A nova lei de licitações como promotora da maldição do vencedor / La nueva ley de licitaciones como promotora de la maldición del ganador / The new Brazilian public procurement law as promoter of the winner's curse

Resumo Evitar sobrepreços e preços manifestamente inexequíveis são dois objetivos principais da recém-promulgada Lei nº 14.133, de 1º de abril de 2021. O presente artigo demonstra que, ao tentar alcançar o primeiro objetivo, a nova lei de licitações promove o segundo, pois um comando específico tende a reduzir os preços até congelá-los nos menores valores possíveis, conduzindo os contratados à maldição do vencedor. Alerta-se os agentes públicos sobre o fato de que a manutenção desse comando levará a descumprimentos generalizados de contratos e a uma eventual falência de competidores. O método Monte Carlo é utilizado para demonstrar que um mecanismo abrangente de pesquisa de preços evitará o problema e garantirá o efeito pretendido pela lei.

Resumen Evitar los sobreprecios y los precios manifiestamente inviables son dos de los principales objetivos de la recién promulgada Ley 14.133/2021 de Brasil. Este artículo demuestra que, al intentar lograr el primer objetivo, la nueva ley de licitaciones promueve el segundo, ya que un comando específico tiende a reducir los precios hasta congelarlos a los valores más bajos practicables, llevando a los contratados a la maldición del ganador. Se advierte a los funcionarios públicos que mantener este comando conducirá a incumplimientos generalizados de contratos y eventual quiebra de los competidores. Se utiliza el método Monte Carlo para demostrar que un mecanismo integral de investigación de precios evitará el problema y garantizará el efecto buscado por la ley.

Abstract Avoiding overpricing and irresponsible pricing are two central objectives of the recently enacted Law 14133/2021. This article shows that when trying to achieve the first objective, the new Brazilian public procurement law promotes the second, since a specific command reduces maximum prices until they freeze to the lowest possible values, leading the contractors to the winner's curse. Public officials are warned that maintaining this command will lead to widespread breaches of contracts and eventual bankruptcy of contractors. The Monte Carlo method is adopted to show that a comprehensive price database will avoid the problem and guarantee the effect intended by the law.

Transient Alterations in Streamwater Quality Induced by Pollution Incidents: Interim Losses Calculations and Compensation Alternatives Based on Habitat Equivalency Analysis.

Pollution incidents cause transient water quality alterations during the passage of contaminants' plume along watercourses, with plume passage period and contaminants' concentrations modelled by advection-dispersion equations. Despite being transient, water quality alterations can impose many impacts on the streamwater ecosystem services. This study proposes two frameworks based on Habitat Equivalency Analysis to be applied during assessments of streamwaters' pollution incidents and respective compensation panoramas: (1) Streamwater interim loss framework, to calculate interim loss debits caused by transient alterations in the streamwater quality; (2) Total credit framework, to calculate streamwater credits generated by improvements in selected watercourse's streamwater quality, produced by wastewater treatment plants in this study. The amount of credits calculated in the selected watercourses assists in the proposal of suitable compensatory remediation projects to offset interim losses. Frameworks' calculations are founded on IVA, a water quality index for protection of aquatic life and aquatic communities. Frameworks' calculations depend on three parameters: IVA, watercourses fluxes and the present value multiplier. The frameworks were calculated in ΔIVAxL, unit defined by multiplying sensed alterations in streamwater quality (as ΔIVA) and streamwater flux, in liters (L). The frameworks were applied to two major streamwater pollution incidents in Brazil, caused by the dam collapses of Mariana and Brumadinho, suggesting suitable compensatory remediations' projects for the respective streamwater interim losses. Depending on the selected project, Brumadinho compensation period varied from 2 to 5 years, with estimated costs in the 2020 Int.$ 5.7-18.7M range; Mariana compensation period varied from 8 to 20 years, with estimated costs in the 2020 Int.$ 16.7-58.1M range. Based on Brumadinho compensatory remediation projects, an average water pollution environmental damage value per interim loss was calculated, 1.17E-4 2020 Int.$/ΔIVAxL, which might be useful in comparing streamwater pollution evaluations around the world.