Epistemics of the soul: Epistemic logics in German 18th-century empirical psychology.

This article examines epistemic logics in 18th-century German empirical psychology and distinguishes three basic patterns at play throughout the century. First, as empirical psychology was introduced in the 1720s, it relied on the Aristotelian-scholastic conception of experience as universal and evidently true propositions of how things typically behave in nature. Empirical psychology was here a matter of defining and demonstrating the general nature, structure, and functions of the soul by referring to experiences that most people could recognize as universally and evidently true. Second, around midcentury this logic was challenged as a new generation of philosopher-physicians launched an empirical psychology based on extraordinary medical cases. Rather than focusing on the general and universal, this new strand of case-based empirical psychology charted the individual, unique and often abnormal. Third, from the early 1770s, the interest in the individual was complemented by a new discourse on psychological method. Adopting the epistemic techniques developed within natural and experimental philosophy, empirical knowledge of the soul was seen as the result of rigorously conducted singular observations that were frequently repeated and carefully documented and analyzed. Rather than replacing one another sequentially, these three epistemic logics should be understood as cumulative. That is, despite sometimes profound differences, each new logic was layered on top of the existing ones, thereby broadening and increasing the epistemic complexity of empirical psychology.

Michael Alberti and the Medical Therapy of the Internal Senses.

In the first half of the eighteenth century, the German physician Michael Alberti was responsible for hundreds of dissertations and other works in medicine. While the bulk of the production reflected the dominating medical topics of his time, he also developed an original focus on the internal senses and their effects on bodily health and disease. Depending on whether internal senses, such as imagination and memory, were cultivated in the right way or not, they could work as powerful remedies or as equally powerful triggers of disease and even death. This article explores this little known strand of early modern medicine in three steps. First, it shows that Alberti's medicine took form in intimate connection to the Stahlian brand of Pietist medicine. As such, it further elaborated an existing strand of medicine that was intimately connected to German Pietism. Second, it analyses in some detail the role of the internal senses from a pathological and therapeutic perspective as well as examining what kind of persona the physician ought to embody. Lastly, it raises larger questions regarding how to understand this strand of early modern medicine. Rather than approaching it from the perspective of disciplinary history, the article seeks to reconstruct it as a part of what has sometimes been referred to as the early modern cultura animi tradition.