[Outbreak with Ralstonia pickettii caused by contaminated magnesium vials]. / Ausbruch mit Ralstonia pickettii durch kontaminierte Magnesium-Ampullen.

HISTORY: In February 2013, 5 patients in an intensive care unit (ICU) were found to have positive blood cultures with Ralstonia pickettii within one week. Because all patients got intravenous therapy, improper work of a staff member was suspected. Some days later, a 6th patient was found with a positive blood culture of Ralstonia pickettii in another department of the hospital. INVESTIGATIONS: Hygienic investigations showed no evidence of failures in preparation of intravenous therapy. All patients were on different intravenous drugs, but every patient had received glucose 5 % and magnesium. We examined samples of glucose and magnesia as well as samples from environment. RESULTS AND COURSE: Glucose and magnesium samples were examined by membrane filter method. Ralstonia pitteckii was detected in some Magnesium vials. We concluded, that contamination of Magnesium vials might have been the reason for blood stream infection of patients. Pharmacists and authorities were informed and all vials were collected and replaced by vials from another company. Later a nationwide recall of Magnesium vials was performed by the producing company. No further Ralstonia pickettii was found in blood cultures in our hospital. CONCLUSION: Unusual pathogens in blood cultures should lead to reflection of rarer causes such as contamination of medicines.

Contact investigation of a case of human novel coronavirus infection treated in a German hospital, October-November 2012.

On 24 October 2012, a patient with acute respiratory distress syndrome of unknown origin and symptom onset on 5 October was transferred from Qatar to a specialist lung clinic in Germany. Late diagnosis on 20 November of an infection with the novel Coronavirus (NCoV) resulted in potential exposure of a considerable number of healthcare workers. Using a questionnaire we asked 123 identified contacts (120 hospital and three out-of-hospital contacts) about exposure to the patient. Eighty-five contacts provided blood for a serological test using a two-stage approach with an initial immunofluorescence assay as screening test, followed by recombinant immunofluorescence assays and a NCoV-specific serum neutralisation test. Of 123 identified contacts nine had performed aerosol-generating procedures within the third or fourth week of illness, using personal protective equipment rarely or never, and two of these developed acute respiratory illness. Serology was negative for all nine. Further 76 hospital contacts also tested negative, including two sera initially reactive in the screening test. The contact investigation ruled out transmission to contacts after illness day 20. Our two-stage approach for serological testing may be used as a template for similar situations.