An Evaluation of Situation Reports and Incident Notices: The DBPR/ESRB Experience.

OBJECTIVE: The main objective of this study is to review information within the situation reports (SITREPs) and incident notices (INs) prepared by the Division of Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response/Epidemiology Surveillance and Response Branch, (DBPR/ESRB), Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). The secondary objective is to evaluate accuracy and completeness of the information provided in these documents. METHODS: The authors reviewed all SITREPs/INs prepared by DBPR/ESRB from January 2007 to June 2009. Data were abstracted for variables related to the type of incidents, the type of CDC assistance requested, the geographic origin of the calls, and the organization reporting the event or requesting CDC assistance or both. In addition, variables were also created to assess the accuracy and completeness of reports for quality improvement analysis. RESULTS: The DBPR/ESRB prepared 77 SITREPs and 22 INs. Most of them were related to unknown white powders/suspicious packages or BioWatch Actionable Reports (78%). Most calls (79%), requesting CDC assistance or not, were domestic. Almost all calls requesting CDC assistance were for clinical and/or laboratory consultation and/or request for analysis of samples. Most of the calls requesting CDC assistance came from city, county, state, or federal government agencies and military organizations (82%). However, 14 of the analyzed documents (14.4%) were misclassified, that is, a SITREP was written when it should have been an IN or vice versa. The authors also noted the absence of some relevant information among some of the documents, for example, date/time of update. CONCLUSIONS: All of the issues/incidents reported in this article to which DBPR/ESRB responded were cause for legitimate concern. However, significant improvement can be made in the preparation of these reports by CDC staff to ensure efficient and effective response from CDC and its partners. Finally, local entities may wish to develop a similar documentation and reporting process to help manage significant incidents.

Call-tracking data and the public health response to bioterrorism-related anthrax.

After public notification of confirmed cases of bioterrorism-related anthrax, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's Emergency Operations Center responded to 11,063 bioterrorism-related telephone calls from October 8 to November 11, 2001. Most calls were inquiries from the public about anthrax vaccines (58.4%), requests for general information on bioterrorism prevention (14.8%), and use of personal protective equipment (12.0%); 882 telephone calls (8.0%) were referred to the state liaison team for follow-up investigation. Of these, 226 (25.6%) included reports of either illness clinically confirmed to be compatible with anthrax or direct exposure to an environment known to be contaminated with Bacillus anthracis. The remaining 656 (74.4%) included no confirmed illness but reported exposures to "suspicious" packages or substances or the receipt of mail through a contaminated facility. Emergency response staff must handle high call volumes following suspected or actual bioterrorist attacks. Standardized health communication protocols that address contact with unknown substances, handling of suspicious mail, and clinical evaluation of suspected cases would allow more efficient follow-up investigations of clinically compatible cases in high-risk groups.