On the latency of object recognition and affect: Evidence from speeded reaction time tasks.

According to the semantic primacy hypothesis of emotion generation, stimuli must be semantically categorized to evoke emotions. This hypothesis was tested in two speeded reaction time experiments that also explored the processes underlying valence judgments. Participants viewed pleasant and unpleasant pictures. In different blocks of trials, they pressed a key as soon as they experienced the feeling evoked by a picture, recognized the depicted object, or detected the valence (pleasant/unpleasant) of the picture. Object recognition was significantly earlier than affect onset, and the two latencies were positively correlated. The latency of valence detection was in between the latencies of object recognition and affect and correlated with both. Experiment 2 additionally found that blurring the pictures delayed the onset of affect and that this effect was partially mediated by delayed object recognition. In contrast, false-coloring the pictures was found to delay affect mainly by reducing its intensity. Coloring also delayed valence judgments of pleasant pictures. The findings provide further chronometric support for the semantic primacy hypothesis of emotion generation and shed light on the processes underlying valence judgments. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

On the latency of object recognition and affect: Evidence from temporal order and simultaneity judgments.

According to the semantic primacy hypothesis of emotion generation, stimuli must be semantically categorized to evoke emotions. This hypothesis was tested for the subjective component of emotions in four chronometric experiments in which the conscious recognition of emotion-eliciting objects and the onset of affect was timed using temporal order judgments (TOJs, Exp. 1a, 1b, and 3) and simultaneity judgments (SJs, Exp. 2). Participants viewed pictures that elicited pleasant or unpleasant feelings. At varying intervals before and after picture onset, a visual probe stimulus was presented. In separate blocks of trials, the participants judged when they recognized the object shown in the picture and noticed the feeling evoked by the picture: Before or after the probe (TOJs), or simultaneously/not simultaneously with the probe (SJs). Psychometric functions were fitted to the data of the individual participants to determine the point of subjective simultaneity (PSS) of the target events and the probe. In both tasks, the mean PSS of affect occurred significantly later than the PSS of object recognition, with an average delay of about 120 ms. A positive lag between object recognition and affect was found for nearly all participants and pictures. In addition, the latencies of object recognition and affect were positively correlated. The found temporal order of object recognition and affect is consistent with the findings of previous studies using speeded reaction time tasks. Implications of the findings for the cognition-emotion debate and for bodily feedback theories of emotional experience are discussed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Tasks for a theoretical psychology of emotion.

In the first part of the article, the central role of theory in emotion psychology is underscored and reasons are given why more theoretical psychology of emotion is needed. In the second part, nine tasks for the theoretical psychology of emotion are defined, by refining and extending three of the general tasks of theoretical psychology proposed 70 years ago by Sigmund Koch [Theoretical psychology, 1950: An overview. Psychological Review, 58(4), 295. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0055768]. The nine tasks are: (1) Analysis, rational reconstruction and critique of existing emotion theories. (2) Comparison of different theories. (3) Systematization and integration of theories. (4) Reconstruction of the development of theories over time. (5) Analysis, reconstruction and critique of theory-data and data-theory inferences. (6) Analysis, reconstruction and critique of the complete set of arguments for and against specific emotion-theoretic assumption and whole theories. (7) Analysis, reconstruction and critique of measurement theories for emotions. (8) Development of new emotion theories and theories of emotion measurement. (9) Information about theoretical and methodological developments of interest to emotion psychology in other subdisciplines of psychology and in neighbouring sciences, and export of theories and methods to other disciplines.

Perceptual latencies of object recognition and affect measured with the rotating spot method: Chronometric evidence for semantic primacy.

According to the semantic primacy hypothesis of emotion generation, stimuli must be semantically categorized to evoke emotions. This hypothesis was tested in two chronometric studies, using the rotating spot method of timing subjective events. Participants saw pleasant and unpleasant pictures while a spot rotated around the edge of the picture. In different blocks of trials, they indicated when they experienced the pleasant or unpleasant feeling evoked by the pictures, or recognized the depicted objects, by reporting the position of the spot at the time when these mental events occurred. In both experiments, the latency of object recognition was found to be shorter than the latency of affect for nearly all participants and pictures, and the two latencies were positively correlated across participants. Experiment 2 replicated these findings and additionally showed that an experimental manipulation that delayed object recognition, blurring the pictures, also delayed the onset of affect. A mediation analysis suggested that this effect was at least partly mediated by the delayed recognition of the objects. The findings support the semantic primacy hypothesis. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Effects of Instrumentality and Personal Force on Deontological and Utilitarian Inclinations in Harm-Related Moral Dilemmas.

Moral dilemmas often concern actions that involve causing harm to others in the attempt to prevent greater harm. But not all actions of this kind are equal in terms of their moral evaluation. In particular, a harm-causing preventive action is typically regarded as less acceptable if the harm is a means to achieve the goal of preventing greater harm than if it is a foreseen but unintended side-effect of the action. Likewise, a harm-causing preventive action is typically deemed less acceptable if it directly produces the harm than if it merely initiates a process that brings about the harmful consequence by its own dynamics. We report three experiments that investigated to which degree these two variables, the instrumentality of the harm (harm as means vs. side-effect; Experiments 1, 2, and 3) and personal force (personal vs. impersonal dilemmas; Experiments 2 and 3) influence deontological (harm-rejection) and utilitarian (outcome-maximization) inclinations that have been hypothesized to underly moral judgments in harm-related moral dilemmas. To measure these moral inclinations, the process dissociation procedure was used. The results suggest that the instrumentality of the harm and personal force affect both inclinations, but in opposite ways. Personal dilemmas and dilemmas characterized by harm as a means evoked higher deontological tendencies and lower utilitarian tendencies, than impersonal dilemmas and dilemmas where the harm was a side-effect. These distinct influences of the two dilemma conceptualization variables went undetected if the conventional measure of moral inclinations, the proportion of harm-accepting judgments, was analyzed. Furthermore, although deontological and utilitarian inclinations were found to be largely independent overall, there was some evidence that their correlation depended on the experimental conditions.

Cognition and emotion: a plea for theory.

Research on cognition and emotion during the past 30 years has made reasonable progress in theory, methods and empirical research. New theories of the cognition-emotion relation have been proposed, emotion research has become more interdisciplinary, and improved methods of emotion measurement have been developed. On the empirical side, the main achievement of the past 30 years is seen to consist in the reduction of the set of serious contenders for a theory of emotions. Still, several important issues are not fully resolved, including the computational implementation of appraisal processes, the nature of emotions, and the link between emotions and actions. Also, quantitative theories of the cognition-emotion relation need to be refined and tested, and improved theories of the link between emotions and bodily and facial expressions need to be developed. To counter the dangers of theoretical fragmentation and knowledge loss, more efforts should be devoted to the analysis, reconstruction, comparison and integration of important theories and hypotheses in the field of emotion, as well as to the systematization of arguments in favor and against these theories and hypotheses.

The Cognitive-Evolutionary Model of Surprise: A Review of the Evidence.

Research on surprise relevant to the cognitive-evolutionary model of surprise proposed by Meyer, Reisenzein, and Schützwohl (1997) is reviewed. The majority of the assumptions of the model are found empirically supported. Surprise is evoked by unexpected (schema-discrepant) events and its intensity is determined by the degree if schema-discrepancy, whereas the novelty and the valence of the eliciting events probably do not have an independent effect. Unexpected events cause an automatic interruption of ongoing mental processes that is followed by an attentional shift and attentional binding to the events, which is often followed by causal and other event analysis processes and by schema revision. The facial expression of surprise postulated by evolutionary emotion psychologists has been found to occur rarely in surprise, for as yet unknown reasons. A physiological orienting response marked by skin conductance increase, heart rate deceleration, and pupil dilation has been observed to occur regularly in the standard version of the repetition-change paradigm of surprise induction, but the specificity of these reactions as indicators of surprise is controversial. There is indirect evidence for the assumption that the feeling of surprise consists of the direct awareness of the schema-discrepancy signal, but this feeling, or at least the self-report of surprise, is also influenced by experienced interference. In contrast, facial feedback probably does contribute substantially to the feeling of surprise and the evidence for the hypothesis that surprise is affected by the difficulty of explaining an unexpected event is, in our view, inconclusive. Regardless of how the surprise feeling is constituted, there is evidence that it has both motivational and informational effects. Finally, the prediction failure implied by unexpected events sometimes causes a negative feeling, but there is no convincing evidence that this is always the case, and we argue that even if it were so, this would not be a sufficient reason for regarding this feeling as a component, rather than as an effect of surprise.

The Culture-Transmission Motive in Immigrants: A World-Wide Internet Survey.

A world-wide internet survey was conducted to test central assumptions of a recent theory of cultural transmission in minorities proposed by the authors. 844 1st to 2nd generation immigrants from a wide variety of countries recruited on a microjob platform completed a questionnaire designed to test eight hypotheses derived from the theory. Support was obtained for all hypotheses. In particular, evidence was obtained for the continued presence, in the immigrants, of the culture-transmission motive postulated by the theory: the desire to maintain the culture of origin and transmit it to the next generation. Support was also obtained for the hypothesized anchoring of the culture-transmission motive in more basic motives fulfilled by cultural groups, the relative intra- and intergenerational stability of the culture-transmission motive, and its motivating effects for action tendencies and desires that support cultural transmission under the difficult conditions of migration. Furthermore, the findings suggest that the assumption that people have a culture-transmission motive belongs to the folk psychology of sociocultural groups, and that immigrants regard the fulfillment of this desire as a moral right.

On the universality of the attribution-affect model of helping.

Although Pilati et al.'s (2014) findings question the strong quantitative universality of the attribution-affect model of helping, they are consistent with a weak form of quantitative universality, as well as with the qualitative universality of the theory. However, universality is put into question by previous studies revealing significant and sizeable between-study differences in the strength of the causal paths postulated by the theory. These differences may in part reflect differences in the type of helping situations studied.

Indirect scaling methods for testing quantitative emotion theories.

Two studies investigated the utility of indirect scaling methods, based on graded pair comparisons, for the testing of quantitative emotion theories. In Study 1, we measured the intensity of relief and disappointment caused by lottery outcomes, and in Study 2, the intensity of disgust evoked by pictures, using both direct intensity ratings and graded pair comparisons. The stimuli were systematically constructed to reflect variables expected to influence the intensity of the emotions according to theoretical models of relief/disappointment and disgust, respectively. Two probabilistic scaling methods were used to estimate scale values from the pair comparison judgements: Additive functional measurement (AFM) and maximum likelihood difference scaling (MLDS). The emotion models were fitted to the direct and indirect intensity measurements using nonlinear regression (Study 1) and analysis of variance (Study 2). Both studies found substantially improved fits of the emotion models for the indirectly determined emotion intensities, with their advantage being evident particularly at the level of individual participants. The results suggest that indirect scaling methods yield more precise measurements of emotion intensity than rating scales and thereby provide stronger tests of emotion theories in general and quantitative emotion theories in particular.

On the expression and experience of surprise: no evidence for facial feedback, but evidence for a reverse self-inference effect.

Three studies examined the effects of experimentally manipulated surprise expressions on the experience of surprise. Surprise was induced by a sudden, unannounced change of the stimulus presentation during a computerized task. Facial expression was manipulated by leading participants to adopt an expression akin to surprise, or by forcing them to look up steeply to a monitor. The expression manipulations had no intensifying effect on the experience of surprise, whereas manipulations of unexpectedness and mental load had strong effects. In addition, mental load was found to affect beliefs about facial expression, suggesting that the participants used their feelings of surprise to infer their probable facial displays. Path analyses supported this reverse self-inference hypothesis.

The process of emotion inference.

Three experiments investigated the process of inferring emotions from brief descriptions of typical eliciting situations, using response time methodology. The initial hypothesis was that emotion inferences are mediated by inferred cognitive appraisals of the eliciting event (concerning e.g., its valence or the responsible agent). This hypothesis was contradicted by the finding of Experiment 1 that emotion judgments are typically made faster than appraisal judgments. To explain this finding, it was hypothesized that emotion judgments are based on automatized (proceduralized) appraisal inferences. This hypothesis was tested in Experiments 2 and 3 using a judgment facilitation paradigm. The results supported the proceduralization hypothesis by demonstrating that appraisal judgments are facilitated by prior emotion judgments.

Emotions and appraisals: can you have one without the other?

In his commentary on M. Siemer and R. Reisenzein (2007), B. Parkinson (2007) raised a number of important questions concerning the process of emotion inference and the scope of appraisal theories. Siemer and Reisenzein first examine the alternative explanations of their findings proposed by Parkinson and then look at the alternative "situated" view of emotions proposed by him. The main conclusion is that the issues raised by Parkinson can be dealt with by (suitable extensions of) appraisal theory.

Evidence for strong dissociation between emotion and facial displays: the case of surprise.

Eight experiments examined facial expressions of surprise in adults. Surprise was induced by disconfirming a previously established schema or expectancy. Self-reports and behavioral measures indicated the presence of surprise in most participants, but surprise expressions were observed only in 4%-25%, and most displays consisted of eyebrow raising only; the full, 3-component display was never seen. Experimental variations of surprise intensity, sociality, and duration/complexity of the surprising event did not change these results. Electromyographic measurement failed to detect notably more brow raisings and, in one study, revealed a decrease of frontalis muscle activity in the majority of the participants. Nonetheless, most participants believed that they had shown a strong surprise expression.

Response styles in affect ratings: making a mountain out of a molehill.

Ratings of affect words are the most commonly used method to assess pleasant affect (PA) and unpleasant affect (UA). The reliance on self-reports would be problematic if affect ratings were heavily influenced by response styles. Several recent publications have indeed suggested (a) that the influence of response styles on affect ratings is pervasive, (b) that this influence can be controlled by variations of the response format using multitrait-multimethod models, and (c) the discriminant validity of PA and UA is spurious. In this article, we examined the evidence for these claims. We demonstrate that (a) response styles have a negligible effect on affect ratings, (b) multiple response formats produce the same results as a single response format, and (c) the discriminant validity of PA and UA is not a method artifact. Rather, evidence against discriminant validity is due to the use of inappropriate response formats that respondents interpreted as bipolar scales.

Experiencing activation: energetic arousal and tense arousal are not mixtures of valence and activation.

R. E. Thayer (1989) proposed 2 types of activation: energetic arousal (awake-tired) and tense arousal (tense-calm). This view has been challenged by claims that energetic arousal and tense arousal are mixtures of valence and a single activation dimension. The authors present a direct test of this hypothesis by computing the correlation between the residuals of energetic arousal and tense arousal after removing the shared variance with valence. Whereas the valence activation hypothesis predicts a strong positive correlation between the 2 residuals, the authors found that it was not significantly different from 0. This finding reaffirms the view of energetic arousal and tense arousal as 2 distinct types of activation.