Implicit and explicit processing on base rate neglect problems.

Base rate reasoning as assessed on Base rate neglect (BRN) Tasks has been studied extensively, with a sizable body of findings indicating that both logical (base rate) and belief-based (case description) processing contribute to responses on the task. Various task conditions have been found to influence which type of processing controls responding. The present study compares two instructional sets, one which requires responding in terms of the base rate information and one which requires responding in accordance with the case description. This manipulation allows for a distinction between explicit processing (set-consistent) and implicit processing (set-inconsistent and potentially interfering). We also manipulated the extremity of the base rates employed in the task and the extremity of the stereotypes contained in the case description. We argue that extremity effects should be present in implicit, but not explicit, processing, suggesting that these effects are the result of limitations in the control of set-inconsistent processing. The results generally supported the predictions. In addition, a proclivity for analytical thinking, as measured by actively open-minded thinking (AOT), was associated with less interference of belief-based processing on logical responding, but greater interference of logical processing on belief-based responding.

Judging the implications of a concession: Conversational distance and belief bias effects.

An arguer's position at a given point in an argument can be characterized as a set of commitments. The present study considers the perceptions of ordinary language users about the implications of making a concession for the contents of the conceder's commitment set. In particular, we examine two sources of influence on such lay perceptions-conversational distance (i.e., the number of turns separating the concession from commitments incurred earlier in the argument) and an individual's prior beliefs regarding the content of the argument. Across two studies, college students were administered an argument task assessing the extent to which a concession by the protagonist of an argument on the last move indicated changes to other commitments incurred earlier in the argument. Results indicated that participants were more likely to judge a concession as indicating a change in prior commitments if (a) the commitment was incurred later in the argument than earlier, and (b) the participant disagreed with the protagonists' thesis in the argument. In addition, performance on deductive reasoning tasks predicted individual differences in the conversational distance effect, but not the belief bias effect.

Dual-systems and the development of reasoning: competence-procedural systems.

Dual-system, dual-process, accounts of adult cognitive processing are examined in the context of a self-organizing relational developmental systems approaches to cognitive growth. Contemporary adult dual-process accounts describe a linear architecture of mind entailing two split-off, but interacting systems; a domain general, content-free 'analytic' system (system 2) and a domain specific highly contextualized 'heuristic' system (system 1). In the developmental literature on deductive reasoning, a similar distinction has been made between a domain general competence (reflective, algorithmic) system and a domain specific procedural system. In contrast to the linear accounts offered by empiricist, nativist, and/or evolutionary explanations, the dual competence-procedural developmental perspective argues that the mature systems emerge through developmental transformations as differentiations and intercoordinations of an early relatively undifferentiated action matrix. This development, whose microscopic mechanism is action-in-the-world, is characterized as being embodied, nonlinear, and epigenetic. WIREs Cogni Sci 2011 2 231-237 DOI: 10.1002/wcs.120 For further resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs website.

The influence of argument structure on judgements of argument strength, function, and adequacy.

The present study explored the extent to which lay adults consider aspects of argument structure in judging the strength and function of informal arguments and in constructing arguments to meet specific adequacy goals. Across two experiments, college students were presented with base (one-premise) arguments, which were then expanded into convergent, coordinate, and subordinate arguments closely matched in terms of content, believability, and strength. Coordinate arguments were associated with the greatest gains in argument strength via their construction and the greatest loss in strength when one of their premises was falsified. To some degree, the argument types were also judged to perform different functions and to serve different goals. The construction of convergent arguments was associated with building independent lines of support while the construction of subordinate arguments was associated with providing justification for premises. Expansion into a coordinate argument was seen as the best way to improve an argument's persuasiveness. The construction of both coordinate and subordinate arguments was associated with building relevance, explicating assumptions, and completing the meaning of a base argument. Results are discussed in terms of argumentation theory and research.

The macrostructure of informal arguments: a proposed model and analysis.

Theories of informal reasoning and critical thinking often maintain that everyday, informal arguments can be classified into types based on the specific organization that the premises or reasons enter into in their support for the conclusion (Snoeck Henkemans, 2000; Vorobej, 1995b). Three general types are identified: convergent, coordinately linked, and subordinately linked arguments. There has been no empirical research, however, to determine whether these structural distinctions have any psychological reality. In the first two of four experiments, college students were presented with premise pairs from larger, informal arguments and were asked to judge the nature of the relationship between the premises in a pair. The judgments involved applying "tests" of linkage, subordination, and so on, that have been proposed in the theoretical literature on argument analysis (e.g., Walton, 1996a; Yanal, 1991). Results suggest that adults can effectively distinguish between linked (interdependent) and convergent relationships and can further distinguish between interdependencies that are full and those that are merely partial. Adults also distinguished between subordinate and nonsubordinate relations. Experiments 3 and 4 provide evidence that adults make use of information about argument structure in evaluating argument strength and in categorizing arguments. Experiment 4 further suggests that facility with macrostructure is only modestly related to deductive reasoning competence. Findings are framed in terms of a speculative account of how argument structure is identified and mentally represented.