Attenuated Access to Emotions in Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder.

The Seeking Proxies for Internal States (SPIS) model of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) posits that OCD is associated with attenuated access to internal states. Here we explored the implications of this model in the realm of emotions. Participants with OCD, anxiety disorders, and nonclinical control participants completed the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT), assessing two domains of emotional intelligence: Experiential emotional intelligence (EI), reflecting the ability to perceive and feel emotions accurately, and Strategic EI, reflecting the ability to understand and manage emotions correctly. As only Experiential EI requires accurate perception of one's emotions for adequate performance, we predicted an interaction between group and EI area. Specifically, we predicted that compared to both anxiety disorders and healthy control participants, OCD participants would show a larger deficit in Experiential area of the MSCEIT relative to the Strategic area. Results were fully in line with this prediction. Moreover, supporting the specificity of the hypothesized deficit to OCD, participants with anxiety disorders did not differ from nonclinical control participants in their performance, and findings were not attributable to anxiety or depression levels. These results replicate and extend previous findings obtained with analogue samples and suggest that OCD is associated with attenuated access to emotional states, which may be partially compensated for by reliance on semantic knowledge of emotion.

Obsessive-Compulsive Tendencies Are Related to a Maximization Strategy in Making Decisions.

The present studies were motivated by the hypothesis that attenuated access to internal states in obsessive-compulsive (OC) individuals, which leads to extensive reliance on external proxies, may manifest in a maximizing decision making style, i.e., to seeking the best option through an exhaustive search of all existing alternatives. Following previous research, we aimed to explore the possible relationships between OC tendencies, seeking proxies for internal states, indecisiveness and maximization. In Study 1, we measured levels of OC tendencies, seeking proxies for internal states, indecisiveness, maximization, depression and anxiety in an online Hebrew speaking sample (N = 201). In Study 2, we administrated the same questionnaires to an online English speaking sample (N = 240) and in addition, examined participants' decision making strategies in a hypothetical situation. The participants in both studies were unscreened adults. Correlational and linear regressions analyses indicated that OC tendencies are related to maximization, even when levels of indecisiveness, depression and anxiety are controlled for. Moreover, the findings suggested that reliance on external proxies may partially account for the aforementioned association. Possible implications and future directions are discussed.

The Sense of Agency Scale: A Measure of Consciously Perceived Control over One's Mind, Body, and the Immediate Environment.

The sense of agency (SoA) is defined as "the registration that I am the initiator of my actions." Both "direct" and "indirect" measurement of SoA has focused on specific contextualized perceptual events, however it has also been demonstrated that "higher level" cognitions seemingly affect the SoA. We designed a measure of person's general, context-free beliefs about having core agency-the Sense of Agency Scale (SoAS). An exploratory (EFA) and confirmatory (CFA) factor analyses on samples of 236 (Study 1) and 408 (Study 2) participants yielded two correlated factors we labeled Sense of Positive Agency (SoPA) and Sense of Negative Agency (SoNA). The construct validity of SoAS is demonstrated by its low-to-moderate correlations with conceptually relevant tools and by the moderate-strong relationship between the SoNA subscale and obsessive-compulsive (OC) symptoms (r = 0.35). We conclude that the SoAS seems to isolate people's general beliefs in their agency from their perceived success in obtaining outcomes.

Things happen: Individuals with high obsessive-compulsive tendencies omit agency in their spoken language.

The study examined the prediction that obsessive-compulsive tendencies are related to an attenuated sense of agency (SoA). As most explicit agency judgments are likely to reflect also motivation for and expectation of control, we examined agency in sentence production. Reduced agency can be expressed linguistically by omitting the agent or by using grammatical framings that detach the event from the entity that caused it. We examined the use of agentic language of participants with high vs. low scores on a measure of obsessive-compulsive (OC) symptoms, using structured linguistic tasks in which sentences are elicited in a conversation-like setting. As predicted, high OC individuals produced significantly more non-agentic sentences than low OC individuals, using various linguistic strategies. The results suggest that OC tendencies are related to attenuated SoA. We discuss the implications of these findings for explicating the SoA in OCD and the potential contribution of language analysis for understanding psychopathology.

The doubt-certainty continuum in psychopathology, lay thinking, and science.

This paper presents a theoretical model suggesting that doubt and certainty are two extremes of a continuum. Different people can be located in different locations on this continuum, according to how much they tend to seek refutation vs. confirmation. In both ends of the continuum lay mental disorders, which can be seen as extreme deviations from the usual relatively stable equilibrium between the two thinking processes. One end is defined by excessive skepticism and manifested as obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD), a disorder characterized by incessant doubt. The other end is defined by excessive certainty and lack of doubt, manifested as delusional disorders. Throughout this article, we demonstrate that the differences between normative thoughts and delusional thoughts are relatively vague, and that in general, the human default tendency is to prefer certainty over doubt. This preference is reflected in the confirmation bias as well as in other cognitive constructs such as overconfidence and stereotypes. Recent perspectives on these biases suggest that the human preference for confirmation can be explained in evolutionary terms as adaptive and rational. A parallel view of the scientific enterprise suggests that it also requires a certain equilibrium between skepticism and confirmation. We conclude by discussing the importance of the dialectic relationship between confirmation and refutation in both lay thinking and scientific thought.