A unified approach to demographic data collection for research with young children across diverse cultures.

Culture is a key determinant of children's development both in its own right and as a measure of generalizability of developmental phenomena. Studying the role of culture in development requires information about participants' demographic backgrounds. However, both reporting and treatment of demographic data are limited and inconsistent in child development research. A barrier to reporting demographic data in a consistent fashion is that no standardized tool currently exists to collect these data. Variation in cultural expectations, family structures, and life circumstances across communities make the creation of a unifying instrument challenging. Here, we present a framework to standardize demographic reporting for early child development (birth to 3 years of age), focusing on six core sociodemographic construct categories: biological information, gestational status, health status, community of descent, caregiving environment, and socioeconomic status. For each category, we discuss potential constructs and measurement items and provide guidance for their use and adaptation to diverse contexts. These items are stored in an open repository of context-adapted questionnaires that provide a consistent approach to obtaining and reporting demographic information so that these data can be archived and shared in a more standardized format. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Validation of an open source, remote web-based eye-tracking method (WebGazer) for research in early childhood.

Measuring eye movements remotely via the participant's webcam promises to be an attractive methodological addition to in-person eye-tracking in the lab. However, there is a lack of systematic research comparing remote web-based eye-tracking with in-lab eye-tracking in young children. We report a multi-lab study that compared these two measures in an anticipatory looking task with toddlers using WebGazer.js and jsPsych. Results of our remotely tested sample of 18-27-month-old toddlers (N = 125) revealed that web-based eye-tracking successfully captured goal-based action predictions, although the proportion of the goal-directed anticipatory looking was lower compared to the in-lab sample (N = 70). As expected, attrition rate was substantially higher in the web-based (42%) than the in-lab sample (10%). Excluding trials based on visual inspection of the match of time-locked gaze coordinates and the participant's webcam video overlayed on the stimuli was an important preprocessing step to reduce noise in the data. We discuss the use of this remote web-based method in comparison with other current methodological innovations. Our study demonstrates that remote web-based eye-tracking can be a useful tool for testing toddlers, facilitating recruitment of larger and more diverse samples; a caveat to consider is the larger drop-out rate.

Differences in self-other control as cognitive mechanism to characterize theory of mind reasoning in autistic and non-autistic adults.

In cognitive science, altered Theory of Mind is a central pillar of etiological models of autism. Yet, recent evidence, showing comparable Theory of Mind abilities in autistic and non-autistic people, draws a more complex picture and renders previous descriptions of Theory of Mind abilities in autism and their role in autistic symptomatology insufficient. Here, we addressed self-other control as a potential candidate cognitive mechanism to explain subtle Theory of Mind reasoning differences between autistic and non-autistic adults. We investigated flexible shifting between another's and one's own congruent or incongruent points of view, an ability that is important for reciprocal social interaction. Measuring response accuracy and reaction time in a multiple-trial unexpected location false belief task, we found evidence for altered self-other control in Theory of Mind reasoning in autistic adults, with a relative difficulty in flexibly considering the other's perspective and less interference of the other's incongruent viewpoint when their own perspective is considered. Our results add to previous findings that social cognitive differences are there but subtle and constitute one step further in characterizing Theory of Mind reasoning in autism and explaining communication and interaction difficulties with non-autistic people in everyday life.

[Gender Differences in Autism Diagnostics]. / Geschlechtsunterschiede in der Autismusdiagnostik.

Autism spectrum condition (ASC) is predominantly diagnosed in boys and men. There is evidence that this is also because girls and women with ASC don't receive a diagnosis, or, if they do, only later in life. This study investigates gender differences in diagnosis, support needs, mental health, and life satisfaction among individuals with autism spectrum condition (ASC) in Germany. Data of an online questionnaire study with 659 persons with ASC from 3-67 years of age living in Bavaria, Germany, were analyzed (215 thereof were female). It was found that women with ASC are diagnosed 7-11 years later than men and are more likely to receive at least one misdiagnosis. They are more likely than men to have unmet educational support needs and comorbid internalizing psychiatric disorders. The results of this study point towards a strong gender bias in clinical diagnosis of ASC in Germany and need for improvements in the case of women.

"I know what's inside because you showed me": Training 33-month-old children to attribute knowledge and ignorance to themselves and others.

The present study investigated the role of language in two-year-old children's early understanding of knowledge and ignorance. An intense microgenetic training consisting of 12 to 14 training sessions within six to seven weeks was conducted between 33 and 36 months. One training group experienced and participated in discourse about epistemic states in theoretically relevant situations which highlighted, for instance, the relation between seeing and knowing or contrasts between different people's knowledge states. The other training group was trained on complement syntax using sentence repetition tasks. An age-matched control group received no training. The complement syntax training was not effective in improving complement syntax competence more than in the other two groups. In contrast, the mental state training led to higher improvements in the mental state training group than in the other two groups on tasks assessing comprehension of the targeted concepts (e.g., comprehension of the seeing-knowing relation). The mental state training also had an effect on children's metacognitive awareness of their own ignorance which was, however, not independent of complement syntax competence assessed at 33 months. No effect was obtained on epistemic perspective-taking skills. Our findings indicate that the use of mental state language in discourse promotes children's acquisition of epistemic concepts even before their third birthday.

Improving the generalizability of infant psychological research: The ManyBabies model.

Yarkoni's analysis clearly articulates a number of concerns limiting the generalizability and explanatory power of psychological findings, many of which are compounded in infancy research. ManyBabies addresses these concerns via a radically collaborative, large-scale and open approach to research that is grounded in theory-building, committed to diversification, and focused on understanding sources of variation.

Evidence for goal- and mixed evidence for false belief-based action prediction in 2- to 4-year-old children: A large-scale longitudinal anticipatory looking replication study.

Unsuccessful replication attempts of paradigms assessing children's implicit tracking of false beliefs have instigated the debate on whether or not children have an implicit understanding of false beliefs before the age of four. A novel multi-trial anticipatory looking false belief paradigm yielded evidence of implicit false belief reasoning in 3- to 4-year-old children using a combined score of two false belief conditions (Grosse Wiesmann, C., Friederici, A. D., Singer, T., & Steinbeis, N. [2017]. Developmental Science, 20(5), e12445). The present study is a large-scale replication attempt of this paradigm. The task was administered three times to the same sample of N = 185 children at 2, 3, and 4 years of age. Using the original stimuli, we did not replicate the original finding of above-chance belief-congruent looking in a combined score of two false belief conditions in either of the three age groups. Interestingly, the overall pattern of results was comparable to the original study. Post-hoc analyses revealed, however, that children performed above chance in one false belief condition (FB1) and below chance in the other false belief condition (FB2), thus yielding mixed evidence of children's false belief-based action predictions. Similar to the original study, participants' performance did not change with age and was not related to children's general language skills. This study demonstrates the importance of large-scaled replications and adds to the growing number of research questioning the validity and reliability of anticipatory looking false belief paradigms as a robust measure of children's implicit tracking of beliefs.

The influence of TMS of the rTPJ on attentional control and mentalizing.

Mentalizing is the powerful cognitive ability to understand others. By attributing mental states to others, we become able to explain and predict their behavior. The right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ) plays a key role in processing models of mental states. Yet, a different line of research suggests that the rTPJ is crucially involved in attentional control, prompting debates on its cognitive function. In this pre-registered neuro-navigated event-related TMS study, we tested for the rTPJ's specificity in mentalizing and attentional control. We interfered with its activity in a recently developed spatial cueing paradigm in which another's mental states were apparently task-relevant, allowing direct comparison of TMS effects on attention and mentalizing. We contrasted effects with a nearby control TMS site. Our confirmatory analysis showed no evidence for an involvement of the rTPJ in mentalizing or attentional control, presumably due to an observed large inter-individual variability of TMS effects on context and validity. To follow up this finding, we conducted exploratory analyses which revealed that rTPJ TMS had an influence on both attentional control and mentalizing. TMS effects on attention and mentalizing co-varied across participants: participants responding most to rTPJ TMS on mentalizing were also those for whom rTPJ TMS increased the attentional effect the most. This provides further evidence against total absolute segregation between mentalizing and attention within the rTPJ. Rather, our results suggest a common cognitive mechanism in both domains for which the rTPJ is necessary, paving the way for future research to cross-validate and extend these findings.

Does syntax play a role in Theory of Mind development before the age of 3 years?

Language plays an important role in Theory of Mind development. Specifically, longitudinal and training studies indicate that the acquisition of complement syntax has an effect on three- to five-year-old children's mastery of the concept of false belief. There is evidence for both a beginning explicit understanding of the mind and mastery of complement syntax in children before their third birthday. In the present study, we investigated longitudinally whether an early sensitivity to complement syntax is related to early development of Theory of Mind abilities in a sample of N = 159 German-speaking 27- to 36-month-old children. Children's sensitivity to formal properties of complement syntax at 33 months was associated with their perspective-taking skills and their metacognition of own ignorance three months later. This relation remained significant when controlling for the effects of general language abilities. Furthermore, children's sensitivity to complement syntax was concurrently related to their early false belief understanding. These findings support the view that complement syntax shares representational demands with an understanding of epistemic states and that language begins to support the acquisition of epistemic concepts earlier than was previously thought.

No links between genetic variation and developing theory of mind: A preregistered replication attempt of candidate gene studies.

Genetic variability is being discussed as a source of inter-individual differences in Theory of Mind development. Previous studies documented an association between variations in DRD4 VNTR 48 bp, OXTR rs53576, COMT rs4680, and Theory of Mind task performance. As empirical evidence on these associations is sparse, we conducted a preregistered replication attempt of a study reporting a link between DRD4 VNTR 48 bp and false belief understanding in 50-month-old children [Lackner, C., Sabbagh, M. A., Hallinan, E., Liu, X., & Holden, J. J. (2012). Developmental Science, 15(2), 272-280.]. Additionally, we attempted a replication of studies on the role of OXTR rs53576 and COMT rs4680 in Theory of Mind. In both replication attempts, we did not find any evidence for associations between the sampled genetic markers and Theory of Mind ability in a series of analyses. Extending the replication attempt of Lackner et al., we employed longitudinal data from several tasks and measurement points, which allowed us to run follow-up robustness checks with more reliable scores. These extensive analyses corroborated our null finding. This comprehensive non-replication is important to balance current research on genetic markers of Theory of Mind. In a combined evaluation of our own and previous studies, we point to substantial methodological issues that research on the genetic basis of Theory of Mind development faces. We conclude that these limitations currently prevent firm conclusions on genetic influences on Theory of Mind development.

Predicting personality from patterns of behavior collected with smartphones.

Smartphones enjoy high adoption rates around the globe. Rarely more than an arm's length away, these sensor-rich devices can easily be repurposed to collect rich and extensive records of their users' behaviors (e.g., location, communication, media consumption), posing serious threats to individual privacy. Here we examine the extent to which individuals' Big Five personality dimensions can be predicted on the basis of six different classes of behavioral information collected via sensor and log data harvested from smartphones. Taking a machine-learning approach, we predict personality at broad domain ([Formula: see text] = 0.37) and narrow facet levels ([Formula: see text] = 0.40) based on behavioral data collected from 624 volunteers over 30 consecutive days (25,347,089 logging events). Our cross-validated results reveal that specific patterns in behaviors in the domains of 1) communication and social behavior, 2) music consumption, 3) app usage, 4) mobility, 5) overall phone activity, and 6) day- and night-time activity are distinctively predictive of the Big Five personality traits. The accuracy of these predictions is similar to that found for predictions based on digital footprints from social media platforms and demonstrates the possibility of obtaining information about individuals' private traits from behavioral patterns passively collected from their smartphones. Overall, our results point to both the benefits (e.g., in research settings) and dangers (e.g., privacy implications, psychological targeting) presented by the widespread collection and modeling of behavioral data obtained from smartphones.

Do ostensive cues affect object processing in children with and without autism? A test of natural pedagogy theory.

Theories suggest that the perception of others' actions and social cues leads to selective processing of object features. Most recently, natural pedagogy theory postulated that ostensive cues lead to a selective processing of an object's features at the expense of processing of its location. This study examined this hypothesis in 10-year-old children with and without autism spectrum condition (ASC) to better understand social information processing in ASC and the relevance of observing others in human object processing in general. Participants saw an agent either ostensively pointing to an object or non-ostensively grasping an object. Thereafter, the cued or uncued object changed either its location or identity. We assessed not only behavioral responses, but also participants' gaze behavior by means of eye tracking. In contrast to natural pedagogy theory, we found that in the non-ostensive grasping context, participants rather noticed an identity change than a location change. Moreover, location changes were more readily identified in the ostensive pointing context. Importantly, there was no difference between children with and without ASC. Our study shows that the perception of ostensively vs. non-ostensively framed actions leads to different processing of object features, indicating a close link between action perception, object processing, and social cues. Moreover, the lacking group difference in our study suggests that these basic perception-action processes are not impaired in autism.

Do Children and Adults with Autism Spectrum Condition Anticipate Others' Actions as Goal-Directed? A Predictive Coding Perspective.

An action's end state can be anticipated by considering the agent's goal, or simply by projecting the movement trajectory. Theories suggest that individuals with autism spectrum condition (ASC) have difficulties anticipating other's goal-directed actions, caused by an impairment using prior information. We examined whether children, adolescents and adults with and without ASC visually anticipate another's action based on its goal or movement trajectory by presenting participants an agent repeatedly taking different paths to reach the same of two targets. The ASC group anticipated the goal and not just the movement pattern, but needed more time to perform goal-directed anticipations. Results are in line with predictive coding accounts, claiming that the use of prior information is impaired in ASC.

Enter the Wild: Autistic Traits and Their Relationship to Mentalizing and Social Interaction in Everyday Life.

Theories derived from lab-based research emphasize the importance of mentalizing for social interaction and propose a link between mentalizing, autistic traits, and social behavior. We tested these assumptions in everyday life. Via smartphone-based experience sampling and logging of smartphone usage behavior we quantified mentalizing and social interaction in our participants' natural environment. Mentalizing occurred less frequently than reasoning about actions and participants preferred to mentalize when alone. Autistic traits were negatively correlated with communication via smartphone. Yet, they were not associated with social media usage, a more indirect way of getting in touch with others. Our findings critically inform recent theories on social cognition, social behavior, and the role of autistic traits in these phenomena.

33-month-old children succeed in a false belief task with reduced processing demands: A replication of Setoh et al. (2016).

A recent low-inhibition false belief task showed a high success rate with 33-month-old children when response-generation demands were reduced [Setoh, Scott, & Baillargeon (2016). Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 113(47), 13360-13365]. We found correct responding in 74% of N = 58 33-month-old children, replicating the original findings. Within the same sample, we compared this performance with performance in a concurrent measure of false belief understanding which has previously produced competence in children below the age of 3 years [Hughes & Ensor (2007). Developmental Psychology, 43(6), 1447-1459]. Contrasting sharply with findings from the low-inhibition false belief task, we found partial competence in 15%, and full competence in only 5% of the same sample. These results show that the paradigm by Setoh and colleagues generates reliable findings in a different lab and a different language. We discuss this pattern of results in relation to theoretical considerations of early false belief understanding.

The robustness and generalizability of findings on spontaneous false belief sensitivity: a replication attempt.

Influential studies showed that 25-month-olds and neurotypical adults take an agent's false belief into account in their anticipatory looking patterns (Southgate et al. 2007 Psychol. Sci.18, 587-592 (doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01944.x); Senju et al. 2009 Science325, 883-885 (doi:10.1126/science.1176170)). These findings constitute central pillars of current accounts distinguishing between implicit and explicit Theory of Mind. In our first experiment, which initially included a replication as well as two manipulations, we failed to replicate the original finding in 2- to 3-year-olds (N = 48). Therefore, we ran a second experiment with the sole purpose of seeing whether the effect can be found in an independent, tightly controlled, sufficiently powered and preregistered replication study. This replication attempt failed again in a sample of 25-month-olds (N = 78), but was successful in a sample of adults (N = 115). In all samples, a surprisingly high number of participants did not correctly anticipate the agent's action during the familiarization phase. This led to massive exclusion rates when adhering to the criteria of the original studies and strongly limits the interpretability of findings from the test phase. We discuss both the reliability of our replication attempts as well as the replicability of non-verbal anticipatory looking paradigms of implicit false belief sensitivity, in general.

False Belief Reasoning in Adults with and without Autistic Spectrum Disorder: Similarities and Differences.

A central diagnostic criteria for autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is the qualitative impairment in reciprocal social interaction and a prominent hypotheses that tried to explain this impairment is the Theory of Mind (ToM) deficit hypotheses. On a behavioral level the critical test for having a ToM, the understanding of false beliefs (FB), is often used for testing ToM abilities in individuals with ASD. Investigating the neural underpinnings several neuroimaging studies revealed a network of areas involved in FB reasoning in neurotypical individuals. For ASD individuals the neural correlates of false belief processing are largely unknown. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging and an adapted unexpected transfer task, that makes it possible to distinguish between the computation of diverging beliefs and the selection of a belief-associated response, we investigated a group of adult high-functioning individuals with ASD (N = 15) and an age and IQ matched group of neurotypical adults (NT; N = 15). On the behavioral level we found no group differences. On the neural level, results were two-fold: In the story phase, in which participants had to compute whether the character's belief is congruent or incongruent to their own belief, there were no differences between neurotypical participants and those diagnosed with ASD. But, in the subsequent question phase, participants with ASD showed increased activity in the bilateral anterior prefrontal cortex, the left posterior frontal cortex, the left superior temporal gyrus, and the left temporoparietal area. These results suggest that during the story phase in which the participants processed observable actions the neural correlates do not differ between adult individuals with ASD and NT individuals. But in the question phase in which participants had to infer an unobservable mental state results revealed neural differences between the two groups. Possibly, these subtle neural processing differences may contribute to the fact that adult ASD individuals are able to master explicit false belief tasks but fail to apply their strategies during everyday social interaction.

Children's and adults' use of verbal information to visually anticipate others' actions: A study on explicit and implicit social-cognitive processing.

According to recent theories, social cognition is based on two different types of information-processing; an implicit or action-based one and an explicit or verbal one. The present study examined whether implicit and explicit social-cognitive information processing interact with each other by investigating young children's and adults' use of verbal (i.e., explicit) information to predict others' actions. Employing eye-tracking to measure anticipatory eye-movements as a measure of implicit processing, Experiment 1 presented 1.5-, 2.5-, and 3.5-year-old children as well as adults with agents who announced to move to either of two possible targets. The results show that only the 3.5-year-old children and adults, but not the 1.5- and 2.5-year-old children were able to use verbal information to correctly anticipate others' actions. Yet, Experiments 2 and 3 showed that 2.5-year-old children were able to use explicit information to give a correct explicit answer (Experiment 2) and that they were able to use statistical information to anticipate the other's actions (Experiment 3). Overall, the study is in line with theoretical claims that two types of information-processing underlie human social cognition. It shows that these two inform each other by 3years of age.

An fMRI study on the comparison of different types of false belief reasoning: False belief-based emotion and behavior attribution.

False belief (FB) reasoning is a key Theory of Mind (ToM) competence. By 4 years of age, children understand that a person's behavior can be based on a FB about reality. Children cannot understand that a person's emotion can also be based on a FB before the age of six. In order to generate hypothesis on basic processes distinguishing these two types of belief reasoning, the present functional magnetic resonance imaging study in adults directly compares functional activity associated with these two FB tasks. Both tasks were associated with activity in the ToM network including the medial prefrontal cortex and the left temporo-parietal junction. Differential activity was observed in the anterior dorsolateral prefrontal cortex for FB-based emotion relative to behavior attribution. Contrary to FB behavior attribution, FB-based emotion attribution requires the processing of two different mental states: a belief and an emotion and their relation to each other. The activity pattern may reflect the differential demands on cognitive processes associated with the two different belief-based attribution processes. These results shed new light on the still ongoing debate about the nature of the developmental lag between the two FB tasks.