Distinct dynamic connectivity profiles promote enhanced conscious perception of auditory stimuli.

The neuroscience of consciousness aims to identify neural markers that distinguish brain dynamics in healthy individuals from those in unconscious conditions. Recent research has revealed that specific brain connectivity patterns correlate with conscious states and diminish with loss of consciousness. However, the contribution of these patterns to shaping conscious processing remains unclear. Our study investigates the functional significance of these neural dynamics by examining their impact on participants' ability to process external information during wakefulness. Using fMRI recordings during an auditory detection task and rest, we show that ongoing dynamics are underpinned by brain patterns consistent with those identified in previous research. Detection of auditory stimuli at threshold is specifically improved when the connectivity pattern at stimulus presentation corresponds to patterns characteristic of conscious states. Conversely, the occurrence of these conscious state-associated patterns increases after detection, indicating a mutual influence between ongoing brain dynamics and conscious perception. Our findings suggest that certain brain configurations are more favorable to the conscious processing of external stimuli. Targeting these favorable patterns in patients with consciousness disorders may help identify windows of greater receptivity to the external world, guiding personalized treatments.

Retrospective cueing mediates flexible conscious access to past spoken words.

Can we become aware of auditory stimuli retrospectively, even if they initially failed to reach awareness? Here, we tested whether spatial cueing of attention after a word had been played could trigger retrospective conscious access. Two sound streams were presented dichotically. One stream was attended for a primary task of speeded semantic categorization. The other stream included occasional target words, which had to be identified as a secondary task after the trial. We observed that cueing attention to the secondary stream improved identification accuracy, even when cueing occurred more than 500 ms after the target offset. In addition, such "retro-cueing" boosted the detection sensitivity and subjective audibility of the target. The effect was a perceptual one and not one based on enhancing or protecting conscious representations already available in working memory, as shown by quantitative models of the experimental data. In particular, the retro-cue did not gradually shift audibility but rather sharply changed the balance between fully audible and not audible trials. Together with remarkably similar results in vision, these results point to a previously unsuspected temporal flexibility of conscious access as a core feature of perception, across modalities. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Consensus Goals in the Field of Visual Metacognition.

Despite the tangible progress in psychological and cognitive sciences over the last several years, these disciplines still trail other more mature sciences in identifying the most important questions that need to be solved. Reaching such consensus could lead to greater synergy across different laboratories, faster progress, and increased focus on solving important problems rather than pursuing isolated, niche efforts. Here, 26 researchers from the field of visual metacognition reached consensus on four long-term and two medium-term common goals. We describe the process that we followed, the goals themselves, and our plans for accomplishing these goals. If this effort proves successful within the next few years, such consensus building around common goals could be adopted more widely in psychological science.

The nature of blindsight: implications for current theories of consciousness.

Blindsight regroups the different manifestations of preserved discriminatory visual capacities following the damage to the primary visual cortex. Blindsight types differentially impact objective and subjective perception, patients can report having no visual awareness whilst their behaviour suggests visual processing still occurs at some cortical level. This phenomenon hence presents a unique opportunity to study consciousness and perceptual consciousness, and for this reason, it has had an historical importance for the development of this field of research. From these studies, two main opposing models of the underlying mechanisms have been established: (a) blindsight is perception without consciousness or (b) blindsight is in fact degraded vision, two views that mirror more general theoretical options about whether unconscious cognition truly exists or whether it is only a degraded form of conscious processing. In this article, we want to re-examine this debate in the light of recent advances in the characterization of blindsight and associated phenomena. We first provide an in-depth definition of blindsight and its subtypes, mainly blindsight type I, blindsight type II and the more recently described blindsense. We emphasize the necessity of sensitive and robust methodology to uncover the dissociations between perception and awareness that can be observed in brain-damaged patients with visual field defects at different cognitive levels. We discuss these different profiles of dissociation in the light of both contending models. We propose that the different types of dissociations reveal a pattern of relationship between perception, awareness and metacognition that is actually richer than what is proposed by either of the existing models. Finally, we consider this in the framework of current theories of consciousness and touch on the implications the findings of blindsight have on these.

Bifurcation in brain dynamics reveals a signature of conscious processing independent of report.

An outstanding challenge for consciousness research is to characterize the neural signature of conscious access independently of any decisional processes. Here we present a model-based approach that uses inter-trial variability to identify the brain dynamics associated with stimulus processing. We demonstrate that, even in the absence of any task or behavior, the electroencephalographic response to auditory stimuli shows bifurcation dynamics around 250-300 milliseconds post-stimulus. Namely, the same stimulus gives rise to late sustained activity on some trials, and not on others. This late neural activity is predictive of task-related reports, and also of reports of conscious contents that are randomly sampled during task-free listening. Source localization further suggests that task-free conscious access recruits the same neural networks as those associated with explicit report, except for frontal executive components. Studying brain dynamics through variability could thus play a key role for identifying the core signatures of conscious access, independent of report.

Making sense of blindsense: a reply to Phillips.

We recently published the results of a study on the occurrence of blindsight among eight, post-stroke homonymous hemianopic (HH) patients (Garric et al., 2019), in whom we measured blindsight through forced-choice tasks and assessed perceptual experiences by a new awareness scale, the Sensation Awareness Scale (SAS). Within the cohort, we found different profiles of dissociation between objective and subjective performance. Importantly, we were able to describe several cases of a dissociation phenomenon that we named blindsense, whereby patients exhibited marked subjective sensitivity in their blind hemifield despite being unable to discriminate the different stimuli. Following publication of our article (Garric et al., 2019), Prof. Ian Phillips (Phillips, 2019) wrote a Commentary in which he questioned the methodology we used to measure and analyze objective and subjective perception in our HH patients. As opposed to our original interpretation of our results to describe the new profile of blindsense, based on a non-visual experience hypothesis (Kentridge, 2015), Prof. Phillips re-evaluated the different blindsight profiles that we identified in our study through the lens of a degraded conscious vision hypothesis (Overgaard, Fehl, Mouridsen, Bergholt, & Cleeremans, 2008). In the present response, we explain that, although we agree that dichotomous visual scales lead to highly conservative responses and mask conscious perceptual experience of patients, we still support the notion that nuanced report protocols can enable more-sensitive measurements of perceptual experiences in the hemianopic, so-called blind visual field. Furthermore, we affirm that the additional awareness-scale phenomenal levels that such protocols enable are more consistent with patients' experiences and lead patients to provide more liberal responses when describing their subjective perceptions.

Retrospective auditory cues can improve detection of near-threshold visual targets.

Recent studies have demonstrated that visually cueing attention towards a stimulus location after its disappearance can facilitate visual processing of the target and increase task performance. Here, we tested whether such retro-cueing effects can also occur across different sensory modalities, as cross-modal facilitation has been shown in pre-cueing studies using auditory stimuli prior to the onset of a visual target. In the present study, participants detected low-contrast Gabor patches in a speeded response task. These patches were presented in the left or right visual periphery, preceded or followed by a lateralized and task-irrelevant sound at 4 stimulus-onset asynchronies (SOA; -600 ms, -150 ms, +150 ms, +450 ms). We found that pre-cueing at the -150 ms SOA led to a general increase in detection performance irrespective of the sound's location relative to the target. On top of this temporal effect, sound-cues also had a spatially specific effect, with further improvement when cue and target originated from the same location. Critically, the temporal effect was absent, but the spatial effect was present in the short-SOA retro-cueing condition (+150 ms). Drift-diffusion analysis of the response time distributions allowed us to better characterize the evidenced effects. Overall, our results show that sounds can facilitate visual processing, both pre- and retro-actively, indicative of a flexible and multisensory attentional system that underlies our conscious visual experience.

Dissociation between objective and subjective perceptual experiences in a population of hemianopic patients: A new form of blindsight?

After a post-chiasmatic lesion, some patients may retain unconscious visual function, known as blindsight, in their contralesional visual field. Despite the importance of blindsight in the study of consciousness, little is known about the nature of patients' experience in their hemianopic field. To address this knowledge gap, we measured blindsight, and assessed the perceptual experience in the contralesional visual field, of seventeen homonymous hemianopic (HH) patients. To ensure that the stimuli were shown in a "blind" sector of the visual field, we selected a subgroup of eight complete-HH patients, as determined by automatic perimetry. Firstly, we measured blindsight through a forced-choice task in which the patients had to identify letters displayed on a screen. Secondly, we compared the patients' binary responses ("Something was presented" vs "Nothing was presented") to responses on a new, five-level scale, the Sensation Awareness Scale (SAS), which we designed to include visual as well as non-visual answers (e.g., "I felt something"). Interestingly, only one of the eight complete-HH patients met the criteria for blindsight. More importantly, our SAS enabled us to identify a previously unreported dissociation, which we have named blindsense, in four of the eight complete-HH patients. Specifically, these four patients exhibited better-than-chance sensitivity to the presence of a stimulus on the subjective scale, despite being unable to identify the stimulus during the forced-choice task. Our findings highlight the importance of awareness-assessment methods to investigate perceptual experiences in the contralesional visual field and suggest a low incidence of blindsight in post-stroke HH patients.

An Informal Internet Survey on the Current State of Consciousness Science.

The scientific study of consciousness emerged as an organized field of research only a few decades ago. As empirical results have begun to enhance our understanding of consciousness, it is important to find out whether other factors, such as funding for consciousness research and status of consciousness scientists, provide a suitable environment for the field to grow and develop sustainably. We conducted an online survey on people's views regarding various aspects of the scientific study of consciousness as a field of research. 249 participants completed the survey, among which 80% were in academia, and around 40% were experts in consciousness research. Topics covered include the progress made by the field, funding for consciousness research, job opportunities for consciousness researchers, and the scientific rigor of the work done by researchers in the field. The majority of respondents (78%) indicated that scientific research on consciousness has been making progress. However, most participants perceived obtaining funding and getting a job in the field of consciousness research as more difficult than in other subfields of neuroscience. Overall, work done in consciousness research was perceived to be less rigorous than other neuroscience subfields, but this perceived lack of rigor was not related to the perceived difficulty in finding jobs and obtaining funding. Lastly, we found that, overall, the global workspace theory was perceived to be the most promising (around 28%), while most non-expert researchers (around 22% of non-experts) found the integrated information theory (IIT) most promising. We believe the survey results provide an interesting picture of current opinions from scientists and researchers about the progresses made and the challenges faced by consciousness research as an independent field. They will inspire collective reflection on the future directions regarding funding and job opportunities for the field.

Human susceptibility to social influence and its neural correlates are related to perceived vulnerability to extrinsic morbidity risks.

Humans considerably vary in the degree to which they rely on their peers to make decisions. Why? Theoretical models predict that environmental risks shift the cost-benefit trade-off associated with the exploitation of others' behaviours (public information), yet this idea has received little empirical support. Using computational analyses of behaviour and multivariate decoding of electroencephalographic activity, we test the hypothesis that perceived vulnerability to extrinsic morbidity risks impacts susceptibility to social influence, and investigate whether and how this covariation is reflected in the brain. Data collected from 261 participants tested online revealed that perceived vulnerability to extrinsic morbidity risks is positively associated with susceptibility to follow peers' opinion in the context of a standard face evaluation task. We found similar results on 17 participants tested in the laboratory, and showed that the sensitivity of EEG signals to public information correlates with the participants' degree of vulnerability. We further demonstrated that the combination of perceived vulnerability to extrinsic morbidity with decoding sensitivities better predicted social influence scores than each variable taken in isolation. These findings suggest that susceptibility to social influence is partly calibrated by perceived environmental risks, possibly via a tuning of neural mechanisms involved in the processing of public information.

The offline stream of conscious representations.

When do we become conscious of a stimulus after its presentation? We would all agree that this necessarily takes time and that it is not instantaneous. Here, I would like to propose not only that conscious access is delayed relative to the external stimulation, but also that it can flexibly desynchronize from external stimulation; it can process some information 'offline', if and when it becomes relevant. Thus, in contrast with initial sensory processing, conscious experience might not strictly follow the sequence of events in the environment. In this article, I will review gathering evidence in favour of this proposition. I will argue that it offers a coherent framework for explaining a great variety of observations in the domain of perception, sensory memory and working memory: the psychological refractory period, the attentional blink, post-dictive phenomena, iconic memory, latent working memory and the newly described retro-perception phenomenon. I will integrate this proposition to the global neuronal workspace model and consider possible underlying brain mechanisms. Finally, I will argue that this capacity to process information 'offline' might have made conscious processing evolutionarily advantageous in spite of its sluggishness and capacity limitations.This article is part of the theme issue 'Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access'.

Multidimensional cognitive evaluation of patients with disorders of consciousness using EEG: A proof of concept study.

The use of cognitive evoked potentials in EEG is now part of the routine evaluation of non-communicating patients with disorders of consciousness in several specialized medical centers around the world. They typically focus on one or two cognitive markers, such as the mismatch negativity or the P3 to global auditory regularity. However it has become clear that none of these markers in isolation is at the same time sufficiently specific and sufficiently sensitive to be taken as the unique gold standard for diagnosing consciousness. A good way forward would be to combine several cognitive markers within the same test to improve evaluation. Furthermore, given the diversity of lesions leading to disorders of consciousness, it is important not only to probe whether a patient is conscious or not, but also to establish a more general and nuanced profile of the residual cognitive capacities of each patient using a combination of markers. In the present study we built a unique EEG protocol that probed 8 dimensions of cognitive processing in a single 1.5 h session. This protocol probed variants of classical markers together with new markers of spatial attention, which has not yet been studied in these patients. The eight dimensions were: (1) own name recognition, (2) temporal attention, (3) spatial attention, (4) detection of spatial incongruence (5) motor planning, and (6,7,8) modulations of these effects by the global context, reflecting higher-level functions. This protocol was tested in 15 healthy control subjects and in 17 patients with various etiologies, among which 13 could be included in the analysis. The results in the control group allowed a validation and a specific description of the cognitive levels probed by each marker. At the single-subject level, this combined protocol allowed assessing the presence of both classical and newly introduced markers for each patient and control, and revealed that the combination of several markers increased diagnostic sensitivity. The presence of a high-level effect in any of the three tested domains distinguished between minimally conscious and vegetative patients, while the presence of low-level effects was similar in both groups. In summary, this study constitutes a validated proof of concept in favor of probing multiple cognitive dimensions to improve the evaluation of non-communicating patients. At a more conceptual level, this EEG tool can help achieve a better understanding of disorders of consciousness by exploring consciousness in its multiple cognitive facets.

Measuring away an attentional confound?

A recent fMRI study by Webb et al. (Cortical networks involved in visual awareness independent of visual attention, Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2016;113:13923-28) proposes a new method for finding the neural correlates of awareness by matching attention across awareness conditions. The experimental design, however, seems at odds with known features of attention. We highlight logical and methodological points that are critical when trying to disentangle attention and awareness.

Retrospective Attention Gates Discrete Conscious Access to Past Sensory Stimuli.

Cueing attention after the disappearance of visual stimuli biases which items will be remembered best. This observation has historically been attributed to the influence of attention on memory as opposed to subjective visual experience. We recently challenged this view by showing that cueing attention after the stimulus can improve the perception of a single Gabor patch at threshold levels of contrast. Here, we test whether this retro-perception actually increases the frequency of consciously perceiving the stimulus, or simply allows for a more precise recall of its features. We used retro-cues in an orientation-matching task and performed mixture-model analysis to independently estimate the proportion of guesses and the precision of non-guess responses. We find that the improvements in performance conferred by retrospective attention are overwhelmingly determined by a reduction in the proportion of guesses, providing strong evidence that attracting attention to the target's location after its disappearance increases the likelihood of perceiving it consciously.

Neurocomputational account of how the human brain decides when to have a break.

No pain, no gain: cost-benefit trade-off has been formalized in classical decision theory to account for how we choose whether to engage effort. However, how the brain decides when to have breaks in the course of effort production remains poorly understood. We propose that decisions to cease and resume work are triggered by a cost evidence accumulation signal reaching upper and lower bounds, respectively. We developed a task in which participants are free to exert a physical effort knowing that their payoff would be proportional to their effort duration. Functional MRI and magnetoencephalography recordings conjointly revealed that the theoretical cost evidence accumulation signal was expressed in proprioceptive regions (bilateral posterior insula). Furthermore, the slopes and bounds of the accumulation process were adapted to the difficulty of the task and the money at stake. Cost evidence accumulation might therefore provide a dynamical mechanistic account of how the human brain maximizes benefits while preventing exhaustion.

Cueing attention after the stimulus is gone can retrospectively trigger conscious perception.

Is our perceptual experience of a stimulus entirely determined during the early buildup of the sensory representation, within 100 to 150 ms following stimulation? Or can later influences, such as sensory reactivation, still determine whether we become conscious of a stimulus? Late visual reactivation can be experimentally induced by postcueing attention after visual stimulus offset. In a contrary approach from previous work on postcued attention and visual short-term memory, which used multiple item displays, we tested the influence of postcued attention on perception, using a single visual stimulus (Gabor patch) at threshold contrast. We showed that attracting attention to the stimulus location 100 to 400 ms after presentation still drastically improved the viewers' objective capacity to detect its presence and to discriminate its orientation, along with drastic increase in subjective visibility. This retroperception effect demonstrates that postcued attention can retrospectively trigger the conscious perception of a stimulus that would otherwise have escaped consciousness. It was known that poststimulus events could either suppress consciousness, as in masking, or alter conscious content, as in the flash-lag illusion. Our results show that conscious perception can also be triggered by an external event several hundred ms after stimulus offset, underlining unsuspected temporal flexibility in conscious perception.

Event related potentials elicited by violations of auditory regularities in patients with impaired consciousness.

Improving our ability to detect conscious processing in non communicating patients remains a major goal of clinical cognitive neurosciences. In this perspective, several functional brain imaging tools are currently under development. Bedside cognitive event-related potentials (ERPs) derived from the EEG signal are a good candidate to explore consciousness in these patients because: (1) they have an optimal time resolution within the millisecond range able to monitor the stream of consciousness, (2) they are fully non-invasive and relatively cheap, (3) they can be recorded continuously on dedicated individual systems to monitor consciousness and to communicate with patients, (4) and they can be used to enrich patients' autonomy through brain-computer interfaces. We recently designed an original auditory rule extraction ERP test that evaluates cerebral responses to violations of temporal regularities that are either local in time or global across several seconds. Local violations led to an early response in auditory cortex, independent of attention or the presence of a concurrent visual task, while global violations led to a late and spatially distributed response that was only present when subjects were attentive and aware of the violations. In the present work, we report the results of this test in 65 successive recordings obtained at bedside from 49 non-communicating patients affected with various acute or chronic neurological disorders. At the individual level, we confirm the high specificity of the 'global effect': only conscious patients presented this proposed neural signature of conscious processing. Here, we also describe in details the respective neural responses elicited by violations of local and global auditory regularities, and we report two additional ERP effects related to stimuli expectancy and to task learning, and we discuss their relations to consciousness.

Top-down modulation of human early visual cortex after stimulus offset supports successful postcued report.

Modulations of sensory processing in early visual areas are thought to play an important role in conscious perception. To date, most empirical studies focused on effects occurring before or during visual presentation. By contrast, several emerging theories postulate that sensory processing and conscious visual perception may also crucially depend on late top-down influences, potentially arising after a visual display. To provide a direct test of this, we performed an fMRI study using a postcued report procedure. The ability to report a target at a specific spatial location in a visual display can be enhanced behaviorally by symbolic auditory postcues presented shortly after that display. Here we showed that such auditory postcues can enhance target-specific signals in early human visual cortex (V1 and V2). For postcues presented 200 msec after stimulus termination, this target-specific enhancement in visual cortex was specifically associated with correct conscious report. The strength of this modulation predicted individual levels of performance in behavior. By contrast, although later postcues presented 1000 msec after stimulus termination had some impact on activity in early visual cortex, this modulation no longer related to conscious report. These results demonstrate that within a critical time window of a few hundred milliseconds after a visual stimulus has disappeared, successful conscious report of that stimulus still relates to the strength of top-down modulation in early visual cortex. We suggest that, within this critical time window, sensory representation of a visual stimulus is still under construction and so can still be flexibly influenced by top-down modulatory processes.