Blocked Presentation Leads Participants to Overutilize Domain Familiarity as a Cue for Judgments of Learning (JOLs).

The accuracy of judgments of learning (JOLs) is vital for efficient self-regulated learning. We examined a situation in which participants overutilize their prior knowledge of a topic ("domain familiarity") as a basis for JOLs, resulting in substantial overconfidence in topics they know the most about. College students rank ordered their knowledge across ten different domains and studied, judged, and then completed a test on facts from those domains. Recall and JOLs were linearly related to self-rated knowledge, as was overconfidence: participants were most overconfident for topics they knew more about, indicating the overutilization of domain familiarity as a cue for JOLs. We examined aspects of the task that might contribute to this pattern, including the order of the task phases and whether participants studied the facts blocked by topic. Although participants used domain familiarity as a cue for JOLs regardless of task design, we found that studying facts from multiple topics blocked by topic led them to overutilize this cue. In contrast, whether participants completed the rank ordering before studying the facts or received a warning about this tendency did not alter the pattern. The relative accuracy of participants' JOLs, however, was not related to domain familiarity under any conditions.

The animacy advantage in memory occurs under self-paced study conditions, but participants' metacognitive beliefs can deter it.

Introduction: Animacy distinguishes living (animate) things from non-living (inanimate) things. People tend to devote attention and processing to living over nonliving things, resulting in a privileged status for animate concepts in human cognition. For example, people tend to remember more animate than inanimate items, a phenomenon known as the "animacy effect" or "animacy advantage." To date, however, the exact cause(s) of this effect is unknown. Methods: We examined the animacy advantage in free-recall performance under computer-paced versus self-paced study conditions and using three different sets of animate and inanimate stimuli (Experiments 1 and 2). We also measured participants' metacognitive beliefs (expectations) about the task before it began (Experiment 2). Results: We consistently obtained an animacy advantage in free-recall, regardless of whether participants studied the materials under computer-paced or self-paced conditions. Those in self-paced conditions spent less time studying items than did those in computer-paced conditions, but overall levels of recall and the occurrence of the animacy advantage were equivalent by study method. Importantly, participants devoted equivalent study time to animate and inanimate items in self-paced conditions, so the animacy advantage in those conditions cannot be attributed to study time differences. In Experiment 2, participants who believed that inanimate items were more memorable instead showed equivalent recall and study time for animate and inanimate items, suggesting that they engaged in equivalent processing of animate and inanimate items. All three sets of materials reliably produced an animacy advantage, but the effect was consistently larger for one set than the other two, indicating some contribution of item-level properties to the effect. Discussion: Overall, the results suggest that participants do not purposely allocate greater processing to animate over inanimate items, even when study is self-paced. Rather, animate items seem to naturally trigger greater richness of encoding than do inanimate items and are then better remembered, although under some conditions participants might engage in deeper processing of inanimate items which can reduce or eliminate the animacy advantage. We suggest that researchers might conceptualize mechanisms for the effect as either centering on intrinsic, item-level properties of the items or centering on extrinsic, processing-based differences between animate and inanimate items.

Within-pair factors might explain the inconsistent effects of animacy on paired-associates recall.

The tendency for people to have better memory for animate (living) concepts than inanimate (nonliving) concepts in memory tasks involving free recall and recognition suggests that animacy status can be an important predictor of memory. To date, however, the effect of animacy on paired-associates recall has been mixed: Some studies have found an animacy advantage, some have found an animacy disadvantage, and some have found no difference by animacy. We tested the hypothesis that the within-pair relationship of the two words in a pair matters more for cued recall than animacy itself. In two experiments, college students studied animate and inanimate English word pairs for a cued-recall test. We varied whether the pairs involved two typical exemplars from the same category (e.g., SALMON-TROUT; FORK-SPOON), one typical and one atypical exemplar from the same category (e.g., DOCTOR-SCIENTIST; HOUSE-IGLOO), or two unrelated words from different categories (e.g., SERGEANT-COBRA; MAGAZINE-PLIERS). Respectively, these pair types produced an animacy disadvantage, an animacy advantage, and no difference by animacy in both experiments. We then examined several measures of within-pair similarity for the items. All were positively associated with paired-associates recall, but animacy had no effect on cued recall above and beyond the relationship of these measures to recall. These results suggest that the within-pair relationship matters more for cued recall than does animacy. Uneven variation in within-pair relationships for animate versus inanimate pairs-rather than animacy itself-might therefore produce the apparently inconsistent effects of animacy on paired-associates recall.

Animate and Inanimate Words Demonstrate Equivalent Retrieval Dynamics Despite the Occurrence of the Animacy Advantage.

People demonstrate a memory advantage for animate (living) concepts over inanimate (nonliving) concepts in a variety of memory tasks, including free recall, but we do not know the mechanism(s) that produces this effect. We compared the retrieval dynamics (serial-position effects, probability of first recall, output order, categorical clustering, and recall contiguity) of animate and inanimate words in a typical free recall task to help elucidate this effect. Participants were more likely to recall animate than inanimate words, but we found few, if any, differences in retrieval dynamics by word type. The animacy advantage was obtained across serial position, including occurring in both the primacy and recency regions of the lists. Participants were equally likely to recall an animate or inanimate word first on the tests and did not prioritize recalling words of one type earlier in retrieval or demonstrate strong clustering by animacy at recall. Participants showed some greater contiguity of recall for inanimate words, but this outcome ran counter to the animacy effect. Together, the results suggest that the animacy advantage stems from increased item-specific memory strength for animate over inanimate words and is unlikely to stem from intentional or strategic differences in encoding or retrieval by word type, categorical strategies, or differences in temporal organization. Although the present results do not directly support or refute any current explanations for the animacy advantage, we suggest that measures of retrieval dynamics can help to inspire or constrain future accounts for this effect and can be incorporated into relevant hypothesis testing.

Delayed Judgments of Learning Are Associated With Activation of Information From Past Experiences: A Neurobiological Examination.

Research in metacognition suggests that the information people use to predict their memory performance can vary depending on the contexts in which they make their predictions. For example, if people judge their memories after a delay from initial encoding, they may be more likely to use retrieved information about the past encoding experience than if they judged memories immediately after encoding. Although this seems intuitive, past behavioral and neuroimaging work has not tested whether delayed memory judgments are more strongly coupled with information about past experiences than immediate memory judgments. We scanned participants using functional MRI while they encoded paired associates and made predictions about their future memory performance either immediately after encoding or after a delay. Consistent with the hypothesis that people use retrieved information about past experiences to inform delayed memory judgments, our results showed that activation patterns associated with past experience were more strongly coupled with delayed memory judgments than with immediate ones.

Forget framing might involve the assumption of mastery, but probably does not activate the notion of forgetting.

Soliciting predictions about hypothetical memory performance (without having participants engage in a related memory task) is a simple way for researchers to examine people's metacognitive beliefs about how memory functions. Using this methodology, researchers can vary what information is provided as part of the scenario or how the memory prediction is framed to examine how such factors alter people's memory predictions. For example, Koriat, Bjork, Sheffer, and Bar (2004) found that participants would factor expected retention intervals into their memory predictions (worse performance over longer intervals) when they were asked to predict future forgetting, but not when they were asked to predict future remembering. In the present experiments, we examined the effects of forget framing on memory predictions and whether we indicated that the hypothetical learners had mastered the information before the retention interval began. Although we hypothesized that stating initial mastery might similarly activate participants' knowledge that memory should decline with longer retention intervals, in our experiments, neither the forget frame nor mastery information seemed to consistently trigger participants' beliefs about forgetting. Furthermore, participants' remember-framed predictions were higher when we indicated mastery than when we did not, but forget-framed predictions were not affected by the mastery information. Taken together, the present results suggest that the forget frame might involve the assumption of an initially high level of mastery but probably does not activate a "notion of forgetting" that alerts participants to the fact that memory declines over increasing retention intervals. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Rule activation and ventromedial prefrontal engagement support accurate stopping in self-paced learning.

When weighing evidence for a decision, individuals are continually faced with the choice of whether to gather more information or act on what has already been learned. The present experiment employed a self-paced category learning task and fMRI to examine the neural mechanisms underlying stopping of information search and how they contribute to choice accuracy. Participants learned to classify triads of face, object, and scene cues into one of two categories using a rule based on one of the stimulus dimensions. After each trial, participants were given the option to explicitly solve the rule or continue learning. Representational similarity analysis (RSA) was used to examine activation of rule-relevant information on trials leading up to a decision to solve the rule. We found that activation of rule-relevant information increased leading up to participants' stopping decisions. Stopping was associated with widespread activation that included medial prefrontal cortex and visual association areas. Engagement of ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) was associated with accurate stopping, and activation in this region was functionally coupled with signal in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC). Results suggest that activating rule information when deciding whether to stop an information search increases choice accuracy, and that the response profile of vmPFC during such decisions may provide an index of effective learning.

The animacy advantage for free-recall performance is not attributable to greater mental arousal.

People often demonstrate better memory for animate concepts (e.g., lion and sailor) than for inanimate concepts (e.g., hammer and mountain). Researchers have attributed this effect to an adaptive memory mechanism that favours information relevant for survival, including information about living things. In the present experiment, we examined the hypothesis that people demonstrate better free-recall performance for animate than inanimate words because animate words tend to be associated with greater mental arousal than inanimate words, a factor that was not controlled for in previous experiments on this topic. To this end, we matched animate and inanimate word lists on mental arousal (and several other factors), and compared participants' free-recall performance for the two word types. We were able to replicate past findings that participants' free-recall of animate words exceeds their free-recall of inanimate words, but we found no support for the possibility that the effect stems from differences in mental arousal between animate and inanimate concepts, as this effect maintained even when the word lists were matched on mental arousal. The present results therefore indicate that mental arousal cannot explain the effects of animacy on free-recall performance.

Framing affects scale usage for judgments of learning, not confidence in memory.

Framing metacognitive judgments of learning (JOLs) in terms of the likelihood of forgetting rather than remembering consistently yields a counterintuitive outcome: The mean of participants' forget-framed JOLs is often higher (after reverse-scoring) than the mean of their remember-framed JOLs, suggesting greater confidence in memory. In the present experiments, we tested 2 competing explanations for this pattern of results. The optimistic-anchoring hypothesis suggests that forget-framed JOLs are associated with greater optimism about memory than are remember-framed JOLs, which leads to their greater magnitude. The differential-scaling hypothesis suggests that forget-framed JOLs and remember-framed JOLs will often be distributed differently across the JOL scale, resulting in means that also often differ. Participants in 3 experiments studied simple memory materials and made JOLs predicting their memory performance for those items. They made their JOLs in terms of either the likelihood of remembering or forgetting. In contrast to the optimistic-anchoring hypothesis, the mean of participants' forget-framed JOLs was unaffected by information concerning the supposed difficulty of the task (Experiment 1), was lower than for remember-framed JOLs in a task selected to evoke high JOLs (Experiment 2), and demonstrated equivalent confidence in memory when participants were restricted to a yes-no binary response (Experiment 3). In support of the differential-scaling hypothesis, participants' forget-framed JOLs were consistently symmetrically distributed across the JOL scale, resulting in a mean at the center of the judgment scale that was often higher than that for remember-framed JOLs. Framing therefore affects how participants scale their JOLs, not their confidence in their memory. (PsycINFO Database Record

Unskilled and unaware in the classroom: College students' desired grades predict their biased grade predictions.

People tend to be overconfident when predicting their performance on a variety of physical and mental tasks (i.e., they predict they will perform better than they actually do). Such a pattern is commonly found in educational settings, in which many students greatly overestimate how well they will perform on exams. In particular, the lowest-performing students tend to show the greatest overconfidence (i.e., the "unskilled-and-unaware" effect). Such overconfidence can have deleterious effects on the efficacy of students' short-term study behaviors (i.e., underpreparing for exams) and long-term academic decisions (i.e., changing one's academic major to an "easier" topic or dropping out of school completely). To help understand why students' grade predictions are often overconfident, we examined the hypothesis that students' grade predictions are biased by their desired levels of performance, which are often much higher than their actual levels of performance. Across three studies in which actual students made predictions about their exam performance in their courses, we demonstrated that students' grade predictions are highly biased by their desired grades on those exams. We obtained this result when students predicted their exam grades over a week before the exam (Study 1), immediately after taking the exam (Study 2), and across the four course exams in a single semester (Study 3). These results are informative for understanding why the "unskilled-and-unaware" pattern of performance predictions occurs, and why people in general tend to be overconfident when making both physical and mental performance predictions.

Adaptive memory: Animacy enhances free recall but impairs cued recall.

Recent research suggests that human memory systems evolved to remember animate things better than inanimate things. In the present experiments, we examined whether these effects occur for both free recall and cued recall. In Experiment 1, we directly compared the effect of animacy on free recall and cued recall. Participants studied lists of objects and lists of animals for free-recall tests, and studied sets of animal-animal pairs and object-object pairs for cued-recall tests. In Experiment 2, we compared participants' cued recall for English-English, Swahili-English, and English-Swahili word pairs involving either animal or object English words. In Experiment 3, we compared participants' cued recall for animal-animal, object-object, animal-object, and object-animal pairs. Although we were able to replicate past effects of animacy aiding free recall, animacy typically impaired cued recall in the present experiments. More importantly, given the interactions found in the present experiments, we conclude that some factor associated with animacy (e.g., attention capture or mental arousal) is responsible for the present patterns of results. This factor seems to moderate the relationship between animacy and memory, producing a memory advantage for animate stimuli in scenarios where the moderator leads to enhanced target retrievability but a memory disadvantage for animate stimuli in scenarios where the moderator leads to impaired association memory.

Low-Dose Alteplase Infusion for the Treatment of Mechanical Aortic Valve Thrombosis: A Spotlight on the Importance of Medication Adherence.

A rare, yet serious, complication of mechanical heart valves is symptomatic obstructive prosthetic valve thrombosis. The risk of valve thrombosis is magnified in patients who are nonadherent to prescribed anticoagulation. In this case report, we describe a 48-year-old male patient with a history of mechanical aortic valve replacement surgery, who stopped taking prescribed warfarin therapy 2 years before presentation and subsequently developed acute decompensated heart failure secondary to valvular dysfunction. Low-dose alteplase therapy was administered successfully with no bleeding complications and a complete return of valvular function.

Examining competing hypotheses for the effects of diagrams on recall for text.

Supplementing text-based learning materials with diagrams typically increases students' free recall and cued recall of the presented information. In the present experiments, we examined competing hypotheses for why this occurs. More specifically, although diagrams are visual, they also serve to repeat information from the text they accompany. Both visual presentation and repetition are known to aid students' recall of information. To examine to what extent diagrams aid recall because they are visual or repetitive (or both), we had college students in two experiments (n = 320) read a science text about how lightning storms develop before completing free-recall and cued-recall tests over the presented information. Between groups, we manipulated the format and repetition of target pieces of information in the study materials using a 2 (visual presentation of target information: diagrams present vs. diagrams absent) × 2 (repetition of target information: present vs. absent) between-participants factorial design. Repetition increased both the free recall and cued recall of target information, and this occurred regardless of whether that repetition was in the form of text or a diagram. In contrast, the visual presentation of information never aided free recall. Furthermore, visual presentation alone did not significantly aid cued recall when participants studied the materials once before the test (Experiment 1) but did when they studied the materials twice (Experiment 2). Taken together, the results of the present experiments demonstrate the important role of repetition (i.e., that diagrams repeat information from the text) over the visual nature of diagrams in producing the benefits of diagrams for recall.

People use the memory for past-test heuristic as an explicit cue for judgments of learning.

When people estimate their memory for to-be-learned material over multiple study-test trials, they tend to base their judgments of learning (JOLs) on their test performance for those materials on the previous trial. Their use of this information-known as the memory for past-test (MPT) heuristic-is believed to be responsible for improvements in the relative accuracy (resolution) of people's JOLs across learning trials. Although participants seem to use past-test information as a major basis for their JOLs, little is known about how learners translate this information into a judgment of learning. Toward this end, in two experiments, we examined whether participants factored past-test performance into their JOLs in either an explicit, theory-based way or an implicit way. To do so, we had one group of participants (learners) study paired associates, make JOLs, and take a test on two study-test trials. Other participants (observers) viewed learners' protocols and made JOLs for the learners. Presumably, observers could only use theory-based information to make JOLs for the learners, which allowed us to estimate the contribution of explicit and implicit information to learners' JOLs. Our analyses suggest that all participants factored simple past-test performance into their JOLs in an explicit, theory-based way but that this information made limited contributions to improvements in relative accuracy across trials. In contrast, learners also used other privileged, implicit information about their learning to inform their judgments (that observers had no access to) that allowed them to achieve further improvements in relative accuracy across trials.

Domain familiarity as a cue for judgments of learning.

Students differ in how much they already know about topics within and across their courses. Few studies, however, have examined the relationship between participants' levels of knowledge across topics (i.e., their "domain familiarity") and their learning of information from those topics, their study choices related to those topics, and their subjective self-assessments of their learning about the topics. As such, in two studies we had participants (Study 1, college students; Study 2, Mturk workers) rank their domain familiarity for several to-be-studied domains (e.g., chemistry, history), rate their efficacy and interest in those domains, study and make judgments of learning (JOLs) for facts from each domain, and finally complete a short-answer test over those facts. Participants' efficacy and interest ratings for the topics were linearly related to their topic rankings, as were their recall of and JOLs for facts from those domains. Although the JOLs were consistently overconfident, they were more overconfident for better-known than for lesser-known topics. Participants' study times were not related to their topic rankings (Studies 1 and 2), but participants did use domain familiarity to strategically decide which domains to restudy before the test (Study 2). Participants typically chose to restudy their least-familiar topics, but chose to restudy their best-known topic under extremely limited restudy conditions. As a whole, the results suggest that participants effectively use their domain familiarity as a basis for their JOLs and restudy choices, but to some extent overuse this factor to assess their learning, and underuse it to guide initial study.

Magnitude and accuracy differences between judgements of remembering and forgetting.

Metacognition researchers have recently begun to examine the effects of framing judgements of learning (JOLs) in terms of forgetting (rather than remembering) on the judgements' magnitude and accuracy. Although a promising new direction for the study of metamemory, initial studies have yielded inconsistent results. To help resolve these inconsistencies, in four experiments we had college students (N = 434) study paired associates and make JOLs framed in terms of either remembering or forgetting over two study-test trials. Our goals were to further document the effects of framing on the magnitude and accuracy of JOLs and to consider explanations for why specific patterns tend to emerge. The present experiments provide evidence that (a) judgements of forgetting are psychologically anchored at the midpoint of the JOL scale, whereas judgements of remembering are anchored at a lower point, (b) differences in absolute accuracy (calibration) by frame are largely artefactual and stem from differences in anchoring, (c) differences in JOL magnitude and absolute accuracy by frame do not obtain when memory cues are salient to participants, and (d) a forget frame impairs the relative accuracy (resolution) of JOLs across trials by reducing participants' reliance on cues such as memory for past test performance.

The contributions of anchoring and past-test performance to the underconfidence-with-practice effect.

In the underconfidence-with-practice effect, people's judgments of learning (JOLs) typically underestimate memory performance across multiple study-test phases. Whereas the past-test hypothesis suggests that this underconfidence stems from participants' reliance on earlier test performance to make subsequent JOLs (despite new learning), the anchoring hypothesis suggests that the underconfidence stems from participants' reliance on a fixed psychological anchor point low on the JOL scale to make their JOLs. To contrast the predictions of these hypotheses, we had college students study, make JOLs, and test over several dozen paired-associate items across two study-test phases. We parametrically manipulated the presence or absence of testing and judging within participants during Phase 1. Contrary to the past-test hypothesis, items tested during Phase 1 demonstrated less underconfidence during Phase 2 than did nontested items. Furthermore, participants did not increase JOLs from Phase 1 to Phase 2 for items that they had not recalled or for items that had not been tested at all, suggesting that the underconfidence stemmed largely from participants' overreliance on a psychological anchor point to make their JOLs. Past test performance, however, seems to be a major cue that participants use to adjust their JOLs away from the anchor, reducing underconfidence. This was most evident when we used a between-participants manipulation (Exp. 2) to cause our participants to anchor their JOLs either high or low on the JOL scale, producing differential underconfidence independent of any adjustment. Taken together, these results support the anchoring hypothesis over the past-test hypothesis for explaining underconfidence with practice.

Stimulation with a low-amplitude, digitized synaptic signal to invoke robust activity within neuronal networks on multielectrode arrays.

Multielectrode arrays (MEAs) are used for analysis of neuronal activity. Here we report two variations on commonly accepted techniques that increase the precision of extracellular electrical stimulation: (i) the use of a low-amplitude recorded spontaneous synaptic signal as a stimulus waveform and (ii) the use of a specific electrode within the array adjacent to the stimulus electrode as a hard-grounded stimulus signal return path. Both modifications remained compatible with manipulation of neuronal networks. In addition, localized stimulation with the low-amplitude synaptic signal allowed selective stimulation or inhibition of otherwise spontaneous signals. These findings indicate that minimizing the area of the culture impacted by external stimulation allows modulation of signaling patterns within subpopulations of neurons in culture. The simple modifications described herein may be useful for precise monitoring and manipulation of neuronal networks.

Metacomprehension judgements reflect the belief that diagrams improve learning from text.

In two experiments we systematically explored whether people consider the format of text materials when judging their text learning, and whether doing so might inappropriately bias their judgements. Participants studied either text with diagrams (multimedia) or text alone and made both per-paragraph judgements and global judgements of their text learning. In Experiment 1 they judged their learning to be better for text with diagrams than for text alone. In that study, however, test performance was greater for multimedia, so the judgements may reflect either a belief in the power of multimedia or on-line processing. Experiment 2 replicated this finding and also included a third group that read texts with pictures that did not improve text performance. Judgements made by this group were just as high as those made by participants who received the effective multimedia format. These results confirm the hypothesis that people's metacomprehension judgements can be influenced by their beliefs about text format. Over-reliance on this multimedia heuristic, however, might reduce judgement accuracy in situations where it is invalid.