Application of the ALARA principle for radon at work: feedback from the European ALARA network.

The Council Directive 2013/59/Euratom has introduced binding requirements for the management of radon in the workplace in Member States of the European Union. How does it work in practice? In 2021, the European ALARA Network created a working group on ALARA for Radon at Work with the objective of collecting and sharing experiences from the field. A survey was developed to detail each step of the national regulations for the control of radon and to describe case studies showing implementation. This article presents a qualitative analysis of the answers received from seven countries. There are no two similar national regulations and, at each step, different provisions, protocols, techniques etc are applicable or recommended. This diversity contributes to the richness of the results and can inform about interesting and good practices, where 'good' is defined by what is appropriate in the nationally and locally prevailing circumstances. All national regulations follow a graded approach, which is a key component for the implementation of the optimisation (ALARA) principle, yet several potential weak points that may be challenging to ALARA have been identified and are discussed, namely the radon risk assessment, the focus on numerical values, uncertainties in the measurement, how to obtain economically efficient remediation, and the interface with other regulations. Strengthening collaboration between risk prevention and radiation protection actors could help to provide and build expertise on radon management in the workplace, especially when exposure is managed as a planned exposure situation.

Management and regulatory supervision of legacy sites and radioactively contaminated lands in Republic of Kazakhstan.

The safe management and disposal of radioactive waste (RW) arising from the nuclear legacy, as well as newly generated RW, are key problems. Their solution will have important implications for nuclear energy development, the introduction of other radiation technologies, and their public perception. In the framework of the cooperation between the Committee of Atomic and Energy Supervision and Control (CAESC) of the Ministry of Energy of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Norwegian Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (DSA), work has been carried out to analyse the current state of nuclear and radiation safety in the Republic of Kazakhstan. The analysis was based on identifying gaps in national legislation and the assessment of corresponding threats in this area. Proposals for their elimination were developed, taking into account international experience and International Atomic Energy Agency recommendations. Analysis of the current situation in the Republic of Kazakhstan showed that at present the RWs are not properly regulated within an up-to-date regulatory framework. Currently, a list of key by-laws is being developed, which will support the provisions of a new law on RW management, and work is underway to adopt the already developed and drafted regulatory documents. Within the framework of the CAESC-DSA cooperation, the priority tasks established for 2021-2024 include the development of regulatory documents for the rehabilitation of uranium heritage sites, site selection for new nuclear facilities, and the management of nuclear materials for certain types of installations and manufactures. Practice has shown the need to use the advanced international experience and common approaches developed internationally, to develop and apply long-term and reliable solutions for the management of RW and nuclear legacy facilities and territories. The solution of these problems concerns not only scientists, technologists, and employers of the nuclear industry, but requires their cooperation with politicians, regulatory authorities, and the general population. The importance of sharing international experience to understand and solve these challenges is highlighted.

Building optimization into the process for decommissioning, remediation of legacy sites and facilities, and management of the wastes arising: results of an international workshop.

The coordinated organisation of decommissioning, remediation of legacy sites and facilities and management of the resultant waste materials has long been recognized as complex, involving technical challenges, safety and security issues, and a wide range of stakeholder interests. To help address these matters, an international workshop was held in November 2019 in Tromsø, jointly organized by the Norwegian Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority and the Nuclear Energy Agency, in cooperation with the International Commission on Radiological Protection and the International Atomic Energy Agency. The workshop was the third in series hosted by DSA. The first, in 2015, considered regulatory supervision of legacy sites from recognition to resolution; the second, in 2017, considered the need for an overall process, recognising the links between legacies and the decommissioning of major nuclear installations, the management of contaminated areas and the management of the corresponding radioactive waste. The focus of the Tromsø workshop was on incorporating optimization into that overall process. Attendance included 66 participants from 17 countries, as well as representatives from international organizations. The 29 presentations and associated discussion resulted in a set of recommendations supporting the development of a coherent and practical framework for optimization of decommissioning, legacy site management, and related waste management activities. This paper provides an overview of the presented material and discussion, and provides further information and suggestions for taking forward the recommendations. It is hoped that these ideas, along with the many further inputs from other international organisations and forums, will support the completion of work to implement these recommendations, leading to international guidance on the construction of an overall process for decommissioning and legacy management from a multidisciplinary perspective. That guidance should support holistically optimised management of current projects and help to avoid the future creation of new legacies.

Practical radioecology support in the management and regulatory supervision of legacy sites.

Legacy sites are a global issue. Experience has shown that every legacy site is different and case-specific management and remediation options have to be considered. Each site presents a unique mix of physical, chemical and radiological hazards and the significance of those hazards is likely to change over time. A life-cycle approach to remediation is therefore appropriate, with priority consideration allocated according to the major hazards, as technically determined by reference to policy on protection objectives and the corresponding regulatory requirements. Additionally, consideration will typically need to be given to wider issues as may be raised by stakeholders. The remediation approach also needs to take account of the waste management options on-site or involving off-site management and disposal. Radiological and wider environmental impact assessments are a crucial part of the holistic evaluation of hazards and risks (along with economic and societal impacts), which in turn underpin project planning, regulatory and wider decision making. This paper examines the role of radioecology in the assessment process, its contribution to reduction of scientific uncertainties in modelling ecosystem processes of release, transport and fate of radionuclides and evaluation of potential ensuing impacts on humans and the environment. Relevant examples are presented to illustrate the complexities of the processes in regulatory decision making, the various conditions that significantly affect the final solutions and how radioecology can be used in these situations. Whilst a case-specific approach will usually need to be taken to legacy sites, future remediation and clean-up work can be helpfully informed through sharing of experience from other sites. Continued international collaboration between all parties involved in legacy site management is therefore needed to inform on the development of practical regulatory guidance and to ensure that radioecological research is focussed on addressing the key issues that give rise to uncertainties that challenge regulatory and wider decision making.

NORWEGIAN-RUSSIAN COOPERATION IN NUCLEAR LEGACY REGULATION: CONTINUING EXPERIENCE AND LESSONS.

Safe management of nuclear legacies arising from past activities is a critical issue in maintaining confidence for the continuing and future use of radioactive materials. Effective and efficient regulatory supervision of nuclear legacy management is a critical part of that process. The Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority plays an active role in bilateral regulatory cooperation projects with sister authorities in the Russian Federation, as part of Norway's Plan of Action to improve radiation and nuclear safety. Based on this experience and by reference to specific legacy sites and facilities, this study provides an overview of the substantial progress made in remediation at the Site of Temporary Storage for spent fuel and radioactive waste at Andreeva Bay and presents radiation protection issues arising from the experience and lessons learned in this work. It is suggested that this experience can be useful in the further development of international recommendations, standards and guidance on remediation of nuclear legacies.

Regulating the path from legacy recognition, through recovery to release from regulatory control.

Past development of processes and technologies using radioactive material led to construction of many facilities worldwide. Some of these facilities were built and operated before the regulatory infrastructure was in place to ensure adequate control of radioactive material during operation and decommissioning. In other cases, controls were in place but did not meet modern standards, leading to what is now considered to have been inadequate control. Accidents and other events have occurred resulting in loss of control of radioactive material and unplanned releases to the environment. The legacy from these circumstances is that many countries have areas or facilities at which abnormal radiation conditions exist at levels that give rise to concerns about environmental and human health of potential interest to regulatory authorities. Regulation of these legacy situations is complex. This paper examines the regulatory challenges associated with such legacy management and brings forward suggestions for finding the path from: legacy recognition; implementation, as necessary, of urgent mitigation measures; development of a longer-term management strategy, through to release from regulatory control.

International Collaboration on Regulatory Supervision / Colaboración Internacional de la Supervisión Reguladora

ABSTRACT This paper describes the Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority’s experience in regulatory cooperation projects in Russia, with special emphasis on inherited problems. This inheritance includes a large amount of waste sources, such as those used in radioisotope thermoelectric generators, and remediation of former military sites used for storage of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste. The goals of the cooperation programme are to promote effective and efficient regulatory supervision, taking into account international recommendations and good practice in other countries. The specific projects in the program are aimed at specific challenges, which require practical local interpretation of ICRP recommendations, the IAEA Basic Safety Standards and other IAEA requirements and guidance documents. In some cases, new regulatory documentation has been required, as well as new regulatory procedures. In the long term, the program is intended to lead to an enhanced and enduring safety culture. The positive experience in Russia encouraged the Norwegian government in 2008 to extend the regulatory collaboration programme to the countries in Central Asia, based on the experience gained from Russian regulatory authorities as well as from support of Russian Technical Support Organisations. The programmes are evolving into a regional regulatory support group. Noting this experience, the paper includes suggestions and ideas about how such regional groups can be effective in addressing common radiation safety objectives while addressing local differences in technical, geographical, economic and cultural matters in each country.

RESUMEN El trabajo describe la experiencia de la Autoridad Reguladora Noruega en el proyecto de cooperación reguladora en Rusia, con un enfoque especial en los problemas legados. Esta herencia incluye gran cantidad de fuentes como desechos, como las utilizadas en los generadores termoeléctricos radisotópicos (RTG) y la remediación de antiguos emplazamientos militares utilizados para el almacenaje de combustible nuclear gastado y desechos radiactivos. Los objetivos de los programas de cooperación son promover una supervisión reguladora efectiva y eficiente, teniendo en cuenta las recomendaciones internacionales y las buenas prácticas en otros países. Los proyectos específicos en el programa están dirigidos a retos específicos, los cuales requieren de una interpretación práctica local de las recomendaciones del ICRP, las Normas Básicas de Seguridad y otros requerimientos del OIEA, así como sus documentos guías. En algunos casos se han nacesitado nuevos requerimientos reguladores, así como nuevos procedimientos reguladores. El programa pretende que alcance a largo plazo, una mejorada y duradera cultura de seguridad. La experiencia positiva de Rusia fue estimulada por el Gobierno Noruego en el 2008, a extender ese programa de cooperación reguladora a países de Asia Central, usando la experiencia que se obtuvo tanto de las autoridades reguladoras como de apoyo técnico rusas. Los programas evolucionan hacia un grupo de apoyo regulador regional. Teniendo en cuenta esta experiencia, este trabajo incluye sugerencias e ideas de cómoel grupo regional puede ser efectivo en el tratamiento de los objetivos comunes de seguridad, inclusive cuando se traten con diferencias técnicas, geográficas, económicas y en materia cultural en cada país.