Accommodating the continuum hypothesis with the déjà vu/déjà vécu distinction.

On Barzykowski and Moulin's continuum hypothesis, déjà vu and involuntary autobiographical memories (IAMs) share their underpinning neurocognitive processes. A discontinuity issue for them is that familiarity and episodic recollection exhibit different neurocognitive signatures. This issue can be overcome, I say, provided the authors are ready to distinguish a déjà vécu/episodic IAM continuity and a déjà vu/semantic IAM continuity.

A leaky evidence accumulation process for perceptual experience.

The neural correlates supporting our perceptual experience of the world remain largely unknown. Recent studies have shown how stimulus detection and related confidence involve evidence accumulation (EA) processes similar to those involved in perceptual decision-making. Here, we propose that independently from any tasks, percepts are not static but fade in and out of consciousness according to the dynamics of a leaky evidence accumulation process (LEAP), and that confidence corresponds to the maximal evidence accumulated by this process. We discuss the implications and limitations of our proposal, assess how it may qualify as a neural correlate of consciousness, and illustrate how it brings us closer to a mechanistic understanding of phenomenal aspects of perceptual experience like intensity and duration, beyond mere detection.

The Phenomenology of Remembering Is an Epistemic Feeling.

This article aims to provide a psychologically informed philosophical account of the phenomenology of episodic remembering. The literature on epistemic or metacognitive feelings has grown considerably in recent years, and there are persuasive reasons, both conceptual and empirical, in favor of the view that the phenomenology of remembering-autonoetic consciousness, as Tulving influentially referred to it, or the feeling of pastness, as we will refer to it here-is an epistemic feeling, but few philosophical treatments of this phenomenology as an epistemic feeling have so far been proposed. Building on insights from the psychological literature, we argue that a form of feeling-based metacognition is involved in episodic remembering and develop an integrated metacognitive feeling-based view that addresses several key aspects of the feeling of pastness, namely, its status as a feeling, its content, and its relationship to the first-order memories the phenomenology of which it provides.