How restudy decisions affect overall comprehension for seventh-grade students.

BACKGROUND: Self-regulated learning requires accurate monitoring and effective regulation of study. Little is known about how effectively younger readers regulate their study. AIMS: We examined how decisions about which text to restudy affect overall comprehension for seventh-grade students. In addition to a Participant's Choice condition where students were allowed to pick texts for restudy on their own, we compared learning gains in two other conditions in which texts were selected for them. The Test-Based Restudy condition determined text selection using initial test performance - presenting the text with the lowest initial test performance for restudy, thereby circumventing potential problems associated with inaccurate monitoring and ineffective regulation. The Judgement-Based Restudy condition determined text selection using metacognitive judgements of comprehension - presenting the text with the lowest judgement of comprehension, thereby circumventing potential problems associated with ineffective regulation. SAMPLE: Four hundred and eighty seventh-grade students participated. METHOD: Students were randomly assigned to conditions in an experimental design. RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS: Gains in comprehension following restudy were larger for the Test-Based Restudy condition than for the Judgement-Based Restudy condition or the Participant's Choice condition. No differences in comprehension were seen between the Judgement-Based Restudy and Participant's Choice conditions. These results suggest seventh graders can systematically use their monitoring to make decisions about what to restudy. However, the results highlight how inaccurate monitoring is one reason why younger students fail to benefit from self-regulated study opportunities.

The interplay between uncertainty monitoring and working memory: Can metacognition become automatic?

The uncertainty response has grounded the study of metacognition in nonhuman animals. Recent research has explored the processes supporting uncertainty monitoring in monkeys. It has revealed that uncertainty responding, in contrast to perceptual responding, depends on significant working memory resources. The aim of the present study was to expand this research by examining whether uncertainty monitoring is also working memory demanding in humans. To explore this issue, human participants were tested with or without a cognitive load on a psychophysical discrimination task that included either an uncertainty response (allowing the participant to decline difficult trials) or a middle-perceptual response (labeling the same intermediate trial levels). The results demonstrated that cognitive load reduced uncertainty responding, but increased middle responding. However, this dissociation between uncertainty and middle responding was only observed when participants either lacked training or had very little training with the uncertainty response. If more training was provided, the effect of load was small. These results suggest that uncertainty responding is resource demanding, but with sufficient training, human participants can respond to uncertainty either by using minimal working memory resources or by effectively sharing resources. These results are discussed in relation to the literature on animal and human metacognition.

Exploring metacognitive accuracy in visual search.

For decades, researchers have examined visual search. Much of this work has focused on the factors (e.g., movement, set size, luminance, distractor features and proximity) that influence search speed. However, no research has explored whether people are aware of the influence of these factors. For instance, increases in set size will typically slow down target detection; yet no research has measured participants' metacognitive awareness of this phenomenon. The present research explores this area by integrating a visual search task with a metacognitive monitoring paradigm. All of the explored factors influenced search latency. However, all of the factors except target presence influenced ratings. Saliency and suppression are discussed as two possible explanations for the results. Future directions for extending the theory and the practical benefits of this research are also outlined.

Refining the visual-cortical hypothesis in category learning.

Participants produce steep typicality gradients and large prototype-enhancement effects in dot-distortion category tasks, showing that in these tasks to-be-categorized items are compared to a prototypical representation that is the central tendency of the participant's exemplar experience. These prototype-abstraction processes have been ascribed to low-level mechanisms in primary visual cortex. Here we asked whether higher-level mechanisms in visual cortex can also sometimes support prototype abstraction. To do so, we compared dot-distortion performance when the stimuli were size constant (allowing some low-level repetition-familiarity to develop for similar shapes) or size variable (defeating repetition-familiarity effects). If prototype formation is only mediated by low-level mechanisms, stimulus-size variability should lessen prototype effects and flatten typicality gradients. Yet prototype effects and typicality gradients were the same under both conditions, whether participants learned the categories explicitly or implicitly and whether they received trial-by-trial reinforcement during transfer tests. These results broaden out the visual-cortical hypothesis because low-level visual areas, featuring retinotopic perceptual representations, would not support robust category learning or prototype-enhancement effects in an environment of pronounced variability in stimulus size. Therefore, higher-level cortical mechanisms evidently can also support prototype formation during categorization.

Stages of category learning in monkeys (Macaca mulatta) and humans (Homo sapiens).

Smith and Minda (1998) and Blair and Homa (2001) studied the time course of category learning in humans. They distinguished an early, abstraction-based stage of category learning from a later stage that incorporated a capacity for categorizing exceptional category members. The present authors asked whether similar processing stages characterize the category learning of nonhuman primates. Humans (Homo sapiens) and monkeys (Macaca mulatta) participated in category-learning tasks that extended Blair and Homa's paradigm comparatively. Early in learning, both species improved on typical items more than on exception items, indicating an initial mastery of the categories' general structure. Later in learning, both species selectively improved their exception-item performance, indicating exception-item resolution or exemplar memorization. An initial stage of abstraction-based category learning may characterize categorization across a substantial range of the order Primates. This default strategy may have an adaptive resonance with the family resemblance organization of many natural-kind categories.

Evidence of metacognitive control by humans and monkeys in a perceptual categorization task.

Metacognition research has focused on the degree to which nonhuman primates share humans' capacity to monitor their cognitive processes. Convincing evidence now exists that monkeys can engage in metacognitive monitoring. By contrast, few studies have explored metacognitive control in monkeys, and the available evidence of metacognitive control supports multiple explanations. The current study addresses this situation by exploring the capacity of human participants and rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) to adjust their study behavior in a perceptual categorization task. The study found that humans and monkeys increased their study for high-difficulty categories, suggesting that both share the capacity to exert metacognitive control. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2009 APA, all rights reserved).

Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) adaptively monitor uncertainty while multi-tasking.

As researchers explore animals' capacity for metacognition and uncertainty monitoring, some paradigms allow the criticism that animal participants-who are always extensively trained in one stimulus domain within which they learn to avoid difficult trials-use task-specific strategies to avoid aversive stimuli instead of responding to a generalized state of uncertainty like that humans might use. We addressed this criticism with an uncertainty-monitoring task environment in which four different task domains were interleaved randomly trial by trial. Four of five macaques (Macaca mulatta) were able to make adaptive uncertainty responses while multi-tasking, suggesting the generality of the psychological signal that occasions these responses. The findings suggest that monkeys may have an uncertainty-monitoring capacity that is like that of humans in transcending task-specific cues and extending simultaneously to multiple domains.

The comparative psychophysics of complex shape perception.

The authors compared the complex shape perception of humans and monkeys. Members of both species participated in a Same-Different paradigm in which they judged the similarity of shape pairs that could be variations of the same underlying prototype. For both species, similarity gradients were found to be steep going out from the transformational center of psychological space. In contrast, similarity gradients were found to be flat going from the periphery in toward the center of psychological space. These results show that there are important common principles in the shape-perception and shape-comparison processes of humans and monkeys. The same general organization of psychological space is obtained. The same quantifiable metric of psychological distance is applied. Established methods for creating controlled shape variation have the same effect on both species' similarity judgments. The member of the to-be-judged pair of shapes that is peripheral in psychological space controls the strength of the perceived similarity of the pair. The results have broader implications for the comparative study of perception and categorization.

The comparative psychology of same-different judgments by humans (Homo sapiens) and monkeys (Macaca mulatta).

The authors compared the performance of humans and monkeys in a Same-Different task. They evaluated the hypothesis that for humans the Same-Different concept is qualitative, categorical, and rule-based, so that humans distinguish 0-disparity pairs (i.e., same) from pairs with any discernible disparity (i.e., different); whereas for monkeys the Same-Different concept is quantitative, continuous, and similarity-based, so that monkeys distinguish small-disparity pairs (i.e., similar) from pairs with a large disparity (i.e., dissimilar). The results supported the hypothesis. Monkeys, more than humans, showed a gradual transition from same to different categories and an inclusive criterion for responding Same. The results have implications for comparing Same-Different performances across species--different species may not always construe or perform even identical tasks in the same way. In particular, humans may especially apply qualitative, rule-based frameworks to cognitive tasks like Same-Different.

Prototype abstraction by monkeys (Macaca mulatta).

The authors analyze the shape categorization of rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) and the role of prototype- and exemplar-based comparison processes in monkeys' category learning. Prototype and exemplar theories make contrasting predictions regarding performance on the Posner-Homa dot-distortion categorization task. Prototype theory--which presumes that participants refer to-be-categorized items to a representation near the category's center (the prototype)--predicts steep typicality gradients and large prototype-enhancement effects. Exemplar theory--which presumes that participants refer to-be-categorized items to memorized training exemplars-predicts flat typicality gradients and small prototype-enhancement effects. Across many categorization tasks that, for the first time, assayed monkeys' dot-distortion categorization, monkeys showed steep typicality gradients and large prototype-enhancement effects. These results suggest that monkeys--like humans--refer to-be-categorized items to a prototype-like representation near the category's center rather than to a set of memorized training exemplars.

Dissociating uncertainty responses and reinforcement signals in the comparative study of uncertainty monitoring.

Although researchers are exploring animals' capacity for monitoring their states of uncertainty, the use of some paradigms allows the criticism that animals map avoidance responses to error-causing stimuli not because of uncertainty monitored but because of feedback signals and stimulus aversion. The authors addressed this criticism with an uncertainty-monitoring task in which participants completed blocks of trials with feedback deferred so that they could not associate reinforcement signals to particular stimuli or stimulus-response pairs. Humans and 1 of 2 monkeys were able to make cognitive, decisional uncertainty responses that were independent of feedback or reinforcement history within a task. This finding unifies the comparative literature on uncertainty monitoring. The dissociation of performance from reinforcement has theoretical implications, and the deferred-feedback technique has many applications.

Rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) monitor uncertainty during numerosity judgments.

Two rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) judged arrays of dots on a computer screen as having more or fewer dots than a center value that was never presented in trials. After learning a center value, monkeys were given an uncertainty response that let them decline to make the numerosity judgment on that trial. Across center values (3-7), errors occurred most often for sets adjacent in numerosity to the center value. The monkeys also used the uncertainty response most frequently on these difficult trials. A 2nd experiment showed that monkeys' responses reflected numerical magnitude and not the surface-area illumination of the displays. This research shows that monkeys' uncertainty-monitoring capacity extends to the domain of numerical cognition. It also shows monkeys' use of the purest uncertainty response possible, uncontaminated by any secondary motivator.

Visual search and the collapse of categorization.

Categorization researchers typically present single objects to be categorized. But real-world categorization often involves object recognition within complex scenes. It is unknown how the processes of categorization stand up to visual complexity or why they fail facing it. The authors filled this research gap by blending the categorization and visual-search paradigms into a visual-search and categorization task in which participants searched for members of target categories in complex displays. Participants have enormous difficulty in this task. Despite intensive and ongoing category training, they detect targets at near-chance levels unless displays are extremely simple or target categories extremely focused. These results, discussed from the perspectives of categorization and visual search, might illuminate societally important instances of visual search (e.g., diagnostic medical screening).

Specific-token effects in screening tasks: possible implications for aviation security.

Screeners at airport security checkpoints perform an important categorization task in which they search for threat items in complex x-ray images. But little is known about how the processes of categorization stand up to visual complexity. The authors filled this research gap with screening tasks in which participants searched for members of target categories in visual displays. The authors found that when targets were sampled with replacement and repetition, participant screeners relied on recognizing familiar targets and had great difficulty using category-general knowledge. The authors observed a "heartbeat" in detection performance--it improved while test images repeated but dropped sharply when unfamiliar targets from the same categories appeared. This reliance on familiarity illuminates the processes of categorization under conditions of visual complexity and suggests limits on those processes. This reliance also has implications for the training and evaluation of screeners in the field.

Influence of a monetary incentive upon attentional modification of short-lead prepulse inhibition and long-lead prepulse facilitation of acoustic startle.

Short-lead prepulse inhibition and long-lead prepulse facilitation of startle are greater during attended than ignored prestimuli. The present work examined whether this attentional modification is influenced by monetary incentive. Participants (43 college students) were randomly assigned to receive a small performance-based monetary incentive or were instructed to try their best. The task was to judge the duration of tones of one of two pitches during a series of 48 tones. Prepulse inhibition of startle eyeblink EMG was assessed at 60, 120, and 240 ms, and prepulse facilitation was assessed at 4,500 ms following tone onset. Short-lead percent prepulse inhibition was greater during attended than ignored prestimuli only at 120 ms among paid participants. Long-lead prepulse facilitation was greater for attended than ignored tones, but this effect did not vary with incentive condition. This study demonstrates that attentional modification of short-lead prepulse inhibition is sensitive to a monetary incentive and provides a basis for further examination of motivational effects on early attentional processing.