Do judges prefer advisors with dependent or independent errors? Investigating judges' advice selection and advice weighting.

Advice stemming from sources with errors that are dependent on each other is usually less accurate than advice provided by sources with independent errors, while simultaneously exhibiting greater consensus. We investigate whether or not individuals express a preference for advice with dependent errors by choosing it over advice with independent errors and by weighting it more strongly. We test for this preference both in a situation where error interdependence does not negatively affect advice accuracy as well as in a situation where advice with dependent errors is less accurate than advice with independent errors. In a series of six studies, we show that, when being given the opportunity to choose between the two types of advice, participants only prefer advice with dependent errors if this is not detrimental for accuracy. However, when being sequentially provided with both types of advice, they generally weight advice with dependent errors more than advice with independent errors, even if the latter is more accurate. This effect is mainly driven by the fact that advice with dependent errors exhibits greater consensus, leading participants' initial estimates to lie outside the range of the advisors' judgments more frequently. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Does change of responsibility reduce escalating commitment? A replication and theoretical extension.

Reassigning responsibility is the most prominent and best-replicated intervention against escalating commitment (i.e., the failure to withdraw from losing courses of action). This intervention is considered effective because it reduces reinvestments after negative feedback in decision scenarios with a single reinvestment decision. However, we argue that any intervention against escalating commitment should fulfill two additional criteria. The first is temporal stability, that is, the beneficial effects of the intervention need to persist beyond a single reinvestment decision. The second is specific effectiveness, that is, the intervention should reduce commitment only if the project continues to fail after an initial setback (structural failure) but not if it recovers and is ultimately profitable (temporary failure). To subject reassignment of responsibility to this critical test of effectiveness, we introduce a modification of the escalation paradigm that allows testing for temporal stability and differentiates between structural and temporary failure. In the first of two experiments, we did not find evidence of temporal stability. Experiment 2 found persistent short-term effects of responsibility reassignment, but these effects were unspecific, reducing commitment to both losing and ultimately successful courses of action. Our findings question the usefulness of responsibility reassignment as an effective intervention against escalating commitment. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Measuring Implicit Motives with the Picture Story Exercise (PSE): Databases of Expert-Coded German Stories, Pictures, and Updated Picture Norms.

We present two openly accessible databases related to the assessment of implicit motives using Picture Story Exercises (PSEs): (a) A database of 183,415 German sentences, nested in 26,389 stories provided by 4,570 participants, which have been coded by experts using Winter's coding system for the implicit affiliation/intimacy, achievement, and power motives, and (b) a database of 54 classic and new pictures which have been used as PSE stimuli. Updated picture norms are provided which can be used to select appropriate pictures for PSE applications. Based on an analysis of the relations between raw motive scores, word count, and sentence count, we give recommendations on how to control motive scores for story length, and validate the recommendation with a meta-analysis on gender differences in the implicit affiliation motive that replicates existing findings. We discuss to what extent the guiding principles of the story length correction can be generalized to other content coding systems for narrative material. Several potential applications of the databases are discussed, including (un)supervised machine learning of text content, psychometrics, and better reproducibility of PSE research.

A test of synergy in dynamic system control tasks.

Individual performance in controlling complex dynamic systems such as managing production in a company or keeping ecosystems in balance is often suboptimal. In this article, we provide the first unequivocal test of whether groups are superior to individuals when controlling dynamic systems. In addition, we test to what extent performance advantages of groups are simply the result of statistically aggregating a larger number of individual opinions and to what extent they represent true synergy attributable to within-group interaction. In 3 experiments, we compared the system control performance of interacting real groups with that of equally sized nominal groups and with individuals. We provide evidence that groups indeed perform better than individuals in dynamic system control tasks. Furthermore, in comparing real groups with nominal groups, we show that, although the majority of real groups' performance advantage stems from statistical aggregation, there is also evidence of true synergy. Finally, we identify the mechanism by which groups achieve synergy, namely group-to-individual transfer. Discussion allows group members to exchange critical information about the system, leading to an improved individual capability to control the system, which, in turn, improves group performance. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

G-I transfer in multicue judgment tasks: Discussion improves group members' knowledge about target relations.

One benefit of working in groups is that group members can learn from each other how to perform the task, a phenomenon called group-to-individual transfer (G-I transfer). In the context of quantitative judgments, G-I transfer means that group members improve their individual accuracy as a consequence of exchanging task-relevant information. This improved individual accuracy allows groups to outperform the average of a comparable number of individuals, that is, G-I transfer leads to synergy. While there is mounting evidence that group members benefit from G-I transfer in quantitative judgment tasks, we still know rather little about what exactly group members learn from each other during this transfer. Here, we build on the distinction between metric knowledge (knowing what constitutes a plausible range of values) and mapping knowledge (knowing the relative magnitude of the targets) to gain further insights into the nature of G-I transfer. Whereas previous research found evidence that G-I transfer improves group members' metric knowledge, there is, so far, no evidence that group discussion also improves mapping knowledge. Using a multicue judgment task, we tested whether group members would benefit from G-I-transfer and, if so, whether this G-I transfer would manifest in the form of improved mapping knowledge. The results of two experiments suggest that this is the case. Participants who worked in real interacting groups outperformed participants who worked individually, and this increase in accuracy was accompanied not only by improved metric but also by increased mapping knowledge. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Effects of process and outcome accountability on escalating commitment: A two-study replication.

Escalating commitment describes the phenomenon that decision makers may become stuck in losing courses of action, throwing good money after bad. In a seminal study, testing interventions against escalating commitment, Simonson and Staw (1992) found that holding decision makers accountable for the decision process (i.e., the decision strategies they use) decreases escalating commitment, whereas accountability for the decision outcomes tends to increase it. The initial aim of our study was to extend the original findings by testing for interactive effects of both types of accountability. However, as we did not replicate the original effects in a first experiment, in spite of the fact that our materials and our procedure resembled the original study as closely as possible, we conducted a second experiment with an even stronger accountability manipulation as compared to the original study, and with an increased sample size. Once again, no effects of accountability were found. Taken together, the results of these two experiments question the robustness of the original findings. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Effects of Process and Outcome Accountability on Idea Generation.

Previous research on the effects of outcome and process accountability on decision making has neglected the preceding phase of idea generation. We conducted a 2 (outcome accountability: yes vs. no) × 2 (process accountability: yes vs. no) experiment (N = 147) to test the effects of accountability on quantity and quality of generated ideas in a product design task. Furthermore, we examined potential negative side effects of accountability (i.e., stress and lengthened decision making). We found that (a) outcome accountability had a negative effect on quantity of ideas and (b) process accountability extended the idea generation process. Furthermore, any type of accountability (c) had a negative effect on uniqueness of ideas, (d) did not affect the quality of the idea that was selected, and (e) increased stress. Moreover, the negative effect of accountability on uniqueness of ideas was mediated by stress.

On the Inability to Ignore Useless Advice.

Research in the judge-advisor-paradigm suggests that advice is generally utilized less than it should be according to its quality. In a series of four experiments, we challenge this widely held assumption. We hypothesize that when advice quality is low, the opposite phenomenon, namely overutilization of advice, occurs. We further assume that this overutilization effect is the result of anchoring: advice serves as an anchor, thus causing an adjustment toward even useless advice. The data of our four experiments support these hypotheses. Judges systematically adjusted their estimates toward advice that we introduced to them as being useless, and this effect was stable after controlling for intentional utilization of this advice. Furthermore, we demonstrate that anchoring-based adjustment toward advice is independent of advice quality. Our findings enhance our understanding of the processes involved in advice taking and identify a potential threat to judgment accuracy arising from an inability to discount useless advice.

Disentangling the effects of advisor consensus and advice proximity.

When advice comes from interdependent sources (e.g., from advisors who use the same database), less information should be gained as compared to independent advice. On the other hand, since individuals strive for consistency, they should be more confident in consistent compared to conflicting advice, and interdependent advice should be more consistent than independent advice. In a study investigating the differential effects of interdependent versus independent advice on a judge's accuracy and confidence (Yaniv, Choshen-Hillel, & Milyavsky, 2009), advice interdependence was confounded with another variable, namely closeness of the advice to the judge's estimate. Interdependent advice was not only more consistent than independent advice but also closer to the judge's first estimate. The present study aimed at disentangling the effects of consensus and closeness of the advice by adding a third experimental condition in which interdependent (and, hence, consistent) advice was far from the judge's own estimate. We found that, as suggested by Yaniv et al., accuracy gains were indeed a consequence of advisor interdependence. However, in contrast to Yaniv et al.'s conclusions, confidence in the correctness of one's estimates was mostly a function of the advice's proximity to the participants' initial estimations, thereby indicating a social validation effect. (PsycINFO Database Record

Differentiation of selves: Differentiating a fuzzy concept.

Notwithstanding the appeal of the "one size fits all" approach that Baumeister et al. propose, we argue that there is no panacea for improving group performance. The concept of "differentiation of selves" constitutes an umbrella term for similar seeming but actually different constructs. Even the same type of "differentiation of selves" can be beneficial for some and harmful for other tasks.

The consistency principle in interpersonal communication: consequences of preference confirmation and disconfirmation in collective decision making.

Interpersonal cognitive consistency is a driving force in group behavior. In this article, we propose a new model of interpersonal cognitive consistency in collective decision making. Building on ideas from the mutual enhancement model (Wittenbaum, Hubbell, & Zuckerman, 1999), we argue that group members evaluate one another more positively when they mention information confirming each other's preferences instead of information disconfirming these preferences. Furthermore, we argue that this effect is mediated by perceived information quality: Group members evaluate one another more positively when they mention information confirming each other's preferences because they perceive this information to be more important and accurate than information disconfirming each other's preferences. Finally, we hypothesize that group members who communicate information confirming each other's preferences receive positive feedback for doing so, which, in turn, leads group members to mention even more of this information. The results of 3 studies with pseudo and face-to-face interacting dyads provide converging support for our model.

The active learning hypothesis of the job-demand-control model: an experimental examination.

The active learning hypothesis of the job-demand-control model [Karasek, R. A. 1979. "Job Demands, Job Decision Latitude, and Mental Strain: Implications for Job Redesign." Administration Science Quarterly 24: 285-307] proposes positive effects of high job demands and high job control on performance. We conducted a 2 (demands: high vs. low) × 2 (control: high vs. low) experimental office workplace simulation to examine this hypothesis. Since performance during a work simulation is confounded by the boundaries of the demands and control manipulations (e.g. time limits), we used a post-test, in which participants continued working at their task, but without any manipulation of demands and control. This post-test allowed for examining active learning (transfer) effects in an unconfounded fashion. Our results revealed that high demands had a positive effect on quantitative performance, without affecting task accuracy. In contrast, high control resulted in a speed-accuracy tradeoff, that is participants in the high control conditions worked slower but with greater accuracy than participants in the low control conditions.

Do you want to convince me or to be understood?: preference-consistent information sharing and its motivational determinants.

In two experiments, we provide evidence for a fundamental discussion asymmetry, namely, preference-consistent information sharing. Despite being in a dyadic situation requiring open information exchange and being given no incentive to do so, participants communicated more information that supported their individually preferred decision alternative than information that contradicted it. Preference-consistent information sharing was not caused by biased recall and occurred in written as well as in face-to-face communication. Moreover, we tested whether preference-consistent information sharing was influenced by statements by bogus discussion partners indicating that they held a congruent versus incongruent preference to the participants' preference and that they understood versus did not understand the participants' preference. We found that when partners stated that they understood the participants' preference, subsequent preference-consistent information sharing was considerably reduced. This indicates that a motivation to be understood by others might be an important driving force underlying preference-consistent information sharing.

Biased information processing in the escalation paradigm: information search and information evaluation as potential mediators of escalating commitment.

Escalation of commitment denotes decision makers' increased reinvestment of resources in a losing course of action. Despite the relevance of this topic, little is known about how information is processed in escalation situations, that is, whether decision makers who receive negative outcome feedback on their initial decision search for and/or process information biasedly and whether these biases contribute to escalating commitment. Contrary to a widely cited study by E. J. Conlon and J. M. Parks (1987), in 3 experiments, the authors found that biases do not occur on the level of information search. Neither in a direct replication and extension of the original study with largely increased test power (Experiment 1) nor under methodologically improved conditions (Experiments 2 and 3) did decision makers responsible for failure differ from nonresponsible decision makers with regards to information search, and no selective search for information supporting the initial decision or voting for further reinvestment was observed. However, Experiments 3 and 4 show that the evaluation of the previously sought information is biased among participants who were responsible for initiating the course of action. Mediation analyses show that this evaluation bias in favor of reinvestment partially mediated the responsibility effect on escalation of commitment.

Endocrinological and psychological responses to job stressors: an experimental test of the job demand--control model.

The buffer hypothesis of the Job Demand-Control Model predicts that high levels of job control compensate for the negative effects of high job demands on well-being and health. Several studies have tested this hypothesis, but the results are far from consistent. The objective of this study was to test the buffer hypothesis with respect to psychological (subjective well-being) and physiological (salivary cortisol) indicators of job strain, using an experimental study design. Seventy-seven men and women worked at a simulated computer workplace for more than two hours. Job demands and job control were manipulated in a 2 (job demands: high vs. low)×2 (job control: high vs. low)×7 (time of measurement) study design. Demands were operationalized in terms of workload, and pacing control (self-paced vs. machine-paced) was used as a job control manipulation. As dependent variables, subjective well-being and salivary cortisol were measured at seven time points during the experiment (T1-T7). In line with the buffer hypothesis, high control eliminated the impact of high demands on salivary cortisol responses. The hypothesis was supported by a predicted significant three-way interaction of demands, control and time of measurement (p<.001), qualified by the absence of significant effects of the independent variables at T1 and T2 due to lagged cortisol reactions, and significant two-way interactions of demands and control, as predicted by the model, at the five remaining times of measurement (T3-T7): high demands led to increased cortisol reactions only in the low control condition. In contrast, no main or interaction effects of the independent variables were found for subjective well-being. This discrepancy between physiological and psychological stress reactions might be due to the lack of specificity inherent in measures of subjective well-being, due to lagged psychological reactions, or due to self-report biases in the subjective measures. In sum, this study provides the first clear-cut experimental evidence for the idea that the negative impact of high job demands on endocrinological responses can be buffered by high levels of job control.

Knowing others' preferences degrades the quality of group decisions.

Results from 4 experiments demonstrate that learning the other group members' preferences at the beginning of a discussion impedes the solution of hidden profiles. In Experiments 1-3, participants who were not informed about their fellow group members' preferences were more likely to solve a hidden profile than those who received bogus information about the others' preferences. The negative effect of learning the others' preferences on decision quality was mediated by participants paying less attention to the information exchanged when they had been made aware of the others' preferences. Experiments 1 and 2 further ruled out that the effect of learning the others' preferences is due to participants bolstering their position or due to an increase in informational load. Experiment 3 showed that learning the other group members' preferences impedes the solution of hidden profiles even if one of the other members favors the correct alternative. Finally, Experiment 4 replicated these results in face-to-face interacting 3-person groups.

Biased information search in homogeneous groups: confidence as a moderator for the effect of anticipated task requirements.

When searching for information, groups that are homogeneous regarding their members' prediscussion decision preferences show a strong bias for information that supports rather than conflicts with the prevailing opinion (confirmation bias). The present research examined whether homogeneous groups blindly search for information confirming their beliefs irrespective of the anticipated task or whether they are sensitive to the usefulness of new information for this forthcoming task. Results of three experiments show that task sensitivity depends on the groups' confidence in the correctness of their decision: Moderately confident groups displayed a strong confirmation bias when they anticipated having to give reasons for their decision but showed a balanced information search or even a dis confirmation bias (i.e., predominately seeking conflicting information) when they anticipated having to refute counterarguments. In contrast, highly confident groups demonstrated a strong confirmation bias independent of the anticipated task requirements.

Selective exposure and information quantity: how different information quantities moderate decision makers' preference for consistent and inconsistent information.

Empirical evidence on selective exposure to information after decisions is contradictory: Whereas many studies have found a preference for information that is consistent with one's prior decision, some have found a preference for inconsistent information. The authors propose that different available information quantities moderate these contradictory findings. Four studies confirmed this expectation. When confronted with 10 pieces of information, decision makers systematically preferred decision-consistent information, whereas when confronted with only 2 pieces of information, they strongly preferred decision-inconsistent information (Study 1). This effect was not due to differences in processing complexity (Study 2) or dissonance processes (Study 3) but could be traced back to different salient selection criteria: When confronted with 2 pieces of information, the salient selection criterion was information direction (consistent vs. inconsistent), which caused a preference for inconsistent information. In contrast, when confronted with more than 2 pieces of information, the salient selection criterion was expected information quality, which caused a preference for consistent information (Study 4).

Being fed up: a social cognitive neuroscience approach to mental satiation.

Being fed up with something is a prevalent and fundamental human experience. Although the relevance of mental satiation, that is, the process of becoming fed up with an action, is highly acknowledged in organizational psychology, almost no empirical research has examined this concept. In this article, we take a social cognitive neuroscience approach to mental satiation. By building on and extending the classic work of Lewin and Karsten, we propose a new model of mental satiation that focuses on the cognitive, motivational, and neural processes underlying mental satiation. Our model starts with the assumption that repeated performance of an action undermines one's need for competence and hence leads to a loss of intrinsic motivation. We then distinguish between two phases of the satiation process: The first phase is characterized by a loss of intrinsic motivation to perform the action. The second phase starts when the intrinsic motivation has vanished and volitional control is required to continue the action. We predict that the loss of intrinsic motivation in the first phase of the satiation process is correlated with a decrease in activity in brain regions associated with positive hedonic experience, such as the nucleus accumbens, the ventral pallidum, and the medial orbitofrontal cortex. In contrast, the growing aversion toward the action during the second phase of the satiation process is predicted to be correlated with an increase in activity in brain regions associated with unpleasant affect and volitional control, such as the amygdala, the anterior insula, and the anterior cingulate cortex.