RESUMO
Anterior chamber intraocular lenses were implanted in phakic cynomolgus monkey eyes and followed clinically over two years. Significant observations included erosion and/or uveal envelopment of the haptic and a decrease in endothelial cell counts. There was good positional stability, no significant inflammation, initial ocular hypotension that returned to normal intraocular pressure, and no evidence of cataracts or cystoid macular edema.
Assuntos
Câmara Anterior/cirurgia , Cristalino , Lentes Intraoculares , Animais , Câmara Anterior/patologia , Contagem de Células , Endotélio Corneano/metabolismo , Estudos de Avaliação como Assunto , Feminino , Angiofluoresceinografia , Seguimentos , Pressão Intraocular , Doenças da Íris/diagnóstico , Macaca fascicularis , MasculinoRESUMO
Anterior chamber intraocular lenses were implanted in 50 phakic primate eyes and followed by serial histopathology for two years. Significant observations included corneal endothelial alterations, haptic erosion into and encapsulation by peripheral iris and ciliary body, and chronic low grade inflammation.
Assuntos
Câmara Anterior/patologia , Cristalino/patologia , Lentes Intraoculares , Animais , Câmara Anterior/cirurgia , Adesão Celular , Contagem de Células , Corpo Ciliar/patologia , Endotélio Corneano/patologia , Estudos de Avaliação como Assunto , Feminino , Seguimentos , Iris/patologia , Macaca fascicularis , Masculino , Retina/patologia , Uveíte Anterior/patologia , Corpo Vítreo/patologiaRESUMO
We identify an important class of economic problems that arise naturally in several applications: the allocation of multiple resources when there are uncertainties in demand or supply, unresponsive supplies (no inventories and fixed capacities), and significant demand indivisibilities (rigidities). Examples of such problems include: scheduling job shops, airports, or supercomputers; zero-inventory planning; and the allocation and pricing of NASA's planned Space Station. Using experimental methods, we show that the two most common organizations used to deal with this problem, markets and administrative procedures, can perform at very low efficiencies (60-65% efficiency in a seemingly robust example). Thus, there is a need to design new mechanisms that more efficiently allocate resources in these environments. We develop and analyze two mechanisms that arise naturally from auctions used to allocate single-dimensional goods. These new mechanisms involve computer-assisted coordination made possible by the existence of networked computers. Both mechanisms significantly improve on the performance of administrative and market procedures.
