"Caught In Each Other's Traps": Factors Perpetuating Incentive-Linked Prescribing Deals Between Physicians and the Pharmaceutical Industry.

BACKGROUND: Despite known adverse impacts on patients and health systems, 'incentive-linked prescribing', which describes the prescribing of medicines that result in personal benefits for the prescriber, remains a widespread and hidden impediment to quality of healthcare. We investigated factors perpetuating incentive-linked prescribing among primary care physicians in for-profit practices (referred to as private doctors), using Pakistan as a case study. METHODS: Our mixed-methods study synthesised insights from a survey of 419 systematically samples private doctors and 68 semi-structured interviews with private doctors (n=28), pharmaceutical sales representatives (n=12), and provincial and national policy actors (n=28). For the survey, we built a verified database of all registered private doctors within Karachi, Pakistan's most populous city, administered an electronic questionnaire in-person and descriptively analysed the data. Semi-structured interviews incorporated a vignette-based exercise and data was analysed using an interpretive approach. RESULTS: Our survey showed that 90% of private doctors met pharmaceutical sales representatives weekly. Three interlinked factors perpetuating incentive-linked prescribing we identified were: gaps in understanding of conflicts of interest and loss of values among doctors; financial pressures on doctors operating in a (largely) privately financed health-system, exacerbated by competition with unqualified healthcare providers; and aggressive incentivisation by pharmaceutical companies, linked to low political will to regulate and an over-saturated pharmaceutical market. CONCLUSION: Regular interactions between pharmaceutical companies and private doctors are normalised in our study setting, and progress on regulating these is hindered by the substantial role of incentive-linked prescribing in the financial success of physicians and the pharmaceutical industry employees. A first step towards addressing the entrenchment of incentive-linked prescribing may be to reduce opposition to restrictions on incentivisation of physicians from stakeholders within the pharmaceutical industry, physicians themselves, and policymakers concerned about curtailing growth of the pharmaceutical industry.

Incentivisation practices and their influence on physicians' prescriptions: A qualitative analysis of practice and policy in Pakistan.

Focus on profit-generating enterprise in healthcare can create conflicts of interest that adversely impact prescribing and pricing of medicines. Although a global challenge, addressing the impacts on quality of care is particularly difficult in countries where the pharmaceutical industry and physician lobby is strong relative to regulatory institutions. Our study characterises the range of incentives exchanged between the pharmaceutical industry and physicians, and investigates the differences between incentivisation practices and policies in Pakistan. In this mixed methods study, we first thematically analysed semi-structured interviews with 28 purposively selected for-profit primary-care physicians and 13 medical sales representatives from pharmaceutical companies working across Pakistan's largest city, Karachi. We then conducted a content analysis of policies on ethical practice issued by two regulatory bodies responsible in Pakistan, and the World Health Organization. This enabled a systematic comparison of incentivisation practices with what is considered 'prohibitive' or 'permissive' in policy. Our findings demonstrate that incentivisation of physicians to meet pharmaceutical sales targets is the norm, and that both parties play in the symbiotic physician-pharma incentivisation dynamics. Further, we were able to categorise the types of incentive exchanged into one of five categories: financial, material, professional or educational, social or recreational, and familial. Our comparison of incentivisation practices with policies revealed three reasons for such widespread incentivisation linked to sales targets: first, some clear policies were being ignored by physicians; second, there are ambiguous or contradictory policies with respect to specific incentive types; and third, numerous incentive types are unaddressed by existing policies, such as pharmaceutical companies paying for private clinic renovations. There is a need for policies to be clarified and updated, and to build buy-in for policy enforcement from pharmaceutical companies and physicians, such that transgressions on target-driven prescribing are seen to be unethical.

The healthcare field as a marketplace: general practitioners, pharmaceutical companies, and profit-led prescribing in Pakistan.

Incentivisation of general practitioners (GPs) by pharmaceutical companies is thought to affect prescribing practices, often not in patients' interest. Using a Bourdieusian lens, we examine the socially structured conditions that underpin exchanges between pharmaceutical companies and GPs in Pakistan. The analysis of qualitative interviews with 28 GPs and 13 pharmaceutical sales representatives (PSRs) shows that GPs, through prescribing medicines, met pharmaceutical sales targets in exchange for various incentives. We argue that these practices can be given meaning through the concept of 'field' - a social space in which GPs, PSRs, and pharmacists were hierarchically positioned, with their unique capacities, to enable healthcare provision. However, structural forces like the intense competition between pharmaceutical companies, the presence of unqualified healthcare providers in the healthcare market, and a lack of regulation by the state institutions produced a context that enabled pharmaceutical companies and GPs to use the healthcare field, also, as space to maximise profits. GPs believed the effort to maximise incomes and meet socially desired standards were two key factors that encouraged profit-led prescribing. We conclude that understanding the healthcare field is an important step toward developing governance practices that can address profit-led prescribing.