Radical Collective Intelligence and the Reimagining of Cognitive Science.

To introduce our special issue How Minds Work: The Collective in the Individual, we propose "radical CI," a form of collective intelligence, as a new paradigm for cognitive science. Radical CI posits that the representations and processes necessary to perform the cognitive functions that humans perform are collective entities, not encapsulated by any individual. To explain cognitive performance, it appeals to the distribution of cognitive labor on the assumption that the human project runs on countless interactions between locally acting individuals with specialized skills that each retain a small part of the relevant information. Some of the papers in the special issue appeal to radical CI to account for a variety of cognitive phenomena including memory performance, metacognition, belief updating, reasoning, and problem-solving. Other papers focus on the cultural and institutional practices that make radical CI possible.

Communities of Knowledge in Trouble.

The community-of-knowledge framework explains the extraordinary success of the human species, despite individual members' demonstrably shallow understanding of many topics, by appealing to outsourcing. People follow the cues of members of their community because understanding of phenomena is generally distributed across the group. Typically, communities do possess the relevant knowledge, but it is possible in principle for communities to send cues despite lacking knowledge-a weakness in the system's design. COVID-19 in the United States offered a natural experiment in collective-knowledge development because a novel phenomenon arrived at a moment of intense division in political partisanship. We review evidence from the pandemic showing that the thought leaders of the two partisan groups sent radically different messages about COVID, which were, in turn, reinforced by close community members (family, friends, etc.). We show that although actual understanding of the individual plays a role in a key COVID-mitigation behavior (vaccination), it plays a smaller role than perceived understanding of thought leaders and beliefs about COVID-related behaviors of close community members. We discuss implications for theory and practice when all communities are in the same epistemic circumstance-relying on the testimony of others.

Knowledge overconfidence is associated with anti-consensus views on controversial scientific issues.

Public attitudes that are in opposition to scientific consensus can be disastrous and include rejection of vaccines and opposition to climate change mitigation policies. Five studies examine the interrelationships between opposition to expert consensus on controversial scientific issues, how much people actually know about these issues, and how much they think they know. Across seven critical issues that enjoy substantial scientific consensus, as well as attitudes toward COVID-19 vaccines and mitigation measures like mask wearing and social distancing, results indicate that those with the highest levels of opposition have the lowest levels of objective knowledge but the highest levels of subjective knowledge. Implications for scientists, policymakers, and science communicators are discussed.

The influence of social norms varies with "others" groups: Evidence from COVID-19 vaccination intentions.

The theory that health behaviors spread through social groups implies that efforts to control COVID-19 through vaccination will succeed if people believe that others in their groups are getting vaccinated. But "others" can refer to many groups, including one's family, neighbors, fellow city or state dwellers, or copartisans. One challenge to examining these understudied distinctions is that many factors may confound observed relationships between perceived social norms (what people believe others do) and intended behaviors (what people themselves will do), as there are plausible common causes for both. We address these issues using survey data collected in the United States during late fall 2020 (n = 824) and spring 2021 (n = 996) and a matched design that approximates pair-randomized experiments. We find a strong relationship between perceived vaccination social norms and vaccination intentions when controlling for real risk factors (e.g., age), as well as dimensions known to predict COVID-19 preventive behaviors (e.g., trust in scientists). The strength of the relationship declines as the queried social group grows larger and more heterogeneous. The relationship for copartisans is second in magnitude to that of family and friends among Republicans but undetectable for Democrats. Sensitivity analysis shows that these relationships could be explained away only by an unmeasured variable with large effects (odds ratios between 2 and 15) on social norms perceptions and vaccination intentions. In addition, a prediction from the "false consensus" view that intentions cause perceived social norms is not supported. We discuss the implications for public health policy and understanding social norms.

Evidence against risk as a motivating driver of COVID-19 preventive behaviors in the United States.

Does an individual's risk profile predict their social distancing and mask wearing in the U.S. during the COVID-19 pandemic? Common sense and some health behavior theories suggest that as a perceived threat increases, an individual should be more likely to take preventive measures. We explore this hypothesis using survey responses collected from 1114 U.S. adults during April and October 2020, and find that neither perceived nor actual risk predicted these preventive behaviors. Instead, being an essential worker, partisanship, and believing compliance was important were more reliable predictors. These results provide guidance for better pandemic response policies and challenge models of health behavior.

Walking the party line: The growing role of political ideology in shaping health behavior in the United States.

OBJECTIVE: To assess the extent to which political ideology affects COVID-19 preventive behaviors and related beliefs and attitudes in the U.S. METHODS: Two surveys, one using a convenience sample and another using a nationally representative sample, were conducted in September and November 2020, respectively. Multiple regressions compared political ideology with identified COVID-19 risk factors and demographics as well as knowledge measures. Surveys were followed by a review of the emerging COVID-19 behavioral literature (completed in January 2021) to assess the frequency of ideological effects in publicly reported data. RESULTS: In the survey data, political ideology was a significant predictor for all dependent variables in both surveys, and the strongest predictor for most of them. Out of 141 estimates from 44 selected studies, political ideology was a significant predictor of responses in 112 (79%) and showed the largest effect on COVID-19-related measures in close to half of these estimates (44%). CONCLUSIONS: This study reinforces previous research that found partisan differences in engaging in behaviors with long-term health consequences by showing that these ideologically-driven differences manifest in situations where the possibility of severe illness or death is immediate and the potential societal impact is significant. The substantial implications for public health research and practice are both methodological and conceptual.

Protecting memory from misinformation: Warnings modulate cortical reinstatement during memory retrieval.

Exposure to even subtle forms of misleading information can significantly alter memory for past events. Memory distortion due to misinformation has been linked to faulty reconstructive processes during memory retrieval and the reactivation of brain regions involved in the initial encoding of misleading details (cortical reinstatement). The current study investigated whether warning participants about the threat of misinformation can modulate cortical reinstatement during memory retrieval and reduce misinformation errors. Participants watched a silent video depicting a crime (original event) and were given an initial test of memory for the crime details. Then, participants listened to an auditory narrative describing the crime in which some original details were altered (misinformation). Importantly, participants who received a warning about the reliability of the auditory narrative either before or after exposure to misinformation demonstrated less susceptibility to misinformation on a final test of memory compared to unwarned participants. Warned and unwarned participants also demonstrated striking differences in neural activity during the final memory test. Compared to participants who did not receive a warning, participants who received a warning (regardless of its timing) demonstrated increased activity in visual regions associated with the original source of information as well as decreased activity in auditory regions associated with the misleading source of information. Stronger visual reactivation was associated with reduced susceptibility to misinformation, whereas stronger auditory reactivation was associated with increased susceptibility to misinformation. Together, these results suggest that a simple warning can modulate reconstructive processes during memory retrieval and reduce memory errors due to misinformation.

Individual Representation in a Community of Knowledge.

An individual's knowledge is collective in at least two senses: it often comes from other people's testimony, and its deployment in reasoning and action requires accuracy underwritten by other people's knowledge. What must one know to participate in a collective knowledge system? Here, we marshal evidence that individuals retain detailed causal information for a few domains and coarse causal models embedding markers indicating that these details are available elsewhere (others' heads or the physical world) for most domains. This framework yields further questions about metacognition, source credibility, and individual computation that are theoretically and practically important. Belief polarization depends on the web of epistemic dependence and is greatest for those who know the least, plausibly due to extreme conflation of others' knowledge with one's own.

Thought as a determinant of political opinion.

Recent political events around the world, including the apparently sudden rise of populism and decline of democratic zeal, have surprised many of us and offered a window onto how people form beliefs and attitudes about the wider world. Cognitive scientists have tended to view belief and attitude formation from one of three perspectives: as a process of deliberative reasoning, as a gut reaction modulated by feelings, or as a cultural phenomenon grounded in partisan relationships. This special issue on the cognitive science of political thought brings a variety of voices to bear on the issue. The upshot is that each perspective captures part of the dynamics of opinion change, but the underlying processes operate in an integrated way. Individuals' affective reactions are conditioned by the social world, and therefore reflect their community norms. They often precede processes of reasoning, but not always. In turn, reasoning is generally motivated in the service of transmitting beliefs acquired from citizens' communities of belief. Cognition is largely a filter for attending to and sharing community norms.

Art and fiction are signals with indeterminate truth values.

Menninghaus et al. distinguish art from fiction, but no current arguments or data suggest that the concept of art can be meaningfully circumscribed. This is a problem for aesthetic psychology. I sketch a solution by rejecting the distinction: Unlike most animal communication, in which signals are either true or false, art and fiction consist of signals without determinate truth values.

Your Understanding Is My Understanding: Evidence for a Community of Knowledge.

In four experiments, we tested the community-of-knowledge hypothesis, that people fail to distinguish their own knowledge from other people's knowledge. In all the experiments, despite the absence of any actual explanatory information, people rated their own understanding of novel natural phenomena as higher when they were told that scientists understood the phenomena than when they were told that scientists did not yet understand them. In Experiment 2, we found that this occurs only when people have ostensible access to the scientists' explanations; the effect does not occur when the explanations exist but are held in secret. In Experiment 3, we further ruled out two classes of alternative explanations (one appealing to task demands and the other proposing that judgments were mediated by inferences about a phenomenon's understandability). In Experiment 4, we ruled out the possibility that the effect could be attributed to a pragmatic inference.