RESUMO
INTRODUCTION: Preventing military sexual assault (SA) is a DoD priority. Building prevention capacity could strengthen the impact of prevention programs and improve outcomes. Capacity was conceptualized as implementation knowledge and skills using the Getting To Outcomes (GTO) process and organizational-level capacities using the Prevention Evaluation Framework, a framework that applies best practices in prevention and implementation science to prevention at the program and organizational level. The present study assesses implementation knowledge and skills currently possessed by SA prevention personnel in one U.S. Army installation with the goal of identifying preexisting proficiencies and potential gaps. The study uses the Prevention Evaluation Framework organizational-level domains to identify organizational capacities that could be improved. MATERIALS AND METHODS: Fifteen SA prevention program personnel were recruited for individual 1-hour interviews from one U.S. Army installation. A semi-structured interview guide was developed by the study team to assess knowledge and skills within the GTO framework. Applied thematic analysis guided data coding and analysis. RESULTS: Participants reported a range of proficiencies and gaps in capacity for SA prevention. Within the prevention workforce capacity, proficiencies were skill in tailoring training, and an existing train-the-trainer model. Gaps were training to facilitate difficult conversations, and an inability to tailor trainings to audience needs. Two proficiencies related to the comprehensive approach were having a victim advocate present during trainings, and providing training across leadership levels. The final proficiency involved data. Existing data sources were viewed as useful for identifying the nature and extent of local problems. However, participants reported a lack of confidence and skill in selecting appropriate outcome measures and collecting and using primary data. Gaps in leadership capacity were cultural norms, lack of trust, leader investment, logistical difficulty working with leaders, and comfort engaging with leaders. Gaps in collaborative relationships were the lack of informal networking within the SA prevention area to include civilians. CONCLUSIONS: The GTO-specific knowledge and skills of SA prevention personnel at one U.S. Army installation revealed proficiencies and gaps in organizational capacities influencing the prevention mission. Findings indicate that GTO support could be useful for improving the quality of program activities. However, results also indicate that GTO support would be more effective if they were paired with sufficient prevention infrastructure at the organizational level.
