient to find meanings in a creative way, and during this process it becomes completely active.

El autor analiza aborda las diferencias entre lo que denomina psicoanálisis epistemológico - relacionado con el conocimiento y la comprensión, teniendo como autores principales a Freud y Klein - y lo que denomina psicoanálisis ontoló-gico, relacionado al ser y a llegar a ser, tomando como articuladores principales en este caso a Winnicott y Bion. Argumenta que, con Winnicott, el psicoanálisis deja de centrarse en el sentido simbólico de jugar y jugar pasa a tomarse como experiencia. Por otro lado, con Bion, el psicoanálisis deja de centrarse en el sentido simbólico de los sueños y la experiencia de soñar pasa a ser considerada en todas sus formas. La idea es que el psicoanálisis epistemológico involucra, principalmente, la búsqueda de la comprensión de sentidos inconscientes. Por su parte, el objetivo del psicoanálisis ontológico es permitir que el paciente descubra sentidos de forma creativa, y que en este proceso se torne más plenamente vivo.

L'auteur discute les différences entre ce qu'il appelle psychanalyse épistémologique - qui a un rapport avec les connaissances et la compréhension, dont les auteurs les plus importants sont Freud et Klein - et ce qu'il appelle psychanalyse ontologique, qui a un rapport avec l'être et le devenir, en prenant comme articulateurs principaux Winnicot et Bion. Il argumente que chez Winnicott la psychanalyse n'est plus centrée sur le sens symbolique de jouer, et le jouer est alors pris en tant qu'expérience. D'autre part, chez Bion la psychanalyse n'est plus centrée sur le sens symbolique des rêves et l'expérience de rêver est alors considérée dans tous ses aspects. L'idée, c'est que la psychanalyse épistémologique concerne surtout la poursuite de la compréhension des sens inconscients. L'objectif de la psychanalyse ontologique est, à son tour, de permettre que le patient découvre les sens de façon créative, et que pendant ce processus devienne pleinement plus vivant.

Toward a Revised Form of Analytic Thinking and Practice: The Evolution of Analytic Theory of Mind.

The author tells the stories of the inception of mind that is developed in the work of five analytic theorists whom he sees as central to the evolution of a new and fertile form of psychoanalytic thinking and practice: Freud, Klein, Fairbairn, Winnicott, and Bion. The conception of mind presented by each of these authors moves from that of an apparatus for thinking (in the work of Freud, Klein, and Fairbairn) to that of a process located in the very act of experiencing (in the work of Winnicott and Bion). The work of each of the theorists constitutes a radical transformation of thinking relative to those who have preceded and those who follow him or her. The author, in telling the "stories" of the emergence of mind and the concept of mind according to each of these theorists, offers not only his own narrative structure and clarifications of their work, but also his own interpretations and extensions of their ideas.

DREAMING THE ANALYTIC SESSION: A CLINICAL ESSAY.

This is a clinical paper in which the author describes analytic work in which he dreams the analytic session with three of his patients. He begins with a brief discussion of aspects of analytic theory that make up a good deal of the context for his clinical work. Central among these concepts are (1) the idea that the role of the analyst is to help the patient dream his previously "undreamt" and "interrupted" dreams; and (2) dreaming the analytic session involves engaging in the experience of dreaming the session with the patient and, at the same time, unconsciously (and at times consciously) understanding the dream. The author offers no "technique" for dreaming the analytic session. Each analyst must find his or her own way of dreaming each session with each patient. Dreaming the session is not something one works at; rather, one tries not to get in its way.

Destruction reconceived: On Winnicott's 'The Use of an Object and Relating through Identifications'.

'The Use of an Object and Relating through Identifications' is a landmark contribution that I find very difficult to write about because so much of what lies at its core is merely suggested. It is necessary for the reader not only to read the paper, but also to write it. In my reading/writing of the paper, the mother becomes real for the infant in the process of his actually destroying her as an external object (destroying her sense of herself as an adequate mother), and his perceiving that destruction. She also becomes a real external object for the infant in the process of his experiencing the psychological work involved in surviving destruction, a form of work that does not occur in the world of fantasied objects. The analyst or mother may not be able to survive destruction. It is essential that the analyst be able to acknowledge to himself his inability to survive and, if necessary, to end the analysis because of the very damaging effects for both patient and analyst of prolonged experience of this sort. The author presents clinical discussions of analyses in which the analyst survives destruction and is unable to survive destruction.

ON LANGUAGE AND TRUTH IN PSYCHOANALYSIS.

The author's focus in this paper is on the role that language plays in bringing to life the truth of the patient's lived experience in the analytic session. He discusses particular forms of discourse that enable the patient to experience with the analyst the truth that the patient had previously been unable to experience, much less put into words, on his own. The three forms of discourse that the author explores-direct discourse, tangential discourse, and discourse of non sequiturs-do not simply serve as ways of communicating the truth; they are integral aspects of the truth of what is happening at any given moment of a session. The truth that is experienced and expressed in the analytic discourse lies at least as much in the breaks (the disjunctions) in that discourse as in its manifest narrative.

Intuiting the truth of what's happening: on Bion's "notes on memory and desire".

Bion's "Notes on Memory and Desire" (1967a) is an impossible paper that this article's author has struggled with for decades. He views the paper, only two and a half pages in length, as a landmark contribution. Despite its title-and its infamous dictates to resist the impulse to remember past sessions and desire for "results"-the paper is not, most importantly, about memory and desire. It proposes a new analytic methodology that supplants awareness from its central role in the analytic process and, in its place, instates the analyst's (largely unconscious) work of intuiting the (unconscious) psychic reality of the present moment by becoming at one with it. This article's clinical examples, provided from the author's own work, illustrate something of his ways of talking with his patients.

El tercero analítico: el trabajo con hechos clínicos intersubjetivos / The analytic third: working with intersubjetive clinical facts

Este artículo presenta dos secuencias clínicas en un esfuerzo por describir los métodos mediante los cuales el analista intenta reconocer, comprender y simbolizar verbalmente para sí mismo y para el analizando la naturaleza específica del interjuego momento-a-momento de la experiencia subjetiva del analista, la experiencia subjetiva del analizando y la experiencia generada intersubjetivamente por el par analítico (la experiencia del tercero analítico). La primera discusión clínica describe cómo la experiencia intersubjetiva creada por el par analítico se vuelve accesible al analista en parte mediante la experiencia de sus propios reveries, formas de actividad mental que parecen a amenudo no ser más que ensimismamientos narcisistas, distracciones, rumias compulsivas, ensoñaciones y cosas parecidas. Un segundo relato clínico se centra en un caso en que la ficción somática del analista, junto con las experiencias sensoriales y fantasías relacionadas con el cuerpo del analizando, sirven de medio principal a través del cual el analista experimenta y llega a entender el significado de las principales angustias que se estaban generando (de manera intersubjetiva) (AU)

In this paper, two clinical sequences are presented in an effort to describe the methods by which the analyst attempts to recognise, understand, and verbally symbolise for himself and the analysand the specific nature of the momento.to.moment interplay of the analyst's subjective experience, the subjective experience of the analysand and the intersubjectively-gene-rated experience of the analytic pair (the experience of the analytic third). The first clinical discussion describes how the intersubjective experience created by the analytic pair becomes accessible to the analyst in part through the analyst's experience of his own reveries, forms of mental activity that often appear to be nothing more than narcissistic self.absorption, distractedness, compulsive rumination, daydreaming and the like. A second clinical account focuses on an instance in which the analyst's somatic delusion, in conjunction with the analysand´s sensory experiences and body-related fantasies, served as a principal medium through which the analyst experienced and came to understand the meaning of the leading anxieties that were being (intersubjectively) generated (AU)

Fear of breakdown and the unlived life.

Winnicott's Fear of breakdown is an unfinished work that requires that the reader be not only a reader, but also a writer of this work which often gestures toward meaning as opposed to presenting fully developed ideas. The author's understanding of the often confusing, sometimes opaque, argument of Winnicott's paper is as follows. In infancy there occurs a breakdown in the mother-infant tie that forces the infant to take on, by himself, emotional events that he is unable to manage. He short-circuits his experience of primitive agony by generating defense organizations that are psychotic in nature, i.e., they substitute self-created inner reality for external reality, thus foreclosing his actually experiencing critical life events. By not experiencing the breakdown of the mother-infant tie when it occurred in infancy, the individual creates a psychological state in which he lives in fear of a breakdown that has already happened, but which he did not experience. The author extends Winnicott's thinking by suggesting that the driving force of the patient's need to find the source of his fear is his feeling that parts of himself are missing and that he must find them if he is to become whole. What remains of his life feels to him like a life that is mostly an unlived life.

La relación edípica transicional en el desarrollo femenino / The transitional oedipal relationship in female development

Se propone el concepto de la relación transicional edípica como una forma de comprender la naturaleza del proceso psicológico-interpersonal que interviene en la entrada de la niña en el complejo de Edipo. Esta relación transicional sirve para permitir a la niña descubrir de una forma no traumática al padre como objeto externo en el contexto de la seguridad de una relación diádica con la madre. En esta fase primaria del desarrollo edípico la niña se enamora de la madre-como-padre y del padre-como-madre, es decir, se enamora de la madre en su identificación inconsciente con su propio padre. De esta manera, paradójicamente, la primera relación objetal triangular se vive en una relación entre dos personas, la primera relación heterosexual se desarrolla en una relación que afecta a dos mujeres; el padre como objeto libidinal es descubierto en la madre (AU)

The concept of the oedipal transitional relationship is proposed as a way of understanding the nature of the psychological-interpersonal process mediating the Little girl's entry into the Oedipus complex. This transitional relationship serves to allow the little girl to discover non-traumatically the father as external object in the context of the safety of the dyadic relationship to the mother. In this early phase of oedipal development, the little girl falls in love with the mother as father and the father as mother, i.e the mother in her unconscious identification with her own father. In this way, paradoxically, the first triangulated object relationship is experienced in a two-person relationship; the first heterosexual relationship develops in a relationship involving two females; the father as libidinal object is discovered in the mother (AU)

Sobre três formas de pensar: o pensamento mágico, o pensamento onírico e o pensamento transformativo / On three ways of thought: magical thinking, dream-like thinking and transformative thinking / Sobre tres formas de pensar: el pensamiento mágico, el pensamiento onírico y el pensamiento transformador

O autor acredita que a ênfase da psicanálise contemporânea mudou da compreensão do significado simbólico dos sonhos, do brincar, e das associações para o estudo dos processos de pensar, sonhar e brincar. Este artigo comenta a sua concepção de três formas de pensar - o pensamento mágico, o pensamento onírico e o pensamento transformativo - e fornece ilustrações clínicas em que cada uma dessas formas de pensar manifesta-se claramente. O autor vê o pensamento mágico como uma forma de pensar que subverte o pensamento genuíno e o crescimento psicológico, pois substitui uma realidade externa perturbadora por uma realidade psíquica inventada. Em contrapartida, o pensamento onírico - a nossa forma de pensar mais profunda - consiste em ver uma experiência emocional a partir de múltiplas perspectivas ao mesmo tempo, como, por exemplo, a dos processos primário e secundário de pensamento. O pensamento transformativo, por sua vez, cria um novo modo de ordenar as experiências que permite gerar tipos de sentimentos, formas de relações de objeto, e qualidade de ser na vida antes inimagináveis.

The author believes that contemporary psychoanalysis has shifted its emphasis from the understanding of the symbolic meaning of dreams, play and associations, to the study of the processes of thinking, dreaming, and playing. In this paper, he discusses his understanding of threeforms of thinking - magical thinking, dream-like thinking, and transformative thinking - and provides clinical illustrations in which each of these figures clearly. The author views magical thinking as a form that subverts genuine thinking and psychological growth by substituting a disturbing external reality with an invented psychic reality. By contrast, dream-like thinking - our most profound form - involves viewing an emotional experience from multiple perspectives simultaneously: for example, the perspectives of primary process and secondary process thinking. Transformative thinking, alternatively, creates a new way of ordering experience that allows one to generate types of feeling, forms of object relation, and characteristics of life that had previously been unimaginable.

El autor considera que el énfasis del psicoanálisis contemporáneo cambió de la comprensión del significado simbólico de los sueños, del juego, y de las asociaciones para el estudio de los procesos de pensar, soñar y jugar. Este artículo comenta su concepción de tres formas de pensar - el pensamiento mágico, el pensamiento onírico y el pensamiento transformador - y provee ilustraciones clínicas en las que cada una de esas formas de pensar surge claramente. El autor ve el pensamiento mágico como una forma de pensar que subvierte el pensamiento genuino y el crecimiento psicológico, pues sustituye una realidad externa perturbadora por una realidad psíquica inventada. Como contrapartida, el pensamiento onírico - nuestra forma de pensar más profunda - consiste en ver una experiencia emocional a partir de múltiples perspectivas al mismo tiempo, como, por ejemplo, la de los procesos primario y secundario del pensamiento. El pensamiento transformador, a su vez, crea un nuevo modo de ordenar las experiencias que permite generar tipos de sentimientos, formas de relaciones de objeto, y cualidades de vida antes inimaginables.

Reading Susan Isaacs: toward a radically revised theory of thinking.

The author views Isaacs's (1952) paper, The nature and function of phantasy, as making an important contribution to the development of a radically revised psychoanalytic theory of thinking. Perhaps Isaacs's most important contribution is the notion that phantasy is the process that creates meaning, and that phantasy is the form in which all meanings - including feelings, defense 'mechanisms,' impulses, bodily experiences, and so on - exist in unconscious mental life. The author discusses both explicit formulations offered by Isaacs as well as his own extensions of her ideas. The latter include (1) the idea that phantasying generates not only unconscious psychic content, but also constitutes the entirety of unconscious thinking; (2) the notion that transference is a form of phantasying that serves as a way of thinking for the first time (in relation to the analyst) emotional events that occurred in the past, but were too disturbing to be experienced at the time they occurred and (3) a principal aim and function of phantasy is that of fulfilling the human need to get to know and understand the truth of one's experience. The author concludes by discussing the relationship between Isaacs's concept of phantasy and Bion's concepts of alpha function and the human need for the truth, as well as the differences between Fairbairn's and Isaacs's conceptions of the nature of unconscious internal object relationships.

The lure of the symptom in psychoanalytic treatment.

Psychoanalysis, which at its core is a search for truth, stands in a subversive position vis-à-vis the contemporary therapeutic culture that places a premium on symptomatic "cure." Nevertheless, analysts are vulnerable to succumbing to the internal and external pressures for the achievement of symptomatic improvement. In this communication we trace the evolution of Freud's thinking about the relationship between the aims of psychoanalysis and the alleviation of symptoms. We note that analysts today may recapitulate Freud's early struggles in their pursuit of symptom removal. We present an account of a clinical consultation in which the analytic pair were ensnared in an impasse that involved the analyst's preoccupation with the intransigence of one of the patient's symptoms. We suggest alternative ways of working with these clinical issues and offer some thoughts on how our own work as analysts and consultants to colleagues has been influenced by our understanding of what frequently occurs when the analyst becomes symptom-focused.

Why read Fairbairn?

The author offers a close reading of portions of Fairbairn's work in which he not only explicates and clarifies Fairbairn's thinking, but generates ideas of his own by developing concepts that he believes to be implicit in, or logical extensions of, Fairbairn's work. Among the unstated or underdeveloped aspects of Fairbairn's contribution that the author discusses are (1) the idea that the formation of the internal object world is always, in part, a response to trauma (actual failure on the part of the mother to convey to her infant a sense that she loves him and accepts his love); (2) the notion that the infant's unceasing efforts to transform the internalized relationship with the unloving mother into a loving relationship--thus reversing the effect on his mother of his (imagined) 'toxic love'--is the single most important motivation sustaining the structure of the internal object world; and (3) the idea that attacks on oneself for the way one loves, while self-destructive, contain a glimmer of insight into one's own self-hatred and shame regarding one's endless, futile attempts to change oneself (or the rejecting object) into a different person. The author, using his own clinical work, illustrates the way he makes use of his understanding of the 'emotional life' of internal objects to facilitate the patient's emotional growth.

On three forms of thinking: magical thinking, dream thinking, and transformative thinking.

The author believes that contemporary psychoanalysis has shifted its emphasis from the understanding of the symbolic meaning of dreams, play, and associations to the exploration of the processes of thinking, dreaming, and playing. In this paper, he discusses his understanding of three forms of thinking-magical thinking, dream thinking, and transformative thinking-and provides clinical illustrations in which each of these forms of thinking figures prominently. The author views magical thinking as a form of thinking that subverts genuine thinking and psychological growth by substituting invented psychic reality for disturbing external reality. By contrast, dream thinking--our most profound form of thinking-involves viewing an emotional experience from multiple perspectives simultaneously: for example, the perspectives of primary process and secondary process thinking. In transformative thinking, one creates a new way of ordering experience that allows one to generate types of feeling, forms of object relatedness, and qualities of aliveness that had previously been unimaginable.

Kafka, Borges, and the creation of consciousness, Part I: Kafka--dark ironies of the "gift" of consciousness.

The ways in which Franz Kafka and Jorge Luis Borges struggled with the creation of consciousness in their lives and in their literary works are explored in this two-part essay. In Part I, the author juxtaposes a biographical sketch of Kafka with a close reading of his story "A Hunger Artist" (1924), in which a character (whose personality holds much in common with that of Kafka) spends his life in a quasi-delusional state starving himself in public performances. The hunger artist's self-awareness (of having lived a life devoid of the experience of love and mutual recognition) is achieved in the context of an interpersonal experience in which he has, in fact, found/created "the food [he] liked," that is, an experience of loving and being loved, of seeing and being seen, of being aware of and alive to his own imminent death. This fragile, paradoxical state of consciousness is sustained for only a moment before it is attacked, but not entirely destroyed.