Novel phonotactic learning by children and infants: Generalizing syllable-position but not co-occurrence regularities.

Restrictions in the sequencing of sounds (phonotactic constraints) can be represented at the level of sound co-occurrences (e.g., in baF.Pev, F and P co-occur) and at the level of the syllable (e.g., F is syllable-coda/end, P is syllable-onset/start). Can children (5-year-olds) and infants (11-month-olds) represent constraints as sound co-occurrences and/or relative to syllable positions? Participants listened to artificial languages displaying both word-medial consonant restrictions in co-occurrence pairs (e.g., FP or DZ but not FZ) and in the position of consonants within syllables (e.g., P/Z onsets and D/F codas) in words like baF.Pev and tiD.Zek. Children responded similarly to novel words with the same (e.g., FP) versus different (e.g., FZ) co-occurrence pairs, but they were more misled (i.e., responded "heard it before") by novel words with consonants in the same (e.g., onset-P) versus different (e.g., coda-P) syllable positions (Experiment 1). With the same training stimuli, infants had similar orientation times for novel words with the same versus different co-occurrence pairs, but they had longer orientation times for novel words with consonants in the same versus different syllable positions (Experiment 2). Thus, across different methods and ages, syllable-position information was more readily available for generalization than consonant co-occurrence information. The results suggest that when multiple regularities are present simultaneously, some phonotactic constraints (e.g., consonants in particular syllable positions) may be spontaneously represented and generalized by children and infants, whereas others (e.g., consonant co-occurrences) might not be available. The results contribute toward understanding how children and infants represent sound sequences.

Implications of video chat use for young children's learning and social-emotional development: Learning words, taking turns, and fostering familial relationships.

Parents of young children use video chat differently than other screen media, paralleling expert recommendations (e.g., American Academy of Pediatrics Council on Communications and Media, 2016), which suggest that video chat, unlike other screen media, is acceptable for use by children under 18 months. Video chat is unique among screen media in that it permits contingent (time-sensitive and content-sensitive) social interactions. Contingent social interactions take place between a child and a partner (dyadic), with objects (triadic), and with multiple others (multi-party configurations), which critically underpin development in multiple domains. First, we review how contingent social interaction may underlie video chat's advantages in two domains: for learning (specifically learning new words) and for social-emotional development (specifically taking turns and fostering familial relationships). Second, we describe constraints on video chat use and how using chat with an active adult (co-viewing) may mitigate some of its limitations. Finally, we suggest future research directions that will clarify the potential advantages and impediments to the use of video chat by young children. This article is categorized under: Linguistics > Language Acquisition Psychology > Learning Cognitive Biology > Social Development.

Judging Strangers' Trustworthiness is Associated with Theory of Mind Skills.

Trusting people requires evaluating them to assess their trustworthiness. Evaluating a stranger's intentions is likely to be one method of assessing trustworthiness. The present study tested the hypothesis that judgments of trustworthiness are associated with mind reading skills, also called theory of mind (ToM). We tested a group of healthy participants and a group of patients with paranoid schizophrenia. Both groups made ToM judgments and judged the trustworthiness of strangers. Participants were also assessed for their disposition to trust as well as levels of paranoid belief. As anticipated, healthy participants had a normal ToM scores and patients with paranoid schizophrenia had poor ToM scores. In paranoid patients, better ability to read others' minds was associated with judging others as more trustworthy, while the reverse was found in the healthy participants (better mind reading was associated with judging others as less trustworthy), suggesting a non-linear relationship between trust in others and being able to read their intentions.

Who can communicate with whom? Language experience affects infants' evaluation of others as monolingual or multilingual.

Adults recognize that people can understand more than one language. However, it is unclear whether infants assume other people understand one or multiple languages. We examined whether monolingual and bilingual 20-month-olds expect an unfamiliar person to understand one or more than one language. Two speakers told a listener the location of a hidden object using either the same or two different languages. When different languages were spoken, monolinguals looked longer when the listener searched correctly, bilinguals did not; when the same language was spoken, both groups looked longer for incorrect searches. Infants rely on their prior language experience when evaluating the language abilities of a novel individual. Monolingual infants assume others can understand only one language, although not necessarily the infants' own; bilinguals do not. Infants' assumptions about which community of conventions people belong to may allow them to recognize effective communicative partners and thus opportunities to acquire language, knowledge, and culture.

The acoustic properties of bilingual infant-directed speech.

Does the acoustic input for bilingual infants equal the conjunction of the input heard by monolinguals of each separate language? The present letter tackles this question, focusing on maternal speech addressed to 11-month-old infants, on the cusp of perceptual attunement. The acoustic characteristics of the point vowels /a,i,u/ were measured in the spontaneous infant-directed speech of French-English bilingual mothers, as well as in the speech of French and English monolingual mothers. Bilingual caregivers produced their two languages with acoustic prosodic separation equal to that of the monolinguals, while also conveying distinct spectral characteristics of the point vowels in their two languages.

Do 6-month-olds understand that speech can communicate?

Adults and 12-month-old infants recognize that even unfamiliar speech can communicate information between third parties, suggesting that they can separate the communicative function of speech from its lexical content. But do infants recognize that speech can communicate due to their experience understanding and producing language, or do they appreciate that speech is communicative earlier, with little such experience? We examined whether 6-month-olds recognize that speech can communicate information about an object. Infants watched a Communicator selectively grasp one of two objects (target). During test, the Communicator could no longer reach the objects; she turned to a Recipient and produced speech (a nonsense word) or non-speech (coughing). Infants looked longer when the Recipient selected the non-target than the target object when the Communicator spoke but not when she coughed - unless the Recipient had previously witnessed the Communicator's selective grasping of the target object. Our results suggest that at 6 months, with a receptive vocabulary of no more than a handful of commonly used words, infants possess some abstract understanding of the communicative function of speech. This understanding may provide an early mechanism for language and knowledge acquisition.

A constructivist connectionist model of transitions on false-belief tasks.

How do children come to understand that others have mental representations, e.g., of an object's location? Preschoolers go through two transitions on verbal false-belief tasks, in which they have to predict where an agent will search for an object that was moved in her absence. First, while three-and-a-half-year-olds usually fail at approach tasks, in which the agent wants to find the object, children just under four succeed. Second, only after four do children succeed at tasks in which the agent wants to avoid the object. We present a constructivist connectionist model that autonomously reproduces the two transitions and suggests that the transitions are due to increases in general processing abilities enabling children to (1) overcome a default true-belief attribution by distinguishing false- from true-belief situations, and to (2) predict search in avoidance situations, where there is often more than one correct, empty search location. Constructivist connectionist models are rigorous, flexible and powerful tools that can be analyzed before and after transitions to uncover novel and emergent mechanisms of cognitive development.

Twelve-month-old infants recognize that speech can communicate unobservable intentions.

Much of our knowledge is acquired not from direct experience but through the speech of others. Speech allows rapid and efficient transfer of information that is otherwise not directly observable. Do infants recognize that speech, even if unfamiliar, can communicate about an important aspect of the world that cannot be directly observed: a person's intentions? Twelve-month-olds saw a person (the Communicator) attempt but fail to achieve a target action (stacking a ring on a funnel). The Communicator subsequently directed either speech or a nonspeech vocalization to another person (the Recipient) who had not observed the attempts. The Recipient either successfully stacked the ring (Intended outcome), attempted but failed to stack the ring (Observable outcome), or performed a different stacking action (Related outcome). Infants recognized that speech could communicate about unobservable intentions, looking longer at Observable and Related outcomes than the Intended outcome when the Communicator used speech. However, when the Communicator used nonspeech, infants looked equally at the three outcomes. Thus, for 12-month-olds, speech can transfer information about unobservable aspects of the world such as internal mental states, which provides preverbal infants with a tool for acquiring information beyond their immediate experience.

Understanding the abstract role of speech in communication at 12 months.

Adult humans recognize that even unfamiliar speech can communicate information between third parties, demonstrating an ability to separate communicative function from linguistic content. We examined whether 12-month-old infants understand that speech can communicate before they understand the meanings of specific words. Specifically, we test the understanding that speech permits the transfer of information about a Communicator's target object to a Recipient. Initially, the Communicator selectively grasped one of two objects. In test, the Communicator could no longer reach the objects. She then turned to the Recipient and produced speech (a nonsense word) or non-speech (coughing). Infants looked longer when the Recipient selected the non-target than the target object when the Communicator had produced speech but not coughing (Experiment 1). Looking time patterns differed from the speech condition when the Recipient rather than the Communicator produced the speech (Experiment 2), and when the Communicator produced a positive emotional vocalization (Experiment 3), but did not differ when the Recipient had previously received information about the target by watching the Communicator's selective grasping (Experiment 4). Thus infants understand the information-transferring properties of speech and recognize some of the conditions under which others' information states can be updated. These results suggest that infants possess an abstract understanding of the communicative function of speech, providing an important potential mechanism for language and knowledge acquisition.

Representations for phonotactic learning in infancy.

Infants rapidly learn novel phonotactic constraints from brief listening experience. Four experiments explored the nature of the representations underlying this learning. 16.5- and 10.5-month-old infants heard training syllables in which particular consonants were restricted to particular syllable positions (first-order constraints) or to syllable positions depending on the identity of the adjacent vowel (second-order constraints). Later, in a headturn listening-preference task, infants were presented with new syllables that either followed the experimental constraints or violated them. Infants at both ages learned first- and second-order constraints on consonant position (Experiments 1 and 2) but found second-order constraints more difficult to learn (Experiment 2). Infants also spontaneously generalized first-order constraints to syllables containing a new, transfer vowel; they did so whether the transfer vowel was similar to the familiarization vowels (Experiment 3), or dissimilar from them (Experiment 4). These findings suggest that infants recruit representations of individuated segments during phonological learning. Furthermore, like adults, they represent phonological sequences in a flexible manner that allows them to detect patterns at multiple levels of phonological analysis.

A vowel is a vowel: generalizing newly learned phonotactic constraints to new contexts.

Adults can learn novel phonotactic constraints from brief listening experience. We investigated the representations underlying phonotactic learning by testing generalization to syllables containing new vowels. Adults heard consonant-vowel-consonant study syllables in which particular consonants were artificially restricted to the onset or coda position (e.g., /f/ is an onset, /s/ is a coda). Subjects were quicker to repeat novel constraint-following (legal) than constraint-violating (illegal) test syllables whether they contained a vowel used in the study syllables (training vowel) or a new (transfer) vowel. This effect emerged regardless of the acoustic similarity between training and transfer vowels. Listeners thus learned and generalized phonotactic constraints that can be characterized as simple first-order constraints on consonant position. Rapid generalization independent of vowel context provides evidence that vowels and consonants are represented independently by processes underlying phonotactic learning.

Can an agent's false belief be corrected by an appropriate communication? Psychological reasoning in 18-month-old infants.

Do 18-month-olds understand that an agent's false belief can be corrected by an appropriate, though not an inappropriate, communication? In Experiment 1, infants watched a series of events involving two agents, a ball, and two containers: a box and a cup. To start, agent1 played with the ball and then hid it in the box, while agent2 looked on. Next, in agent1's absence, agent2 moved the ball from the box to the cup. When agent1 returned, agent2 told her "The ball is in the cup!" (informative-intervention condition) or "I like the cup!" (uninformative-intervention condition). During test, agent1 reached for either the box (box event) or the cup (cup event). In the informative-intervention condition, infants who saw the box event looked reliably longer than those who saw the cup event; in the uninformative-intervention condition, the reverse pattern was found. These results suggest that infants expected agent1's false belief about the ball's location to be corrected when she was told "The ball is in the cup!", but not "I like the cup!". In Experiment 2, agent2 simply pointed to the ball's new location, and infants again expected agent1's false belief to be corrected. These and control results provide additional evidence that infants in the second year of life can attribute false beliefs to agents. In addition, the results suggest that by 18 months of age infants expect agents' false beliefs to be corrected by relevant communications involving words or gestures.

Comparing online and lab methods in a problem-solving experiment.

Online experiments have recently become very popular, and--in comparison with traditional lab experiments--they may have several advantages, such as reduced demand characteristics, automation, and generalizability of results to wider populations (Birnbaum, 2004; Reips, 2000, 2002a, 2002b). We replicated Dandurand, Bowen, and Shultz's (2004) lab-based problem-solving experiment as an Internet experiment. Consistent with previous results, we found that participants who watched demonstrations of successful problem-solving sessions or who read instructions outperformed those who were told only that they solved problems correctly or not. Online participants were less accurate than lab participants, but there was no interaction with learning condition. Thus, we conclude that online and Internet results are consistent. Disadvantages included high dropout rate for online participants; however, combining the online experiment with the department subject pool worked well.

Prototypicality in sentence production.

Three cued-recall experiments examined the effect of category typicality on the ordering of words in sentence production. Past research has found that typical items tend to be mentioned before atypical items in a phrase--a pattern usually associated with lexical variables (like word frequency), and yet typicality is a conceptual variable. Experiment 1 revealed that an appropriate conceptual framework was necessary to yield the typicality effect. Experiment 2 tested ad hoc categories that do not have prior representations in long-term memory and yielded no typicality effect. Experiment 3 used carefully matched sentences in which two category members appeared in the same or in different phrases. Typicality affected word order only when the two words appeared in the same phrase. These results are consistent with an account in which typicality has its origin in conceptual structure, which leads to differences in lexical accessibility in appropriate contexts.

Persistent structural priming from language comprehension to language production.

To examine the relationship between syntactic processes in language comprehension and language production, we compared structural persistence from sentence primes that speakers heard to persistence from primes that speakers produced. [Bock, J. K., & Griffin, Z. M. (2000). The persistence of structural priming: transient activation or implicit learning? Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 129, 177-192.] showed that the production of target priming structures increased the probability of spontaneously using the same structures to describe events in subsequent pictures that were semantically unrelated to the primes. These priming effects persisted across as many as ten intervening filler trials. The present studies replicated these results using auditorily presented primes to which participants only listened. The results indicated persistence of priming across all lags, with relative magnitudes of priming as large as those observed by Bock and Griffin. The implication is that structural priming is persistent regardless of the modality in which language structures are experienced, underscoring the power of priming as an implicit learning mechanism.

15-month-old infants detect violations in pretend scenarios.

Are 15-month-old infants able to detect a violation in the consistency of an event sequence that involves pretense? In Experiment 1, infants detected a violation when an actor pretended to pour liquid into one cup and then pretended to drink from another cup. In Experiment 2, infants no longer detected a violation when the cups were replaced with objects not typically used in the context of drinking actions, either shoes or tubes. Experiment 3 showed that infants' difficulty in Experiment 2 was not due to the use of atypical objects per se, but arose from the novelty of seeing an actor appearing to drink from these objects. After receiving a single familiarization trial in which they observed the actor pretend to drink from either a shoe or a tube, infants now detected a violation when the actor pretended to pour into and to drink from different shoes or tubes. Thus, at an age (or just before the age) when infants are beginning to engage in pretend play, they are able to show comprehension of at least one aspect of pretense in a violation-of-expectation task: specifically, they are able to detect violations in the consistency of pretend action sequences.

Do 15-month-old infants understand false beliefs?

For more than two decades, researchers have argued that young children do not understand mental states such as beliefs. Part of the evidence for this claim comes from preschoolers' failure at verbal tasks that require the understanding that others may hold false beliefs. Here, we used a novel nonverbal task to examine 15-month-old infants' ability to predict an actor's behavior on the basis of her true or false belief about a toy's hiding place. Results were positive, supporting the view that, from a young age, children appeal to mental states--goals, perceptions, and beliefs--to explain the behavior of others.

Infants learn phonotactic regularities from brief auditory experience.

Two experiments investigated whether novel phonotactic regularities, not present in English, could be acquired by 16.5-month-old infants from brief auditory experience. Subjects listened to consonant-vowel-consonant syllables in which particular consonants were artificially restricted to either initial or final position (e.g. /baep/ not /paeb/). In a later head-turn preference test, infants listened longer to new syllables that violated the experimental phonotactic constraints than to new syllables that honored them. Thus, infants rapidly learned phonotactic regularities from brief auditory experience and extended them to unstudied syllables, documenting the sensitivity of the infant's language processing system to abstractions over linguistic experience.

Learning phonotactic constraints from brief auditory experience.

Three experiments asked whether phonotactic regularities not present in English could be acquired by adult English speakers from brief listening experience. Subjects listened to consonant-vowel-consonant (CVC) syllables displaying restrictions on consonant position. Responses in a later speeded repetition task revealed rapid learning of (a) first-order regularities in which consonants were restricted to particular positions (e.g. [baep] not *[paeb]), and (b) second-order regularities in which consonant position depended on the adjacent vowel (e.g. [baep] or [pIb], not *[paeb] or *[bIp]). No evidence of learning was found for second-order regularities in which consonant position depended on speaker's voice. These results demonstrated that phonotactic constraints are rapidly learned from listening experience and that some types of contingencies (consonant-vowel) are more easily learned than others (consonant-voice).