Are US hospitals making progress in implementing guidelines for prevention of Mycobacterium tuberculosis transmission?

BACKGROUND: Outbreaks of tuberculosis (TB) in hospitals have occurred when the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) guideline recommendations for preventing the transmission of Mycobacterium tuberculosis were not fully implemented. OBJECTIVE: To determine whether US hospitals are making progress in implementing the CDC guidelines for preventing TB. METHODS: In 1992, we surveyed all public (city, county, Veterans Affairs, and primary medical school-affiliated) US hospitals (n = 632) and 444 (20%) random samples of all private hospitals with 100 beds or more. In 1996, we resurveyed 136 random samples (50%) of all 1992 respondent hospitals with 6 or more TB admissions in 1991. RESULTS: Of the 1076 hospitals surveyed in 1992, 763 (71%) respondents returned a completed questionnaire. Among these, 536 (71%) of 755 reported having rooms that met CDC criteria for acid-fast bacilli isolation, ie, negative air pressure, 6 or more air exchanges per hour, and air directly vented to the outside. The predominant respiratory protective device for health care workers was nonfitted surgical mask and attending physicians were infrequently (50%) included in tuberculin skin-testing programs. In the 1996 resurvey, 103 (76%) of 136 respondents returned a completed questionnaire. Of these, 99 (96%) reported having rooms that met CDC criteria for acid-fast bacilli isolation. The N95 respiratory protective devices were predominantly used by health care workers, and attending physicians were increasingly (69%) included in the hospitals' tuberculin skin-testing programs. CONCLUSIONS: Most US hospitals are making progress in the implementation of CDC guidelines for preventing the transmission of M tuberculosis.

Gram-negative bacteremia in open-heart-surgery patients traced to probable tap-water contamination of pressure-monitoring equipment.

OBJECTIVE: To determine the cause(s) of an outbreak of gram-negative bacteremia (GNB) in open-heart-surgery (OHS) patients at hospital A. DESIGN: Case-control and cohort studies and an environmental survey. RESULTS: Nine patients developed GNB with Enterobacter cloacae (6), Pseudomonas aeruginosa (5), Klebsiella pneumoniae (3), Serratia marcescens (2), or Klebsiella oxytoca (1) following OHS; five of nine patients had polymicrobial bacteremia. When the GNB patients were compared with randomly selected OHS patients, having had the first procedure of the day (8 of 9 versus 12 of 27, P = .02), longer cardiopulmonary bypass (median, 122 versus 83 minutes, P = .01) or cross-clamp times (median, 75 versus 42 minutes, P = .008), intraoperative dopamine infusion (9 of 9 versus 15 of 27, P = .01), or exposure to scrub nurse 6 (6 of 9 versus 4 of 27, P = .001) were identified as risk factors. When stratified by length of the procedure, only being the first procedure of the day and exposure to scrub nurse 6 remained significant. First procedures used pressure-monitoring equipment that was assembled before surgery and left open and uncovered overnight in the operating room, whereas other procedures used pressure-monitoring equipment assembled immediately before the procedure. At night, operating rooms were cleaned by maintenance personnel who used a disinfectant-water solution sprayed through a hose connected to an automatic diluting system. Observation of the use of this hose documented that this solution could have contacted and entered uncovered pressure-monitoring equipment left in the operating room. Water samples from the hose revealed no disinfectant, but grew P aeruginosa. The outbreak was terminated by setting up pressure-monitoring equipment immediately before the procedure and discontinuing use of the hose-disinfectant system. CONCLUSIONS: This outbreak most likely resulted from contamination of uncovered preassembled pressure-monitoring equipment by water from a malfunctioning spray disinfectant device. Pressure-monitoring equipment should be assembled immediately before use and protected from possible environmental contamination.

U.S. hospital mycobacteriology laboratories: status and comparison with state public health department laboratories.

In response to the resurgence of tuberculosis, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention recommended the use of certain mycobacteriology laboratory methods to improve the accuracy of diagnosis and/or minimize times to complete specimen processing. A study to determine the extent to which these recommended methods were being used in hospital laboratories was needed. In 1992, a survey was mailed to infection control and laboratory personnel at 1,076 hospitals with > or = 100 beds to determine the mycobacterial laboratory services being performed, the methods being used, the number of specimens being processed, and the times to completion during 1991. In 1995, a 20% sample of hospital laboratories that responded to the initial questionnaire was resurveyed. Responses to the 1992 survey were received from personnel at 756 (70%) hospitals representing 750 laboratories. Among laboratories performing the services, the use of recommended methods was as follows: fluorochrome stain for acid-fast bacillus microscopy (47%); radiometric methods for primary culture (29%); rapid (radiometric methods, use of nucleic acid probes, high-performance liquid chromatography, or gas-liquid chromatography) methods for identification of Mycobacterium tuberculosis (59%); and radiometric methods for drug susceptibility testing (55%). Reported times to complete specimen processing were shortest for laboratories that used recommended methods and longest for hospitals that referred specimens to outside laboratories. Only 46% of surveyed laboratories performed at least the minimal number of mycobacterial cultures (20/week) deemed necessary to maintain competence. Among 145 laboratories that performed the services and were resurveyed in 1995, use of recommended techniques increased from 44 to 73% for acid-fast bacillus microscopy, from 27 to 37% for primary culture, from 59 to 88% for M. tuberculosis identification, and from 55 to 75% for drug susceptibility testing. These changes were associated with reductions in reported specimen turnaround times. Use of the methods recommended by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention increased at the resurveyed hospital mycobacteriology laboratories between 1991 and 1995. However, continued efforts are needed to increase the use of recommended methods at moderate- and high-volume laboratories, encourage referral of specimens from low-volume laboratories, and transmit results rapidly from all laboratories.

An outbreak of pyrogenic reactions in chronic hemodialysis patients associated with hemodialyzer reuse.

In February 1992, 22 patients undergoing chronic hemodialysis at an outpatient dialysis center experienced pyrogenic reactions (PR). The PR rate was significantly greater (p < 0.001) during the epidemic (February 3-5) than the pre-epidemic period (November 1, 1992-February 1, 1992). All patients with PR used dialyzers that had been manually reprocessed either on February 1 or 3. These dialyzers contained up to 120.8 EU/ml of endotoxin in the blood compartment. The only dialyzer reprocessed before February 1 that was available for analysis was found to contain no detectable endotoxin, while dialyzers reprocessed during the epidemic period contained a median endotoxin concentration of 52.8 EU/ml. The bioburden of water used to prepare dialysate was in excess of the Association for the Advancement of Medical Instrumentation (AAMI) standard for water, < or = 200 colony forming units (CFU)/ml. Samples of treated water collected in the reuse area were within AAMI standards at the time of the investigation (February 11 and February 26), but before the investigation, water samples were assayed with a culture method that could not detect microbial concentrations below 10(3) CFU/ml. In addition, the treated water feed line to the disinfectant container may never have been disinfected. However, no samples were collected from this line during the investigation. This outbreak emphasizes the need to use water that meets the AAMI bacteriologic and endotoxin standards of < or = to 200 CFU/ml and/or 5 EU/ml, respectively, for reprocessing hemodialyzers nad to ensure that appropriate culture techniques are used for treated water dialysate.