Developing architecture of system management in the English NHS: evidence from a qualitative study of three Integrated Care Systems.

OBJECTIVE: Integrated Care Systems (ICSs) mark a change in the English National Health Service to more collaborative interorganisational working. We explored how effective the ICS form of collaboration is in achieving its goals by investigating how ICSs were developing, how system partners were balancing organisational and system responsibilities, how partners could be held to account and how local priorities were being reconciled with ICS priorities. DESIGN: We carried out detailed case studies in three ICSs, each consisting of a system and its partners, using interviews, documentary analysis and meeting observations. SETTING/PARTICIPANTS: We conducted 64 in-depth, semistructured interviews with director-level representatives of ICS partners and observed eight meetings (three in case study 1, three in case study 2 and two in case study 3). RESULTS: Collaborative working was welcomed by system members. The agreement of local governance arrangements was ongoing and challenging. System members found it difficult to balance system and individual responsibilities, with concerns that system priorities could run counter to organisational interests. Conflicts of interest were seen as inherent, but the benefits of collaborative decision-making were perceived to outweigh risks. There were multiple examples of work being carried out across systems and 'places' to share resources, change resource allocation and improve partnership working. Some interviewees reported reticence addressing difficult issues collaboratively, and that organisations' statutory accountabilities were allowing a 'retreat' from the confrontation of difficult issues facing systems, such as agreeing action to achieve financial sustainability. CONCLUSIONS: There remain significant challenges regarding agreeing governance, accountability and decision-making arrangements which are particularly important due to the recent Health and Care Act 2022 which gave ICSs allocative functions for the majority of health resources for local populations. An arbiter who is independent of the ICS may be required to resolve disputes, along with increased support for shaping governance arrangements.

Challenges of maintaining accountability in networks of health and care organisations: A study of developing Sustainability and Transformation Partnerships in the English National Health Service.

The English National Health Service (NHS) constitutes a unique institutional context, which combines elements of hierarchy, markets and networks. This has always raised issues about competing forms of accountability. Recent policy has emphasised a move from quasi market competition towards collaboration in the form of new regional organisational arrangements known as Sustainability and Transformation Partnerships (STPs). We explore accountability relationships in STPs, focusing on the challenges of increasing horizontal accountability given existing vertical accountabilities, most notably to national regulators. We utilize a case study approach concentrated on three Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) in urban and rural settings in England. We conducted in-person interviews with 22 managers from NHS organisations and local authorities and examined local documents to obtain information on governance and accountability structures. The fieldwork was undertaken between November 2017 and July 2018. We analysed results by considering which actors were accountable to what forums and the nature of the obligation (vertical or horizontal). We found that individual organisations still retained vertical accountabilities and were reluctant to be held accountable for the whole STP, given they were responsible for only part of the joint effort. Moreover, organisations did not feel accountable to STPs and instead highlighted vertical accountabilities upwards to their own boards and to national regulators; and downwards to the public. But while local commissioning organisations, CCGs engaged with their members and the public, STPs failed to engage adequately with the public. Nevertheless, there were indications that horizontal accountability was starting to develop. This could become complementary to vertical accountability by facilitating mutual learning and peer review to anticipate and defer regulatory intervention. While vertical accountability is necessary to provide oversight and apply sanctions, it is not sufficient and should be accompanied by horizontal accountability.

Agreeing the allocation of scarce resources in the English NHS: Ostrom, common pool resources and the role of the state.

A challenge facing health systems such as the English National Health Service (NHS), which operate in a context of diversity of provision and scarcity of financial resources, is how organisations engaged in the provision of services can be encouraged to adopt collective resource utilisation strategies to ensure limited resources are utilised in the interests of service users and, in the case of tax funded services, the general public. In this paper the authors apply Elinor Ostrom's work concerning communities' self-governance of common pool resources to the development of collective approaches to the utilisation of resources for the provision of health services. Focusing on the establishment of Sustainability and Transformation Partnerships (STPs) in the English NHS, and drawing on interviews with senior managers in English NHS purchaser and provider organisations, we use Ostrom's work as a frame to analyse STPs, as vehicles to agree and enact shared rules governing the allocation of financial resources, and the role of the state in relation to the development of this collective governance. While there was an unwillingness to use STPs to agree collective rules for resource allocation, we found that local actors were discussing and agreeing collective approaches regarding how resources should be utilised to deliver health services in order to make best use of scarce resources. State influence on the development of collective approaches to resource allocation through the STP was viewed by some as coercive, but also provided a necessary function to ensure accountability. Our analysis suggests Ostrom's notion of resource 'appropriation' should be extended to capture the nuances of resource utilisation in complex production chains, such as those involved in the delivery of health services where the extraction of funds is not an end in itself, but where the value of resources depends on how they are utilised.

The regulation of competition and procurement in the National Health Service 2015-2018: enduring hierarchical control and the limits of juridification.

Since 1990, market mechanisms have occurred in the predominantly hierarchical National Health Service (NHS). The Health and Social Care Act 2012 led to concerns that market principles had been irrevocably embedded in the NHS and that the regulators would acquire unwarranted power compared with politicians (known as 'juridification'). To assess this concern, we analysed regulatory activity in the period from 2015 to 2018. We explored how economic regulation of the NHS had changed in light of the policy turn back to hierarchy in 2014 and the changes in the legislative framework under Public Contracts Regulations 2015. We found the continuing dominance of hierarchical modes of control was reflected in the relative dominance and behaviour of the sector economic regulator. But there had also been a limited degree of juridification involving the courts. Generally, the regulatory decisions were consistent with the 2014 policy shift away from market principles and with the enduring role of hierarchy in the NHS, but the existing legislative regime did allow the incursion of pro market regulatory decision making, and instances of such decisions were identified.

Commissioning through competition and cooperation in the English NHS under the Health and Social Care Act 2012: evidence from a qualitative study of four clinical commissioning groups.

OBJECTIVE: The Health and Social Care Act 2012 ('HSCA 2012') introduced a new, statutory, form of regulation of competition into the National Health Service (NHS), while at the same time recognising that cooperation was necessary. NHS England's policy document, The Five Year Forward View ('5YFV') of 2014 placed less emphasis on competition without altering the legislation. We explored how commissioners and providers understand the complex regulatory framework, and how they behave in relation to competition and cooperation. DESIGN: We carried out detailed case studies in four clinical commissioning groups, using interviews and documentary analysis to explore the commissioners' and providers' understanding and experience of competition and cooperation. SETTING/PARTICIPANTS: We conducted 42 interviews with senior managers in commissioning organisations and senior managers in NHS and independent provider organisations (acute and community services). RESULTS: Neither commissioners nor providers fully understand the regulatory regime in respect of competition in the NHS, and have not found that the regulatory authorities have provided adequate guidance. Despite the HSCA 2012 promoting competition, commissioners chose mainly to use collaborative strategies to effect major service reconfigurations, which is endorsed as a suitable approach by providers. Nevertheless, commissioners are using competitive tendering in respect of more peripheral services in order to improve quality of care and value for money. CONCLUSIONS: Commissioners regard the use of competition and cooperation as appropriate in the NHS currently, although collaborative strategies appear more helpful in respect of large-scale changes. However, the current regulatory framework contained in the HSCA 2012, particularly since the publication of the 5YFV, is not clear. Better guidance should be issued by the regulatory authorities.

The regulation of competition in the National Health Service (NHS): what difference has the Health and Social Care Act 2012 made?

This article examines the impact of the Health and Social Care Act 2012 on the regulation of competition in the English National Health Service (NHS), by focussing on the change it marked from a system of sector-specific regulation to one which is clearly based in competition law. It has been suggested that the Act and its associated reforms would significantly alter accountability in the NHS, and would change decisions from the remit of public policy to that of the law. To assess the impact the Act has had in practice, the article compares the interpretation of the rules regarding competition in the NHS by the regulators of competition immediately before, and following, the passing of the Act. It argues that, whilst the reforms have the potential significantly to alter the way competition in the NHS is regulated, the impact of the reforms in this area is limited by the development of systems within the NHS to manage and resolve issues internally where possible.

Engaging GPs in commissioning: realist evaluation of the early experiences of Clinical Commissioning Groups in the English NHS.

Objectives To explore the 'added value' that general practitioners (GPs) bring to commissioning in the English NHS. We describe the experience of Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) in the context of previous clinically led commissioning policy initiatives. Methods Realist evaluation. We identified the programme theories underlying the claims made about GP 'added value' in commissioning from interviews with key informants. We tested these theories against observational data from four case study sites to explore whether and how these claims were borne out in practice. Results The complexity of CCG structures means CCGs are quite different from one another with different distributions of responsibilities between the various committees. This makes it difficult to compare CCGs with one another. Greater GP involvement was important but it was not clear where and how GPs could add most value. We identified some of the mechanisms and conditions which enable CCGs to maximize the 'added value' that GPs bring to commissioning. Conclusion To maximize the value of clinical input, CCGs need to invest time and effort in preparing those involved, ensuring that they systematically gather evidence about service gaps and problems from their members, and engaging members in debate about the future shape of services.

Community nursing in systems reform: the London polyclinic experience.

Internationally, the polyclinic has been a feature of many health systems. The recent UK policy shift towards enhanced coordination of care closer to home resulted in the development of polyclinics, most notably in London. This article explores the background to the development of polyclinics and draws on the early experience of developments in London to explore what their impact has been, and is likely to be, on community nursing. Emerging findings from an evaluation of four pilot polyclinics suggests that rather than one model, polyclinics evolved in distinctively different ways more appropriately labelled as polysystems. Although policy makers clearly identified community nursing as being one of the key components of integrated, community-based care, the evaluation suggests a focus on high-level organizational restructuring and system change can shift attention from what many would consider core activities such as community health services.