Is all prejudice created equal? The role of modern and aversive racism in mock juror decisions.

The current study examined whether aversive and modern racists would convict Black defendants differently based on theoretical differences: aversive racists are egalitarian and discriminate when not reminded of their values, whereas modern racists do not espouse egalitarian values and discriminate when a non-racial reason exists to justify their behavior. Participants read a criminal trial where defendant race (Black vs. White), race salience (present vs. absent), and justification (weak vs. strong evidence) were manipulated. Results showed that aversive and modern racists convicted the Black defendant at similar rates, but aversive racists were more likely to convict the White than the Black defendant. Aversive racists were also more egalitarian and less socially conservative. The finding that aversive racists convict Black and White defendants differently, but modern racists did not, suggests the importance of distinguishing aversive and modern racists to obtain a more complete picture of racial discrimination in juror decision making.

COVID-19 in the Courtroom: The Role of Mask Mandates and Source of Exposure on Negligence and Recklessness Decisions.

The current study examined whether business owners would be found liable for an employee's illness from COVID-19 contracted at work. We varied whether there was a mask mandate at the time of the employee's exposure (Yes or No), how the employee was exposed (an unmasked customer, an unmasked owner who forgot her mask, or an unmasked owner who did not require masks in her store) and measured participants' political orientation. Participants (N = 257) read and listened to a trial transcript about an employee that contracted COVID-19 at her workplace and was suing her employer for compensation to cover hospital bills. Participants were more likely to find the defendant negligent, reckless, and responsible when a mask mandate was present and when an unmasked owner led to the employee's COVID-19 exposure compared to an unmasked customer. Furthermore, the more conservative the participant, the less likely they were to find the defendant negligent, reckless, and responsible. In sum, presence of a mask mandate, owner exposure, and juror political orientation play an important role in civil litigation involving COVID-19.

Geographic distribution of prejudice toward African Americans: Applying the two-dimensional model.

Using the two-dimensional model of prejudice as a theoretical framework, we examined the geographic distribution of prejudice toward African Americans in the United States (N = 10,522). We found the East South Central, West South Central, and South Atlantic regions were associated with modern racism, principled conservatism characterized the Mountain region, aversive racism was prevalent in the East North Central region, and finally, low in prejudice was found in the Pacific, West North Central, Mid Atlantic, and New England regions. Additional analyses on political conservatism, social conservatism, and egalitarianism generally supported the distinctions between prejudice types made by the two-dimensional model. We believe mapping regional prejudice may have implications for testing theoretical differences between distinct types of prejudice as well as for implementing prejudice reduction strategies.

Influence of the Fundamental Attribution Error on Perceptions of Blame and Negligence.

Automobile accidents are a frequent occurrence in the United States and commonly result in legal ramifications. Through a fundamental attribution error (FAE) framework (Ross, 1977), the current research examined how individuals perceive blame and negligence in these cases. In Study 1 (N = 360), we manipulated the driver (you vs. stranger) of a hypothetical accident scenario and the situational circumstances surrounding the accident (favorable vs. unfavorable). Supporting the FAE, individuals' situational blame attributions only varied as a function of situational circumstances when they themselves were hypothetically driving. However, neither the driver nor the situation significantly predicted dispositional blame attributions. Yet, Study 1 provided initial support for the importance of an individual's trait tendency to neglect situational constraints when making dispositional blame attributions. In Study 2 (N = 212), we again manipulated situational circumstances surrounding the hypothetical accident, but within the context of a mock civil trial. Results provided additional support for the importance of this trait tendency and expanded our findings of dispositional blame attributions to perceptions of negligence. Implications include the importance of considering trait individual differences in the likelihood to ignore situational demands when individuals are making legally relevant judgments about automobile accidents.

Strain and Depression following Release from Prison: The Moderating Role of Social Support Mechanisms on Substance Use.

Research on prison reentry shows that individuals with depression turn to substances to cope with the stress of reintegration. While social support drawn from families, peers, and institutions may help returning individuals avoid substance use, it is unclear how social support might condition the link between depression and substance use. Using longitudinal panel data from the Serious and Violent and Offender Reentry Initiative, results from mixed-models demonstrate that depression is significantly associated with increased substance use. Family support, but not peer support, is tied to lower use, and institutional support relates to decreased alcohol use but increased illicit drug use.

What Evidence Matters to Jurors? The Prevalence and Importance of Different Homicide Trial Evidence to Mock Jurors.

The present research explores how important different trial evidence is to mock jurors' decisions. Study 1 surveys legal professionals to determine what evidence is common at homicide trials. Study 2 utilizes the list of evidence generated in Study 1 to ask mock jurors to report how important each piece of evidence would be in deciding their verdicts. The results indicate that DNA is most important to mock jurors, followed by fingerprints, the weapon, video records, crime-scene photos, gunshot residue, bodily secretions, video confession, testimony from a forensic expert, and eyewitness testimony. Study 3 utilizes a different methodology wherein mock jurors were presented with folders labeled with different evidence and asked to choose the piece of evidence they wanted to learn more about first, second, and so on. The results from Study 3 indicate again that DNA evidence is most important to mock jurors, followed by video confession evidence, eyewitness testimony, and fingerprint evidence. Implications are discussed.

Victim Impact Statements: How Victim Social Class Affects Juror Decision Making.

Although the Supreme Court has ruled that victim impact statements (VIS) should be allowed at trial, the concern voiced in Payne v. Tennessee (1991) and Furman v. Georgia (1972) was that VIS might enable jurors to make comparative judgments about the worth of the victim. This study examined the effect VIS and low and middle socioeconomic status (SES) victims have on jurors' decisions. Mock jurors listened to 1 of 3 audio recordings of the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial (no VIS, low SES VIS, or middle SES VIS) and were asked to sentence the defendant to either life in prison without parole or death. Results indicated VIS themselves did not significantly affect mock jurors' sentencing decisions. However, mock jurors who heard the middle SES victim VIS were significantly more likely to sentence the defendant to death compared to those who heard the low SES victim VIS. The results suggest that the concerns of the Supreme Court were valid. Mock jurors were impacted by SES information in the VIS and were more punitive toward the defendant when he killed a higher rather than a lower SES person.

Unintended, but still blameworthy: the roles of awareness, desire, and anger in negligence, restitution, and punishment.

Two experiments (Experiment 1 N = 149, Experiment 2 N = 141) investigated how two mental states that underlie how perceivers reason about intentional action (awareness of action and desire for an outcome) influence blame and punishment for unintended (i.e., negligent) harms, and the role of anger in this process. Specifically, this research explores how the presence of awareness (of risk in acting, or simply of acting) and/or desire in an acting agent's mental states influences perceptions of negligence, judgements that the acting agent owes restitution to a victim, and the desire to punish the agent, mediated by anger. In both experiments, awareness and desire led to increased anger at the agent and increased perception of negligence. Anger mediated the effect of awareness and desire on negligence rather than negligence mediating the effect of mental states on anger. Anger also mediated punishment, and negligence mediated the effects of anger on restitution. We discuss how perceivers consider mental states such as awareness, desire, and knowledge when reasoning about blame and punishment for unintended harms, and the role of anger in this process.

Why side-effect outcomes do not affect intuitions about intentional actions: properly shifting the focus from intentional outcomes back to intentional actions.

Over the last decade, many articles have suggested that the "badness" of side-effect outcomes influences perceivers' intuitions about intentionality, contradicting the traditional notion that mental state inferences lead to moral judgments rather than the reverse. Challenging this assertion, we argue that typically, consideration of intentionality involves thinking about "intentional actions" (things people do) rather than unintended outcomes. Across several studies, we offer an explanatory framework describing why side-effect asymmetries emerge. We first establish that people differentiate actions, outcomes, goals, and side effects, associating intentions with goals but intentionality with actions in furtherance of goals, and that each of these components is readily identified in side-effect scenarios. We then demonstrate that when relationships among actions, goals, and side effects are available for consideration in response options, side-effect effects disappear. We additionally show that, because actions are not explicitly referenced, people reinterpret questions about the intentionality of side effects-particularly for harmful outcomes-as asking about intentional actions that caused side effects, creating a mismatch between participants' pragmatic and researchers' literal interpretations. Finally, we demonstrate how harmful side effects shift perceivers' attention toward considering agents' knowledge/awareness, whereas beneficial side effects focus attention on intentions/motives, which serves a useful social purpose. We discuss how perceptions of intentionality are not influenced by side-effect valence, although, because of structural differences in how people view harm versus benefit, outcomes influence which mental states perceivers consider important when answering questions that are typically asked in side-effects research. Beyond intentionality, we consider how these findings may shed light on trait attribution processes, more generally.