The lived experience of depression: a bottom-up review co-written by experts by experience and academics.

We provide here the first bottom-up review of the lived experience of depression, co-written by experts by experience and academics. First-person accounts within and outside the medical field were screened and discussed in collaborative workshops involving numerous individuals with lived experience of depression, family members and carers, representing a global network of organizations. The material was enriched by phenomenologically informed perspectives and shared with all collaborators in a cloud-based system. The subjective world of depression was characterized by an altered experience of emotions and body (feeling overwhelmed by negative emotions, unable to experience positive emotions, stuck in a heavy aching body drained of energy, detached from the mind, the body and the world); an altered experience of the self (losing sense of purpose and existential hope, mismatch between the past and the depressed self, feeling painfully incarcerated, losing control over one's thoughts, losing the capacity to act on the world; feeling numb, empty, non-existent, dead, and dreaming of death as a possible escape route); and an altered experience of time (experiencing an alteration of vital biorhythms, an overwhelming past, a stagnation of the present, and the impossibility of the future). The experience of depression in the social and cultural context was characterized by altered interpersonal experiences (struggling with communication, feeling loneliness and estrangement, perceiving stigma and stereotypes), and varied across different cultures, ethnic or racial minorities, and genders. The subjective perception of recovery varied (feeling contrasting attitudes towards recovery, recognizing recovery as a journey, recognizing one's vulnerability and the need for professional help), as did the experience of receiving pharmacotherapy, psychotherapy, and social as well as physical health interventions. These findings can inform clinical practice, research and education. This journey in the lived experience of depression can also help us to understand the nature of our own emotions and feelings, what is to believe in something, what is to hope, and what is to be a living human being.

Starving to death and the anorexic frame of mind.

Because some forms of self-starvation such as hunger striking are exempt from attributions of pathology, and due to incomplete understanding of its etiology, anorexia nervosa (AN) is and must presently be defined by psychological criteria as well as behavioral and bodily measures. Although opaque, typical motivational frames of mind in AN lack the apparent cognitive and volitional dysfunction usually indicating disorder. In contrast to other conditions that exhibit more evident dysfunction, this distinguishes AN from the perspective of medical epistemology: the opacity of AN motivation jeopardizing the epistemic warrant for assigning it to the category of a mental disorder (and so influencing decisions over diagnosis and recovery). This seems to invite non-medical approaches to its prevention and care.

Capturing the anorexia nervosa phenotype: Conceptual and normative issues in ICD-11.

INTRODUCTION: ICD-11's diagnostic definition possesses conceptual lacunae and normative implications calling for further attention. METHOD: Assumptions underlying it and their ethical implications, are examined employing philosophical analysis; particularly, these are (1) changes to eliminate implications of voluntary agency to caloric restriction; (2) definitions of "dangerously low weight;" and (3) disorder boundaries as stated in qualifications and exclusions. RESULTS: (1) The extent to which AN behaviour can be acknowledged to be driven by forces out of, or limiting, voluntary control is unresolved; this is illustrated using the contested part played by excessive exercise, clarification of which requires understanding of AN motivation. (2) AN's uncertain aetiology leaves doubt over the sub-threshold state. This affects not only when treatment is appropriate, but how definitions of morbidly low body weight are determined, putting individuals with prodromal symptoms at the social risks associated with "medicalizing" normal variation. Concluded here is not that ICD-11's conservative definition is mistaken but that since false positives are common, they must be factored into the complex cost-risk assessments involved. (3) ICD-11 efforts to minimize reliance on subjective motivation reveal limitations in exclusion criteria. Were AN motivation itself better understood, it would be possible to deal with non-anorexic motivation by exclusion. But the history of "fat fears" illustrates that uncertainty attaches to interpretations of AN motivation. Neither AN motivation nor cultural norms around other forms of self-starvation admit of clear characterization, leaving an impasse. DISCUSSION: At least with present day medical and scientific knowledge, a complete characterization of the AN phenotype cannot be achieved without reference to psychological states of motivation. And more research, not only clinical, genetic and neurobiological but also conceptual and ethical, will be required to resolve the challenges presented by AN.

'Mad agency', reflections on Goya's 'The Madhouse'.

We must remain open to revising and expanding the important but incompletely understood philosophical categories of agency and responsibility in light of what can be learned from atypical states and behaviour. A reflection on images - here, Goya's great Madhouse scene, and photographs of Mad Pride events since the 1980s - is shown to provide assistance towards this end.

Rethinking disease in psychiatry: Disease models and the medical imaginary.

The first decades of the 21st century have seen increasing dissatisfaction with the diagnostic psychiatry of the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manuals (DSMs). The aim of the present discussion is to identify one source of these problems within the history of medicine, using melancholy and syphilis as examples. Coinciding with the 19th-century beginnings of scientific psychiatry, advances that proved transformative and valuable for much of the rest of medicine arguably engendered, and served to entrench, mistaken, and misleading conceptions of psychiatric disorder. Powerful analogical reasoning based on what is assumed, projected, and expected (and thus occupying the realm of the medical imaginary), fostered inappropriate models for psychiatry. Dissatisfaction with DSM systems have given rise to alternative models, exemplified here in (i) network models of disorder calling for revision of ideas about causal explanation, and (ii) the critiques of categorical analyses associated with recently revised domain criteria for research. Such alternatives reflect welcome, if belated, revisions.

Deconstructing Risk Management in Psychotherapy Supervision.

In the ongoing controversy over how much regulation and standardization to impose on clinical practice and research, it is not surprising that the activity of psychotherapy supervision should be swept up in the drive for uniformity. The managers amongst us want to regulate and institutionalize all aspects of practice. In opposition, many clinicians resist the relentless march toward the safety of uniformity travel alongside managerial imposition of regulations. Psychotherapy supervision's method of a close apprenticeship relationship between supervisor and trainee and its focus on the process and ethics of professional interaction stand at the humanistic core of what is otherwise becoming an increasingly mechanistic model of providing care to persons with mental illness. Our commentary picks up on these themes as it reviews the work by Mehrtens et al about strengthening awareness of liability in psychiatry residency training programs. We argue that the practice of psychiatry is overburdened by documentation requirements. In imposing further record-keeping on psychotherapy supervision, we lose much more than we gain. We recommend that the supervisory process focus on the characterological virtues essential to functioning as an ethical therapist. We also argue that self-protective rules place restraints on possibilities for imaginative insights and innovations in psychotherapy.

Psychiatric treatment of the VIP: some paradoxical risks.

One might expect that VIPs-individuals with wealth, fame, or power-would typically receive excellent care when treated for psychiatric disorders. Often, this is the case, but paradoxically, VIP status may compromise the quality of psychiatric treatment. In this article, we present four case examples, representing disguised amalgamations of actual cases from our experience, demonstrating how VIP patients may sometimes receive suboptimal psychiatric care. These cases show certain similarities; typically, there was no serious doubt about the general nature of the treatment that should be undertaken, but the treatment team was unable to deliver that treatment in the usual manner because of various outside pressures created by the VIP status of the patient and by the patient's entourage. One possible solution to this problem, when feasible, is to assign treatment to a team specifically experienced with VIP patients. A strong and united treatment team, accustomed to the unusual difficulties and pressures often encountered with VIP patients, can be prepared to act promptly, firmly, and unanimously to devise an appropriate treatment plan and then maintain this plan true to its course despite these pressures.

Recognition rights, mental health consumers and reconstructive cultural semantics.

INTRODUCTION: Those in mental health-related consumer movements have made clear their demands for humane treatment and basic civil rights, an end to stigma and discrimination, and a chance to participate in their own recovery. But theorizing about the politics of recognition, 'recognition rights' and epistemic justice, suggests that they also have a stake in the broad cultural meanings associated with conceptions of mental health and illness. RESULTS: First person accounts of psychiatric diagnosis and mental health care (shown here to represent 'counter stories' to the powerful 'master narrative' of biomedical psychiatry), offer indications about how experiences of mental disorder might be reframed and redefined as part of efforts to acknowledge and honor recognition rights and epistemic justice. However, the task of cultural semantics is one for the entire culture, not merely consumers. These new meanings must be negotiated. When they are not the result of negotiation, group-wrought definitions risk imposing a revision no less constraining than the mis-recognizing one it aims to replace. Contested realities make this a challenging task when it comes to cultural meanings about mental disorder. Examples from mental illness memoirs about two contested realities related to psychosis are examined here: the meaninglessness of symptoms, and the role of insight into illness. They show the magnitude of the challenge involved--for consumers, practitioners, and the general public--in the reconstruction of these new meanings and realities. CONCLUSION: To honor recognition rights and epistemic justice acknowledgement must be made of the heterogeneity of the effects of, and of responses to, psychiatric diagnosis and care, and the extent of the challenge of the reconstructive cultural semantics involved.

Character virtues in psychiatric practice.

The character-focused approach known as virtue ethics is especially well suited to understanding and promoting ethical psychiatric practice. Virtues are stable dispositions and responses attributed to character, and a virtue-based ethics is one in which people's selves or characters are at the center of moral assessment. In this discussion by a clinician and a philosopher, clinical scenarios using exchanges and inner monologue illustrate key aspects of virtues. Virtues are acquired through habituation; they are habits of mind as much as behavior; they are as a group heterogeneous, and individually composite; they involve affective responses; they are not impartial; they are compatible with the "role morality" required of professionals; they are responses to particular temptations and weaknesses; and they include, in the capacity for practical judgment known as phronesis, a way of resolving many of the conflicts and dilemmas that arise in practice. The virtue approach to ethics will likely be most useful in the educational setting where practitioners are learning clinical skills and socialized into the broad ethos of professional practice. Aspects of this educational effort are briefly reviewed, including whether it ought to be undertaken at all, whether the effort to teach virtues is possible, and, if so, how it can be achieved.

The price of a gift: an approach to receiving gifts from patients in psychiatric practice.

When a patient or patient's family presents a psychiatrist with a gift, the clinician is challenged to maintain appropriate professional boundaries but have the flexibility to respond with warmth and appreciation. The psychiatrist must consider such factors as the intention of the gift, its value to the patient, and the anticipated effect of accepting or refusing it on the patient and the treatment. Psychiatric practitioners are ethically obligated to consider patients' best interests when deciding about how to handle the offer of a gift. Ethical deliberations about such situations occur on a case-by-case basis and require careful analysis of how to promote the patient's best interest while adhering to professional ethics. In this article, members of the McLean Hospital Ethics Committee present a pragmatic model for managing the presentation of a gift from a patient or a patient's family member. The pragmatic model, which focuses on the practical results of accepting or declining the gift, minimizes the risk of exploiting the patient by accepting a gift or hurting the patient by declining it. We present five clinical cases that raise ethical dilemmas concerning patient gift giving in psychiatry and discuss each case from the standpoint of the pragmatic model.

Psychiatric ethics.

Psychiatric ethics spans several overlapping domains, including the guidelines for ethical research in psychiatry, the professional ethics required in the practice of psychiatry, and a broader set of moral and ethical problems and dilemmas distinctive to, or at least magnified by, the mental health care setting. Reviewed here are selected issues arising in the last two domains, some seemingly inevitable components of mental disorder and its cultural history and others resultant from recent changes and discoveries. Even as science explains and demystifies mental disorder, it is concluded, new ethical problems will continue to arise in psychiatry and certain recalcitrant problems will likely persist.

Notes towards a professional ethics for psychiatry.

OBJECTIVE: The uniqueness of psychiatry calls for a unique ethics. By identifying the features distinguishing psychiatry as medical and social practice, this article seeks to illustrate the methodology by which that ethics can be derived and to determine what kind of a framework and focus such an ethics requires. METHOD: The author is an analytically trained philosopher and employs the method of conceptual analysis. RESULTS: At least three characteristics are suggested by the features which taken together constitute psychiatry's uniqueness: an ethical framework accommodating character, a rubric for acknowledging boundary violations, and an emphasis on gender. CONCLUSIONS: The larger task of formulating the substance and details of that unique ethics is the next step.

Choosing to refuse: patients' rights and psychotropic medication.

KIE: The author discusses the position of the plaintiffs in Rogers v. Okin, a legal case in which it was argued that involuntarily committed mental patients have the right to refuse psychotropic medication. She expresses reservations about paternalistic justifications for forced medication that are based on authority, on loss of autonomy by the mentally ill, on overriding autonomy for the patient's good, on the 'self paternalism' of the psychiatric will, and on intervention as restoring autonomy. Radden argues that the patient's right to choose is supported by an extension of the concept of competence to include competence to judge an issue. She asserts that neither patients nor physicians have sufficient knowledge of the side effects of psychotropic drugs to make rational decisions. Since neither possesses proper competence, the patient should choose.^ieng