Showcasing Environmental Health and Safety Activities During the Coronavirus Disease 2019 Pandemic.

Introduction: Emergency preparedness is not a novel topic. What has been novel is the fast pace at which organizations, including academic institutions, have had to adapt to infectious disease outbreaks since 2000. Objective: The goal of this article is to highlight the various environmental health and safety (EHS) team activities during the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic to ensure that on-site personnel was safe, the research could be conducted, and critical business operations such as academics, laboratory animal care, environmental compliance, and routine healthcare functions could continue during the pandemic. Methods: The response framework is presented by discussing first the lessons learned in preparedness and emergency response during outbreaks that occurred since 2000, namely Influenza virus, Zika virus, and Ebola virus. Then, how the response to the COVID-19 pandemic was activated, and the effects of ramping down research and business activities. Results: Next, the contributions of each EHS unit are presented, namely, environmental, industrial hygiene and occupational safety, research safety and biosafety, radiation safety, supporting healthcare activities, disinfection, and communications and training. Discussion: Lastly, a few lessons learned are shared with the reader for moving toward normalcy.

A University-Led Contact Tracing Program Response to a COVID-19 Outbreak Among Students in Georgia, February-March 2021.

Few reports have described how university programs have controlled COVID-19 outbreaks. Emory University established a case investigation and contact tracing program in June 2020 to identify and mitigate transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in the Emory community. In February 2021, this program identified a surge in COVID-19 cases. In this case study, we present details of outbreak investigation, construction of transmission networks to assess clustering and identify groups for targeted testing, and program quality metrics demonstrating the efficiency of case investigation and contact tracing, which helped bring the surge under control. During February 10-March 5, 2021, Emory University identified 265 COVID-19 cases confirmed by nucleic acid testing in saliva or nasopharyngeal samples. Most students with COVID-19 were undergraduates (95%) and were affiliated with Greek life organizations (70%); 41% lived on campus. Network analysis identified 1 epidemiologically linked cluster of 198 people. Nearly all students diagnosed with COVID-19 (96%) were interviewed the same day as their positive test result. Of 340 close contacts, 90% were traced and 89% were tested. The median time from contact interview to first test was 2 days (interquartile range, 0-6 days); 43% received a positive test result during their quarantine. The surge was considered under control within 17 days, after which new cases were no longer epidemiologically linked. Early detection through systematic testing protocols and rapid and near-complete contact tracing, paired with isolation and quarantine measures, helped to contain the surge. Our approach emphasizes the importance of early preparation of adequate outbreak response infrastructure and staff to implement interventions appropriately and consistently during a pandemic.

Early warning of a COVID-19 surge on a university campus based on wastewater surveillance for SARS-CoV-2 at residence halls.

As COVID-19 continues to spread globally, monitoring the disease at different scales is critical to support public health decision making. Surveillance for SARS-CoV-2 RNA in wastewater can supplement surveillance based on diagnostic testing. In this paper, we report the results of wastewater-based COVID-19 surveillance on Emory University campus that included routine sampling of sewage from a hospital building, an isolation/quarantine building, and 21 student residence halls between July 13th, 2020 and March 14th, 2021. We examined the sensitivity of wastewater surveillance for detecting COVID-19 cases at building level and the relation between Ct values from RT-qPCR results of wastewater samples and the number of COVID-19 patients residing in the building. Our results show that weekly wastewater surveillance using Moore swab samples was not sensitive enough (6 of 63 times) to reliably detect one or two sporadic cases in a residence building. The Ct values of the wastewater samples over time from the same sampling location reflected the temporal trend in the number of COVID-19 patients in the isolation/quarantine building and hospital (Pearson's r < -0.8), but there is too much uncertainty to directly estimate the number of COVID-19 cases using Ct values. After students returned for the spring 2021 semester, SARS-CoV-2 RNA was detected in the wastewater samples from most of the student residence hall monitoring sites one to two weeks before COVID-19 cases surged on campus. This finding suggests that wastewater-based surveillance can be used to provide early warning of COVID-19 outbreaks at institutions.

Pericardial Tamponade After Systemic Alteplase in Stroke and Emergent Reversal With Tranexamic Acid.

Alteplase, or tissue plasminogen activator (tPA), lyses clots by enhancing activation of plasminogen to plasmin. Conversely, tranexamic acid (TXA) functions by inhibiting the conversion of plasminogen to plasmin, which inhibits fibrinolysis. TXA has proven safe and effective in major bleeding with various etiologies. A 76-year-old male developed acute ischemic stroke symptoms. Systemic alteplase was administered and he showed clinical improvement. Shortly thereafter, the patient became hypotensive and lost pulses. Point-of-care ultrasound revealed cardiac tamponade. TXA was immediately given to inhibit fibrinolysis since cryoprecipitate and blood products were not immediately available. Pericardiocentesis was performed and successfully removed 200 milliliters of blood with return of pulses. Clinicians must consider TXA as a rapidly accessible antagonist of tPA's fibrinolytic effects.

Developing a Mass Casualty Surge Capacity Protocol for Emergency Medical Services to Use for Patient Distribution.

OBJECTIVES: Metropolitan areas must be prepared to manage large numbers of casualties related to a major incident. Most US cities do not have adequate trauma center capacity to manage large-scale mass casualty incidents (MCIs). Creating surge capacity requires the distribution of casualties to hospitals that are not designated as trauma centers. Our objectives were to extrapolate MCI response research into operational objectives for MCI distribution plan development; formulate a patient distribution model based on research, hospital capacities, and resource availability; and design and disseminate a casualty distribution tool for use by emergency medical services (EMS) personnel to distribute patients to the appropriate level of care. METHODS: Working with hospitals within the region, we refined emergency department surge capacity for MCIs and developed a prepopulated tool for EMS providers to use to distribute higher-acuity casualties to trauma centers and lower-acuity casualties to nontrauma hospitals. A mechanism to remove a hospital from the list of available resources, if it is overwhelmed with patients who self-transport to the location, also was put into place. RESULTS: The number of critically injured survivors from an MCI has proven to be consistent, averaging 7% to 10%. Moving critically injured patients to level 1 trauma centers can result in a 25% reduction in mortality, when compared with care at nontrauma hospitals. US cities face major gaps in the surge capacity needed to manage an MCI. Sixty percent of "walking wounded" casualties self-transport to the closest hospital(s) to the incident. CONCLUSIONS: Directing critically ill patients to designated trauma centers has the potential to reduce mortality associated with the event. When applied to MCI responses, damage-control principles reduce resource utilization and optimize surge capacity. A universal system for mass casualty triage was identified and incorporated into the region's EMS. Flagship regional coordinating hospitals were designated to coordinate the logistics of the disaster response of both trauma-designated and undesignated hospitals. Finally, a distribution tool was created to direct the flow of critically injured patients to trauma centers and redirect patients with lesser injuries to centers without trauma designation. The tool was distributed to local EMS personnel and validated in a series of tabletop and functional drills. These efforts demonstrate that a regional response to MCIs can be implemented in metropolitan areas under-resourced for trauma care.

Opportunity for Collaboration Between Radiation Injury Treatment Network Centers and Medical Toxicology Specialists.

OBJECTIVES: The Radiation Injury Treatment Network (RITN) comprises >50 centers across the United States that are poised to care for victims of a radiation emergency. The network is organized around bone marrow transplant centers because these facilities excel in both radiation medicine and the care of patients with severe bone marrow depression. A radiation emergency may cause not only irradiation from an external source but also internal contamination with radioactive material. Because medical toxicologists are trained in radiation injury management and have expertise in the management of internal contamination, RITN centers may benefit from partnerships with medical toxicology resources, which may be located at academic medical centers, hospital inpatient clinical services, outpatient clinics, or poison control centers. METHODS: We determined the locations of existing RITN centers and assessed their proximity to various medical toxicology resources, including medical toxicology fellowship programs, inpatient toxicology services, outpatient toxicology clinics, and poison control centers. Data were derived from publicly available Internet sources in March 2015. RESULTS: The majority of RITN centers do not have a medical toxicology fellowship, an inpatient toxicology service, or an outpatient toxicology clinic within the same institution. Fifty-seven percent of RITN centers have at least one of these resources located in the same city, however, and 73% of centers have at least one of these resources or a poison control center within the same city. Ninety-five percent of RITN centers have at least one medical toxicology resource within the state. CONCLUSIONS: Most RITN centers are located in the same city as at least one medical toxicology resource. Establishing relationships between RITN centers and medical toxicologists needs to be explored further.