Softly empowering a prosocial expert in the family: lasting effects of a counter-misinformation intervention in an informational autocracy.

The present work is the first to comprehensively analyze the gravity of the misinformation problem in Hungary, where misinformation appears regularly in the pro-governmental, populist, and socially conservative mainstream media. In line with international data, using a Hungarian representative sample (Study 1, N = 991), we found that voters of the reigning populist, conservative party could hardly distinguish fake from real news. In Study 2, we demonstrated that a prosocial intervention of ~ 10 min (N = 801) helped young adult participants discern misinformation four weeks later compared to the control group without implementing any boosters. This effect was the most salient regarding pro-governmental conservative fake news content, leaving real news evaluations intact. Although the hypotheses of the present work were not preregistered, it appears that prosocial misinformation interventions might be promising attempts to counter misinformation in an informational autocracy in which the media is highly centralized. Despite using social motivations, it does not mean that long-term cognitive changes cannot occur. Future studies might explore exactly how these interventions can have an impact on the long-term cognitive processing of news content as well as their underlying neural structures.

A prosocial fake news intervention with durable effects.

The present online intervention promoted family-based prosocial values-in terms of helping family members-among young adults to build resistance against fake news. This preregistered randomized controlled trial study is among the first psychological fake news interventions in Eastern Europe, where the free press is weak and state-sponsored misinformation runs riot in mainstream media. In this intervention, participants were endowed with an expert role and requested to write a letter to their digitally less competent relatives explaining six strategies that help fake news recognition. Compared to the active control group there was an immediate effect (d = 0.32) that persisted until the follow-up four weeks later (d = 0.22) on fake news accuracy ratings of the young, advice-giving participants. The intervention also reduced the bullshit receptivity of participants both immediately after the intervention and in the long run. The present work demonstrates the power of using relevant social bonds for motivating behavior change among Eastern European participants. Our prosocial approach with its robust grounding in human psychology might complement prior interventions in the fight against misinformation.

The tendency to dehumanize, group malleability beliefs, and perceived threat from migrants in Hungary.

Examining the humanness attributed to several groups in a comprehensive Hungarian sample (N = 505) at the height of the "European refugee crisis of 2015," we found that Hungarians dehumanize Eastern ethnic groups more and Western ethnic groups less than they do to their own ethnic ingroup. Interestingly, we also found that a general tendency of dehumanization is expressed across all national groups. This general tendency of dehumanization was strongly associated with threat perceived from migrants, but the relationship was mediated by group malleability-the belief that human groups can change and are not set in their ways irreversibly. Malleability beliefs were negatively linked to dehumanization tendencies and threat perceived from migrants. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of the findings that point to the critical role of fixed mindsets about groups in the mechanisms linked to prejudice in a highly xenophobic Hungarian context.

Changing Conspiracy Beliefs through Rationality and Ridiculing.

Conspiracy theory (CT) beliefs can be harmful. How is it possible to reduce them effectively? Three reduction strategies were tested in an online experiment using general and well-known CT beliefs on a comprehensive randomly assigned Hungarian sample (N = 813): exposing rational counter CT arguments, ridiculing those who hold CT beliefs, and empathizing with the targets of CT beliefs. Several relevant individual differences were measured. Rational and ridiculing arguments were effective in reducing CT, whereas empathizing with the targets of CTs had no effect. Individual differences played no role in CT reduction, but the perceived intelligence and competence of the individual who conveyed the CT belief-reduction information contributed to the success of the CT belief reduction. Rational arguments targeting the link between the object of belief and its characteristics appear to be an effective tool in fighting conspiracy theory beliefs.