An anti-inertial motion bias explains people discounting inertial motion of carried objects.

In this paper we propose an anti-inertial motion (AIM) bias that can explain several intuitive physics beliefs including the straight-down belief and beliefs held concerning the pendulum problem. We show how the AIM bias also explains two new beliefs that we explore - a straight-up-and-down belief as well as a straight-out/backward bias that occurs for objects traveling in one plane that are then thrown in another plane, ostensibly affording a greater opportunity for perception of canonical motion. We then show how the AIM bias in general is invariant across perceived/imagined speed of the object carrier, only altering percentages of straight-out from backward responses, and why occluding the carrier once the object is released into a second plane does not result in more veridical perception. The AIM bias serves as a simple explanation for a family of beliefs including those in the current paper as well as those shown in previous work.

Manipulation of expended effort and intent does not affect estimates of slant or distance.

It is well known that people overestimate the orientation of both geographical and man-made sloped surfaces by between 5°-20°. More recently, work has shown that when people are encumbered by wearing a heavy backpack they overestimate hills and distances even more than a group not wearing heavy backpacks; however, the backpack manipulation has since been shown to be a demand effect-that is, being encumbered does not affect perception-it only biases those people influenced by it to give estimates the experimenters are seeking. Here we first show that expended effort and intent have never actually been manipulated between subjects in any of the work on steepness estimates, and expended effort has never been explicitly manipulated between subjects for distance estimates. When they are, they do not affect steepness or distance estimates. Our work is the first to experimentally manipulate effort and intent, to do this between subjects, while controlling for demand characteristics and checking to see whether the effort manipulation was effective. The experimental manipulation of effort and especially intent may be of benefit to parsing out perceptual effects from more cognitive or postperceptual processes in future work. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Pushing people to their tipping point: Phenomenal tipping point is predicted by phenomenal vertical and intuitive beliefs.

Previous work has shown that people overestimate their own body tilt by a factor of about 1.5, the same factor by which people overestimate geographical and man-made slopes. In Experiment 1 we investigated whether people can accurately identify their own and others' tipping points (TPs) - the point at which they are tilted backward and would no longer be able to return to upright - as well as their own and others' center of mass (COM) - the relative position of which is used to determine actual TP. We found that people overestimate their own and others' TP when tilted backward, estimate their own and others' COM higher than actual, and that COM estimation is unrelated to TP. In Experiment 2, we investigated people's intuitive beliefs about the TP. We also investigated the relationship between phenomenal TP and perceived vertical. Whether verbally (conceptually) estimating the TP, drawing the TP, or demonstrating the position of the TP, people believe that the TP is close to 45°. In Experiment 3, we found that anchoring influences phenomenal TP and vertical. When accounting for starting position, the TP seems to be best predicted by an intuitive belief that it is close to 45°. In Experiment 4, we show that there is no difference in phenomenal TP and vertical when being tilted about the feet or waist/hips. We discuss the findings in terms of action-perception differences found in other domains and practical implications.

Pedal and haptic estimates of slant suggest a common underlying representation.

It is well known that people verbally exaggerate the slant of visually perceived geographical, virtual, and man-made hills. More recently it has been shown that haptic and verbal estimates of slant result in similar exaggerations, supporting the proprioception calibration hypothesis-that similar biases exist in both verbal estimates of visually perceived slant and proprioceptively perceived hand orientation. This seems to point to a common underlying representation of slant. However, it is unclear if and how manual proprioceptive estimates might be relevant for perception of ground surface slant or how this might translate to pedal perception of surface orientation. In the current work we tested whether pedal perception is systematically connected to a representational system shared by haptic and visual perception. We did this by having people orient their foot to four different orientations of a ramp (Experiment 1) or to a staircase (Experiment 2) and compared these to estimates made using a free hand measure as well as to verbal estimates. Our results show that verbal, haptic, and pedal measures of visually perceived surface orientation all result in similar estimates of slant and do so across different slanted surfaces. This suggests that verbal and haptic proprioceptive estimates tap into a representational system of visually perceived surface orientation that is relevant for walking up various surface orientations.