Safety in the operating theatre - Part 2: human error and organisational failure.

Over the past decade, anaesthetists and human factors specialists have worked together to find ways of minimising the human contribution to anaesthetic mishaps. As in the functionally similar fields of aviation, process control and military operations, it is found that errors are not confined to those at the "sharp end". In common with other complex and well defended technologies, anaesthetic accidents usually result from the often unforeseeable combination of human and organisational failures in the presence of some weakness or gap in the system's many barriers and safeguards. Psychological factors such as inattention, distraction and forgetfulness are the last and often the least manageable aspects of the accident sequence. Whereas individual unsafe acts are hard to predict and control, the organisational and contextual factors that give rise to them are present before the occurrence of an incident or accident. As such, they are prime candidates for treatment. Errors at the sharp end are symptomatic of both human fallibility and underlying organisational failings. Fallibility is here to stay. Organisational and local problems, in contrast, are both diagnosable and manageable.

Beyond the organisational accident: the need for "error wisdom" on the frontline.

Complex, well defended, high technology systems are subject to rare but usually catastrophic organisational accidents in which a variety of contributing factors combine to breach the many barriers and safeguards. To the extent that healthcare institutions share these properties, they too are subject to organisational accidents. A detailed case study of such an accident is described. However, it is important to recognise that health care possesses a number of characteristics that set it apart from other hazardous domains. These include the diversity of activity and equipment, a high degree of uncertainty, the vulnerability of patients, and a one to one or few to one mode of delivery. Those in direct contact with patients, particularly nurses and junior doctors, often have little opportunity to reform the system's defences. It is argued that some organisational accident sequences could be thwarted at the last minute if those on the frontline had acquired some degree of error wisdom. Some mental skills are outlined that could alert junior doctors and nurses to situations likely to promote damaging errors.

Combating omission errors through task analysis and good reminders.

Leaving out necessary task steps is the single most common human error type. Certain task steps possess characteristics that are more likely to provoke omissions than others, and can be identified in advance. The paper reports two studies. The first, involving a simple photocopier, established that failing to remove the last page of the original is the commonest omission. This step possesses four distinct error-provoking features that combine their effects in an additive fashion. The second study examined the degree to which everyday memory aids satisfy five features of a good reminder: conspicuity, contiguity, content, context, and countability. A close correspondence was found between the percentage use of strategies and the degree to which they satisfied these five criteria. A three stage omission management programme was outlined: task analysis (identifying discrete task steps) of some safety critical activity; assessing the omission likelihood of each step; and the choice and application of a suitable reminder. Such a programme is applicable to a variety of healthcare procedures.

Diagnosing "vulnerable system syndrome": an essential prerequisite to effective risk management.

Investigations of accidents in a number of hazardous domains suggest that a cluster of organisational pathologies-the "vulnerable system syndrome" (VSS)-render some systems more liable to adverse events. This syndrome has three interacting and self-perpetuating elements: blaming front line individuals, denying the existence of systemic error provoking weaknesses, and the blinkered pursuit of productive and financial indicators. VSS is present to some degree in all organisations, and the ability to recognise its symptoms is an essential skill in the progress towards improved patient safety. Two kinds of organisational learning are discussed: "single loop" learning that fuels and sustains VSS and "double loop" learning that is necessary to start breaking free from it.

The human factor in cardiac surgery: errors and near misses in a high technology medical domain.

In this review, we discuss human factors research in cardiac surgery and other medical domains. We describe a systems approach to understanding human factors in cardiac surgery and summarize the lessons that have been learned about critical incident and near-miss reporting in other high technology industries that are pertinent to this field.

Human factors and cardiac surgery: a multicenter study.

OBJECTIVE: To study the role of human factors on surgical outcomes, with a series of 243 arterial switch operations performed by 21 surgeons taken as a model. METHODS: The following data were collected: patient-specific and procedural variables, self-assessment questionnaires, and a written report from a human factors researcher who observed the operation. The relationship of patient-specific variables to outcomes (death and death and/or near miss) was used to develop a multivariable baseline model to analyze the role of human factors after adjustment for these variables. RESULTS: The overall mortality was 6.6% with 24.3% of cases resulting in death and death and/or near misses. The self-assessment questionnaires were found to be unhelpful. Major and minor human failures were extracted from the written report. Major negative events were potentially life-threatening failures, whereas minor events were failures that, in isolation, were not expected to have serious consequences. Major events were closely related to death (P <.001) and death and/or near misses (P <.001). Appropriate compensation, however, sharply reduced the risk of death (P =.003). The total number of minor events was also closely related to both death and death and/or near misses (P <.001). CONCLUSION: The study highlights the role of human factors in negative surgical outcomes. Even in the most eventful circumstances, however, appropriate human factors defense mechanisms can lead to a successful outcome.

Understanding adverse events: human factors.

(1) Human rather than technical failures now represent the greatest threat to complex and potentially hazardous systems. This includes healthcare systems. (2) Managing the human risks will never be 100% effective. Human fallibility can be moderated, but it cannot be eliminated. (3) Different error types have different underlying mechanisms, occur in different parts of the organisation, and require different methods of risk management. The basic distinctions are between: Slips, lapses, trips, and fumbles (execution failures) and mistakes (planning or problem solving failures). Mistakes are divided into rule based mistakes and knowledge based mistakes. Errors (information-handling problems) and violations (motivational problems) Active versus latent failures. Active failures are committed by those in direct contact with the patient, latent failures arise in organisational and managerial spheres and their adverse effects may take a long time to become evident. (4) Safety significant errors occur at all levels of the system, not just at the sharp end. Decisions made in the upper echelons of the organisation create the conditions in the workplace that subsequently promote individual errors and violations. Latent failures are present long before an accident and are hence prime candidates for principled risk management. (5) Measures that involve sanctions and exhortations (that is, moralistic measures directed to those at the sharp end) have only very limited effectiveness, especially so in the case of highly trained professionals. (6) Human factors problems are a product of a chain of causes in which the individual psychological factors (that is, momentary inattention, forgetting, etc) are the last and least manageable links. Attentional "capture" (preoccupation or distraction) is a necessary condition for the commission of slips and lapses. Yet, its occurrence is almost impossible to predict or control effectively. The same is true of the factors associated with forgetting. States of mind contributing to error are thus extremely difficult to manage; they can happen to the best of people at any time. (7) People do not act in isolation. Their behaviour is shaped by circumstances. The same is true for errors and violations. The likelihood of an unsafe act being committed is heavily influenced by the nature of the task and by the local workplace conditions. These, in turn, are the product of "upstream" organisational factors. Great gains in safety can ve achieved through relatively small modifications of equipment and workplaces. (8) Automation and increasing advanced equipment do not cure human factors problems, they merely relocate them. In contrast, training people to work effectively in teams costs little, but has achieved significant enhancements of human performance in aviation. (9) Effective risk management depends critically on a confidential and preferable anonymous incident monitoring system that records the individual, task, situational, and organisational factors associated with incidents and near misses. (10) Effective risk management means the simultaneous and targeted deployment of limited remedial resources at different levels of the system: the individual or team, the task, the situation, and the organisation as a whole.

Determinants of intention to commit driving violations.

Ajzen's theory of planned behaviour was used to measure the attitudes and intentions of a large stratified sample of drivers (N = 881) towards four driving violations. Measures were taken of respondents' attitudes to four imaginary scenarios depicting their commission of the four violations concerned. Demographic subgroups of drivers within the sample were differentiated on the basis of their beliefs about and evaluations of their commission of the violations. We were able to identify attitude items differentiating the younger, statistically more "accident liable" drivers in the sample from their older, and statistically safer counterparts. The implications of using this approach to inform future road safety campaigns are discussed.

Accident analysis of large-scale technological disasters applied to an anaesthetic complication.

The occurrence of serious accidents in complex industrial systems such as at Three Mile Island and Bhopal has prompted development of new models of causation and investigation of disasters. These analytical models have potential relevance in anaesthesia. We therefore applied one of the previously described systems to the investigation of an anaesthetic accident. The model chosen describes two kinds of failures, both of which must be sought. The first group, active failures, consists of mistakes made by practitioners in the provision of care. The second group, latent failures, represents flaws in the administrative and productive system. The model emphasizes the search for latent failures and shows that prevention of active failures alone is insufficient to avoid further accidents if latent failures persist unchanged. These key features and the utility of this model are illustrated by application to a case of aspiration of gastric contents. While four active failures were recognized, an equal number of latent failures also became apparent. The identification of both types of failures permitted the formulation of recommendations to avoid further occurrences. Thus this model of accident causation can provide a useful mechanism to investigate and possibly prevent anaesthetic accidents.

The contribution of latent human failures to the breakdown of complex systems.

Several recent accidents in complex high-risk technologies had their primary origins in a variety of delayed-action human failures committed long before an emergency state could be recognized. These disasters were due to the adverse conjunction of a large number of causal factors, each one necessary but singly insufficient to achieve the catastrophic outcome. Although the errors and violations of those at the immediate human-system interface often feature large in the post-accident investigations, it is evident that these 'front-line' operators are rarely the principal instigators of system breakdown. Their part is often to provide just those local triggering conditions necessary to manifest systemic weaknesses created by fallible decisions made earlier in the organizational and managerial spheres. The challenge facing the human reliability community is to find ways of identifying and neutralizing these latent failures before they combine with local triggering events to breach the system's defences. New methods of risk assessment and risk management are needed if we are to achieve any significant improvements in the safety of complex, well-defended, socio-technical systems. This paper distinguishes between active and latent human failures and proposes a general framework for understanding the dynamics of accident causation. It also suggests ways in which current methods of protection may be enhanced, and concludes by discussing the unusual structural features of 'high-reliability' organizations.

Errors and violations on the roads: a real distinction?

In considering the human contribution to accidents, it seems necessary to make a distinction between errors and violations; two forms of aberration which may have different psychological origins and demand different modes of remediation. The present study investigated whether this distinction was justified for self-reported driver behaviour. Five hundred and twenty drivers completed a driver behaviour questionnaire (DBQ) which asked them to judge the frequency with which they committed various types of errors and violations when driving. Three fairly robust factors were identified: violations, dangerous errors, and relatively harmless lapses, respectively. Violations declined with age, errors did not. Men of all ages reported more violations than women. Women, however, were significantly more prone to harmless lapses (or more honest) than men. These findings were consistent with the view that errors and violations are indeed mediated by different psychological mechanisms. Violations require explanation in terms of social and motivational factors, whereas errors (slips, lapses, and mistakes) may be accounted for by reference to the information-processing characteristics of the individual.

Absent-mindedness in shops: its incidence, correlates and consequences.

This paper describes a questionnaire study of absent- mindedness in shops, and an analysis of 166 letters written by 67 individuals who felt themselves to be wrongly accused of shoplifting . A total of 150 men and women were asked how often they had experienced each of 24 varieties of mental lapse while shopping. If they had not actually suffered a particular lapse, they were asked to judge its likelihood of occurrence. Approximately half of the sample also completed the Cognitive Failures Questionnaire ( CFQ ). Lapses carrying the risk of shop-lifting accusations were reported as occurring far less frequently, and were judged as less likely, than either ' embarrassing ' or 'nuisance' lapses. However, an examination of the circumstances leading up to accusations of shoplifting indicated that high risk lapses can occur when ill health, extreme preoccupation and distraction are combined with unwise supermarket practices. A positive and significant correlation was found between the CFQ and the Absent- Mindedness in Shops Questionnaire ( AMSQ ). A factor analysis of the AMSQ revealed a very pervasive general factor, together with a risk appreciation factor. The findings supported the view that responses to both the CFQ and the AMSQ reflected characteristic differences in the management of some superordinate attentional control resource.

A visually-driven postural after-effect.

Viewing a large-scale moving scene typically causes a free standing observer to lean in the direction of the seen motion. It was also noted that when the visual motion ceases, the observer drifts back toward the upright position, but instead of this body movement stopping at the vertical, it tends to continue so that the observer remains leaning in the opposite direction for several seconds before finally returning to the upright. The two experiments reported here were designed to investigate the determinants of this postural after-effect in relation to a pitch vection stimulus. Our findings clearly showed that the after-effect was dependent upon (1) the establishment of a prior visually-induced body lean, and (2) sight of the static display on the cessation of motion. The notion of an internalised representation of body position was invoked to account for these results.

Voluntary movement control and adaptation to cross-coupled stimulation.

The rates at which protective adaptation was acquired to an incremental cross-coupled stimulus were compared under three conditions of movement control: 1) a passive condition in which the 45 degree lateral tilts of the subject's chair were controlled entirely by the experimenter (N = 12); 2) an active condition in which the same movements were achieved directly through the subject's own muscular effort (N = 12); and 3) an active-passive condition in which control was exercised indirectly through microswitches located on the chair arms (N = 12). Adaptation was measured by the rate of neutralization of the oculogyral illusion, as estimated from the apparent motion of a small, dimly illuminated target. The results supported the prediction that the passive condition would be the least effective mode for acquiring adaptation. An unexpected finding was that the active-passive condition proved to be the most efficient for the development of adaptation.