A simple proximity heuristic allows tracking of multiple objects through occlusion.

Moving objects in the world present a challenge to the visual system, in that they often move in and out of view as they are occluded by other surfaces. Nevertheless, the ability to track multiple objects through periods of occlusion is surprisingly robust. Here, we identify a simple heuristic that underlies this ability: Pre- and postocclusion views of objects are linked together solely by their spatial proximity. Tracking through occlusion was always improved when the postocclusion instances reappeared closer to the preocclusion views. Strikingly, this was true even when objects' previous trajectories predicted different reappearance locations and when objects reappeared "too close," from invisible "slits" in empty space, rather than from more distant occluder contours. Tracking through occlusion appears to rely only on spatial proximity, and not on encoding heading information, likely reappearance locations, or the visible structure of occluders.

Enumerating by pointing to locations: a new method for measuring the numerosity of visual object representations.

The fast and accurate enumeration of a small set of objects, called subitizing, is thought to involve a different mechanism from other numerosity judgments, such as those based on estimation. In this report, we examine the subitizing limit using a novel enumeration task that obtained the perceived locations of enumerated objects. Observers were shown brief masked displays (50, 200, and 350 ms) of 2-9 small black discs randomly placed on a gray screen and then asked to place a marker where each disc had been located. The number of these markers provided an estimate of the number of items processed. This "pointing" methodology enabled observers to accurately "enumerate" displays containing up to six items in contrast with the four-item limit typically found when using standard reporting methods (and replicated here in Experiment 2). These results suggest a different account of the limits found in most subitizing and enumeration studies.

Attentional resources in visual tracking through occlusion: the high-beams effect.

A considerable amount of research has uncovered heuristics that the visual system employs to keep track of objects through periods of occlusion. Relatively little work, by comparison, has investigated the online resources that support this processing. We explored how attention is distributed when featurally identical objects become occluded during multiple object tracking. During tracking, observers had to detect small probes that appeared sporadically on targets, distracters, occluders, or empty space. Probe detection rates for these categories were taken as indexes of the distribution of attention throughout the display and revealed two novel effects. First, probe detection on an occluder's surface was better when either a target or distractor was currently occluded in that location, compared to when no object was behind that occluder. Thus even occluded (and therefore invisible) objects recruit object-based attention. Second, and more surprising, probe detection for both targets and distractors was always better when they were occluded, compared to when they were visible. This new attentional high-beams effect indicates that the ability to track through occlusion, though seemingly effortless, in fact requires the active allocation of special attentional resources.

Is motion extrapolation employed in multiple object tracking? Tracking as a low-level, non-predictive function.

In a series of five experiments, we investigated whether visual tracking mechanisms utilize prediction when recovering multiple reappearing objects. When all objects abruptly disappeared and reappeared mid-trajectory, it was found that (a) subjects tracked better when objects reappeared at their loci of disappearance than when they reappeared in their extrapolated trajectories, (b) disappearance episodes ranging from 150 to 900 ms had virtually no differential effect on performance, (c) tracking deteriorated monotonically as a function of displacement magnitude during disappearance, and (d) tracking did not depend on whether objects moved in predictable paths. Even objects that reappeared backward in their trajectories were tracked dramatically better than objects that reappeared in their extrapolated trajectories. When all objects disappeared and reappeared in ways that implicated the presence of an occluder (i.e., with occlusion and disocclusion cues along fixed contours), tracking again was not predictive, and performance deteriorated with increased displacement. When objects reappeared predictably in 75% of trials, they were still tracked better when they reappeared at their points of disappearance. Theoretical implications of a non-predictive multiple object tracking mechanism are discussed.

Dynamics of target selection in multiple object tracking (MOT).

In four experiments we address the question whether several visual objects can be selected voluntarily (exogenously) and then tracked in a Multiple Object Tracking paradigm and, if so, whether the selection involves a different process. Experiment 1 showed that items can indeed be selected based on their labels. Experiment 2 showed that to select the complement set to a set that is automatically (exogenously) selected--e.g. to select all objects not flashed--observers require additional time and that given 1080 ms they were able to select and track them as well as those selected automatically. Experiment 3 showed that the additional time needed in the previous experiment cannot be attributed solely to time required to disengage attention from the initially automatic selections. Experiment 4 showed that the added time provides a monotonically greater benefit when there are more targets, suggesting a serial process. These results are discussed in relation to the Visual Index (FINST) theory which assumes that visual indexes are captured by a data-driven process. It is suggested that voluntarily allocated attention can be used to facilitate the automatic attention capture by objects of interest.

Mental imagery: in search of a theory.

It is generally accepted that there is something special about reasoning by using mental images. The question of how it is special, however, has never been satisfactorily spelled out, despite more than thirty years of research in the post-behaviorist tradition. This article considers some of the general motivation for the assumption that entertaining mental images involves inspecting a picture-like object. It sets out a distinction between phenomena attributable to the nature of mind to what is called the cognitive architecture, and ones that are attributable to tacit knowledge used to simulate what would happen in a visual situation. With this distinction in mind, the paper then considers in detail the widely held assumption that in some important sense images are spatially displayed or are depictive, and that examining images uses the same mechanisms that are deployed in visual perception. I argue that the assumption of the spatial or depictive nature of images is only explanatory if taken literally, as a claim about how images are physically instantiated in the brain, and that the literal view fails for a number of empirical reasons--for example, because of the cognitive penetrability of the phenomena cited in its favor. Similarly, while it is arguably the case that imagery and vision involve some of the same mechanisms, this tells us very little about the nature of mental imagery and does not support claims about the pictorial nature of mental images. Finally, I consider whether recent neuroscience evidence clarifies the debate over the nature of mental images. I claim that when such questions as whether images are depictive or spatial are formulated more clearly, the evidence does not provide support for the picture-theory over a symbol-structure theory of mental imagery. Even if all the empirical claims were true, they do not warrant the conclusion that many people have drawn from them: that mental images are depictive or are displayed in some (possibly cortical) space. Such a conclusion is incompatible with what is known about how images function in thought. We are then left with the provisional counterintuitive conclusion that the available evidence does not support rejection of what I call the "null hypothesis"; namely, that reasoning with mental images involves the same form of representation and the same processes as that of reasoning in general, except that the content or subject matter of thoughts experienced as images includes information about how things would look.