Screening and electronic labelling of ward contacts of vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus faecium vanB carriers during a single-strain hospital outbreak and after discharge from hospital.

A large single-strain outbreak of vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus faecium (VREF) vanB occurred in Royal Perth Hospital from July to December 2001. When a VREF-carrying patient was discovered on a ward, all patients on the ward were screened with rectal swabs. A total of 172 patients were colonised, four with infections, but no deaths were attributable to VREF. The number of rectal swabs required to detect each carrier was recorded. On average four rectal swabs, each collected on separate days, were needed to detect more than 90 per cent of the 172 VREF carriers who were epidemiologically linked to the Royal Perth Hospital outbreak. An electronic alert system (Micro-Alert) was used to identify ward contacts of VREF carriers and enabled those who had not been screened before discharge to be followed-up and screened. Ninety-six contacts were actively followed-up in October 2001 and 32 (33.3%) were found to be VREF carriers. From 28 September 2001 to 30 April 2002, a total of 1,977 ward contacts were screened after discharge from hospital and 54 (2.73%) were found to be carrying VREF. We conclude that during single-strain outbreaks of vancomycin-resistant enterococci in hospitals, patient contacts need to be screened on more than three occasions in order to detect most of the carriers and control the outbreak. Secondly, electronic labelling and active follow-up of ward contacts of VREF carriers resulted in a significant number of carriers being detected who otherwise posed a risk of initiating further outbreaks in hospitals if they were readmitted.

A review of the Royal Perth Hospital Bali experience: an infection control perspective.

Thirty five patients were transferred to Royal Perth Hospital (RPH) after the Bali bombings. The patients had severe burn injuries and were considered to be at high-risk of both the carriage and acquisition of multi-resistant organisms (MROs). Whilst seeking to protect the Bali patients with a comprehensive infection control response, we also sought to protect other high-risk patients from nosocomial acquisition of MROs. MROs were detected from 25 (82%) of the 29 Bali patients admitted to RPH. Bali patients were colonised, or infected, with one or more of the following MROs: multi-resistant Acinetobacter baumannii (MRAB) (19 patients), extended-spectrum ß-lactamase (ESBL) producing Gram-negative bacteria (15 patients), vancomycin-resistant enterococci (VRE) (nine patients), multi-resistant Pseudomonas aeruginosa (MRPA) (six patients), multi-resistant Chryseobacterium sp. (four patients), and methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) (three patients). Five Bali patients developed a total of eight bacteraemic episodes, with MRPA sepsis contributing to death in two patients. Since the Bali bombings horizontal transmission of Bali MROs has occurred in 41 non-Bali patients in RPH. MRPA has had the greatest clinical impact. Eight non-Bali patients developed a total of 11 bacteraemic episodes, with MRPA sepsis contributing to death in four patients. However, apart from MRPA, we have now controlled transmission of the other MROs in RPH. The emergency response to the Bali disaster required strong leadership, good communication and multi-disciplinary teamwork. The infection control strategy contributed to good outcomes for most Bali bombing patients. However, many patients within the Bali cohort were heavily colonised with MROs, and some developed invasive infection. Subsequent nosocomial transmission of these MROs to non-Bali patients has been a legacy of the Bali tragedy.