An international survey of perceptions of the 2014 FIFA World Cup: National levels of corruption as a context for perceptions of institutional corruption.

We conducted a survey about the 2014 FIFA World Cup that measured attitudes about FIFA, players, and officials in 18 languages with 4600 respondents from 29 countries. Sixty percent of respondents perceived FIFA officials as being dishonest, and people from countries with less institutional corruption and stronger rule of law perceived FIFA officials as being more corrupt and less competent running the tournament than people from countries with more corruption and weaker rule of law. In contrast, respondents evaluated players as skilled and honest and match officials as competent and honest. We discuss the implications of our findings for perceptions of corruption in general.

Towards the elucidation of evolution of out-group aggression.

We focus on the implications of De Dreu and Gross's findings for the evolutionary perspective on out-group aggression and in-group cooperation. Although their experimental protocols are potentially useful in determining the origins of out-group aggression in humans, they so far provide inconclusive evidence only. We suggest ways of furthering our understanding of the connection between parochial cooperation and intergroup conflict.

Intergroup Biases in Fear-induced Aggression.

Using a recently created preemptive strike game (PSG) with 176 participants, we investigated if the motivations of spite and/or fear promotes aggression that requires a small cost to the aggressor and imposes a larger cost on the opponent, and confirmed the earlier finding that fear does but spite does not promote intergroup aggression when the groups are characterized as minimal groups; additionally, the rate of intergroup aggression did not vary according to the group membership of the opponent. The PSG represents a situation in which both the motivations of spite and of fear can logically drive players to choose an option of aggression against an opponent. Participants decide whether or not to attack another participant, who also has the same capability. The decision is made in real time, using a computer. We discuss theoretical implications of our findings on the evolutionary foundations of intragroup cooperation and intergroup aggression. The evolutionary model of intergroup aggression, or the parochial altruism model, posits that intragroup cooperation and intergroup aggression have co-evolved, and thus it predicts both intragroup cooperation and intergroup aggression to emerge even in a minimal group devoid of a history of intergroup relationships. The finding that only intragroup cooperation but not intergroup aggression emerged in the minimal group experiments strongly suggests that intergroup aggression involves a psychological mechanism that is independent from that of intragroup cooperation. We further discuss the implications of these findings on real-world politics and military strategy.

Rejection of unfair offers in the ultimatum game is no evidence of strong reciprocity.

The strong reciprocity model of the evolution of human cooperation has gained some acceptance, partly on the basis of support from experimental findings. The observation that unfair offers in the ultimatum game are frequently rejected constitutes an important piece of the experimental evidence for strong reciprocity. In the present study, we have challenged the idea that the rejection response in the ultimatum game provides evidence of the assumption held by strong reciprocity theorists that negative reciprocity observed in the ultimatum game is inseparably related to positive reciprocity as the two sides of a preference for fairness. The prediction of an inseparable relationship between positive and negative reciprocity was rejected on the basis of the results of a series of experiments that we conducted using the ultimatum game, the dictator game, the trust game, and the prisoner's dilemma game. We did not find any correlation between the participants' tendencies to reject unfair offers in the ultimatum game and their tendencies to exhibit various prosocial behaviors in the other games, including their inclinations to positively reciprocate in the trust game. The participants' responses to postexperimental questions add support to the view that the rejection of unfair offers in the ultimatum game is a tacit strategy for avoiding the imposition of an inferior status.