Mendelian or Multifactorial? Current Undergraduate Genetics Assessments Focus on Genes and Rarely Include the Environment.

Undergraduate genetics courses have historically focused on simple genetic models, rather than taking a more multifactorial approach where students explore how traits are influenced by a combination of genes, the environment, and gene-by-environment interactions. While a focus on simple genetic models can provide straightforward examples to promote student learning, they do not match the current scientific understanding and can result in deterministic thinking among students. In addition, undergraduates are often interested in complex human traits that are influenced by the environment, and national curriculum standards include learning objectives that focus on multifactorial concepts. This research aims to discover to what extent multifactorial genetics is currently being assessed in undergraduate genetics courses. To address this, we analyzed over 1,000 assessment questions from a commonly used undergraduate genetics textbook; published concept assessments; and open-source, peer-reviewed curriculum materials. Our findings show that current genetics assessment questions overwhelmingly emphasize the impact of genes on phenotypes and that the effect of the environment is rarely addressed. These results indicate a need for the inclusion of more multifactorial genetics concepts, and we suggest ways to introduce them into undergraduate courses.

Mendel the fraud? A social history of truth in genetics.

Two things about Gregor Mendel are common knowledge: first, that he was the "monk in the garden" whose experiments with peas in mid-nineteenth-century Moravia became the starting point for genetics; second, that, despite that exalted status, there is something fishy, maybe even fraudulent, about the data that Mendel reported. Although the notion that Mendel's numbers were, in statistical terms, too good to be true was well understood almost immediately after the famous "rediscovery" of his work in 1900, the problem became widely discussed and agonized over only from the 1960s, for reasons having as much to do with Cold War geopolitics as with traditional concerns about the objectivity of science. Appreciating the historical origins of the problem as we have inherited it can be a helpful step in shifting the discussion in more productive directions, scientific as well as historiographic.

Presidential address: Experimenting with the scientific past.

When it comes to knowledge about the scientific pasts that might have been - the so-called 'counterfactual' history of science - historians can either debate its possibility or get on with the job. Taking the latter course means re-engaging with some of the most general questions about science. It can also lead to fresh insights into why particular episodes unfolded as they did and not otherwise. Drawing on recent research into the controversy over Mendelism in the early twentieth century, this address reports and reflects on a novel teaching experiment conducted in order to find out what biology and its students might be like now had the controversy gone differently. The results suggest a number of new options: for the collection of evidence about the counterfactual scientific past, for the development of collaborations between historians of science and science educators, for the cultivation of more productive relationships between scientists and their forebears, and for heightened self-awareness about the curiously counterfactual business of being historical.

The Unmaking of a Modern Synthesis: Noam Chomsky, Charles Hockett, and the Politics of Behaviorism, 1955-1965.

A familiar story about mid-twentieth-century American psychology tells of the abandonment of behaviorism for cognitive science. Between these two, however, lay a scientific borderland, muddy and much traveled. This essay relocates the origins of the Chomskyan program in linguistics there. Following his introduction of transformational generative grammar, Noam Chomsky (b. 1928) mounted a highly publicized attack on behaviorist psychology. Yet when he first developed that approach to grammar, he was a defender of behaviorism. His antibehaviorism emerged only in the course of what became a systematic repudiation of the work of the Cornell linguist C. F. Hockett (1916-2000). In the name of the positivist Unity of Science movement, Hockett had synthesized an approach to grammar based on statistical communication theory; a behaviorist view of language acquisition in children as a process of association and analogy; and an interest in uncovering the Darwinian origins of language. In criticizing Hockett on grammar, Chomsky came to engage gradually and critically with the whole Hockettian synthesis. Situating Chomsky thus within his own disciplinary matrix suggests lessons for students of disciplinary politics generally and--famously with Chomsky--the place of political discipline within a scientific life.

Physics in the Galtonian sciences of heredity.

Physics matters less than we once thought to the making of Mendel. But it matters more than we tend to recognize to the making of Mendelism. This paper charts the variety of ways in which diverse kinds of physics impinged upon the Galtonian tradition which formed Mendelism's matrix. The work of three Galtonians in particular is considered: Francis Galton himself, W. F. R. Weldon and William Bateson. One aim is to suggest that tracking influence from physics can bring into focus important but now little-remembered flexibilities in the Galtonian tradition. Another is to show by example why generalizations about what happens when 'physics' meets 'biology' require caution. Even for a single research tradition in Britain in the decades around 1900, these categories were large, containing multitudes.

Did Darwin change his mind about the Fuegians?

Shocked by what he considered to be the savagery he encountered in Tierra del Fuego, Charles Darwin ranked the Fuegians lowest among the human races. An enduring story has it, however, that Darwin was later so impressed by the successes of missionaries there, and by the grandeur they discovered in the native tongue, that he changed his mind. This story has served diverse interests, religious and scientific. But Darwin in fact continued to view the Fuegians as he had from the start, as lowly but improvable. And while his case for their unity with the other human races drew on missionary evidence, that evidence concerned emotional expression, not language.

Darwin's puzzling Expression.

Charles Darwin's The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (1872) is a very different kind of work from On the Origin of Species (1859). This "otherness" is most extreme in the character of the explanations that Darwin offers in the Expression. Far from promoting his theory of natural selection, the Expression barely mentions that theory, instead drawing on explanatory principles which recall less Darwinian than Lamarckian and structuralist biological theorizing. Over the years, historians have offered a range of solutions to the puzzle of why the Expression is so "non-Darwinian". Close examination shows that none of these meets the case. However, recent research on Darwin's lifelong engagement with the controversies in his day over the unity of the human races makes possible a promising new solution. For Darwin, emotional expression served the cause of defending human unity precisely to the extent that natural selection theory did not apply.

Race and language in the Darwinian tradition (and what Darwin's language-species parallels have to do with it).

What should human languages be like if humans are the products of Darwinian evolution? Between Darwin's day and our own, expectations about evolution's imprint on language have changed dramatically. It is now a commonplace that, for good Darwinian reasons, no language is more highly evolved than any other. But Darwin, in The descent of man, defended the opposite view: different languages, like the peoples speaking them, are higher or lower in an evolutionarily generated scale. This paper charts some of the changes in the Darwinian tradition that transformed the notion of human linguistic equality from creationist heresy to evolutionist orthodoxy. Darwin's position in particular is considered in detail, for there is disagreement about what it was, and about the bearing of a famous paragraph in the Descent comparing languages and species.

What's in a name? The vervet predator calls and the limits of the Washburnian synthesis.

After the Second World War, a renaissance in field primatology took place in the United States under the aegis of the 'new physical anthropology'. Its leader, Sherwood Washburn, envisioned a science uniting studies of hominid fossils with Darwinian population genetics, experimental functional anatomy, and field observation of non-human primates and human hunter-gatherers. Thanks to Washburn's stimulus, his colleague at Berkeley, the bird ethologist Peter Marler, took up the study of the natural communicative behaviour of apes and monkeys. When Marler's first primatological student, Thomas Struhsaker, reported in the mid-1960s that the vervet monkeys of Amboseli, Kenya, give acoustically distinct alarm calls to different predators, and respond to alarm calls as if to the sight of those predators, a debate broke out over whether the vervet calls thus function as names, translating as 'leopard', 'eagle' and 'python'. Washburn and his students argued that no matter what the behavioural evidence, vervet calls could not be predator names, since monkeys had been shown to lack the neuroanatomical basis of naming. This controversy thus reveals, first, the persistence of older patterns of disciplinary allegiance within the new, synthetic physical anthropology; and second, the impotence of adaptationist Darwinism--common to both sides of the debate--as a force for unity.