Mapping county-level vulnerability to the energy transition in US fossil fuel communities.

The energy transition toward lower-carbon energy sources will inevitably result in socioeconomic impacts on certain communities, particularly those that have historically produced fossil fuel resources and electricity generation using fossil fuels. Such communities stand to lose jobs, tax revenues, and support for public services. Which communities are most likely to be affected, which are more susceptible to being harmed, and how to target adaptive capacity programs-such as economic development and workforce training-accordingly are pressing scholarly and policy questions. In this study, we apply a vulnerability framework to calculate, rank, and map exposure and sensitivity scores for fossil fuel producing regions in the US. We find that, while counties in most regions of the United States will be affected by the transition away from fossil fuels, counties in Appalachia, Texas and the Gulf Coast region, and the Intermountain West are likely to experience the most significant impacts, and some regions experience overlapping and significant incidence of vulnerability. These results can be used to target future adaptive capacity programs.

Decommissioning Orphaned and Abandoned Oil and Gas Wells: New Estimates and Cost Drivers.

Millions of abandoned oil and gas wells are scattered across the United States, causing methane emissions and other environmental hazards. Governments are increasingly interested in decommissioning these wells but want to do so efficiently. However, information on the costs of decommissioning wells is very limited. In this analysis, we provide new cost estimates for decommissioning oil and gas wells and key cost drivers. We analyze data from up to 19,500 wells and find median decommissioning costs are roughly $20,000 for plugging only and $76,000 for plugging and surface reclamation. In rare cases, costs exceed $1 million per well. Each additional 1,000 feet of well depth increases costs by 20%, older wells are more costly than newer ones, natural gas wells are 9% more expensive than wells that produce oil, and costs vary widely by state. Surface characteristics also matter: each additional 10 feet of elevation change in the 5-acre area surrounding the well raises costs by 3%. Finally, we find that contracting in bulk pays: each additional well per contract reduces decommissioning costs by 3% per well. These findings suggest that regulators can adjust bonding requirements to better match the characteristics of each well.

Comment on "The intensification of the water footprint of hydraulic fracturing".

Kondash et al. provide a valuable contribution to our understanding of water consumption and wastewater production from oil and gas production using hydraulic fracturing. Unfortunately, their claim that the water intensity of energy production using hydraulic fracturing has increased in all regions is incorrect. More comprehensive data show that, while the water intensity of production may have increased in regions such as the Permian basin, it has decreased by 74% in the Marcellus and by 19% in the Eagle Ford region. This error likely stems from an improper method for estimating energy production from wells: The authors use the median well to represent regional production, which systematically underestimates aggregate production volumes. Across all regions, aggregate data suggest that the water intensity of oil and natural gas production using hydraulic fracturing has increased by 19%. There also appears to be an error in estimates for water consumption in the Permian basin.

Implications of shale gas development for climate change.

Advances in technologies for extracting oil and gas from shale formations have dramatically increased U.S. production of natural gas. As production expands domestically and abroad, natural gas prices will be lower than without shale gas. Lower prices have two main effects: increasing overall energy consumption, and encouraging substitution away from sources such as coal, nuclear, renewables, and electricity. We examine the evidence and analyze modeling projections to understand how these two dynamics affect greenhouse gas emissions. Most evidence indicates that natural gas as a substitute for coal in electricity production, gasoline in transport, and electricity in buildings decreases greenhouse gases, although as an electricity substitute this depends on the electricity mix displaced. Modeling suggests that absent substantial policy changes, increased natural gas production slightly increases overall energy use, more substantially encourages fuel-switching, and that the combined effect slightly alters economy wide GHG emissions; whether the net effect is a slight decrease or increase depends on modeling assumptions including upstream methane emissions. Our main conclusions are that natural gas can help reduce GHG emissions, but in the absence of targeted climate policy measures, it will not substantially change the course of global GHG concentrations. Abundant natural gas can, however, help reduce the costs of achieving GHG reduction goals.