"It is for God to judge"1: Understanding Why and When Islamic Religiosity Inhibits Homotolerance.

In Western Europe, Muslims' cultural attitudes take center stage in debates in media and politics. In these debates, the claim that Muslims' religious interpretations cause them to be intolerant of homosexual people is often repeated. While previous public opinion studies have time and again shown that Muslims are indeed on average more homonegative than other people, the present study theoretically explores and empirically tests whether those differences are because of Islamic religiosity. This assumption is often made but has yet to be empirically addressed. Using unique data on young Muslim adults in the Netherlands and more direct measurements of religious interpretations on homosexuality, we find that Islamic religiosity as such hardly fuels intolerance of homosexual people. In fact, our results show that even believing that Islam forbids homosexuality does not necessarily fuel Muslims' intolerance of homosexual people. Rather, what is pivotal, is whether such beliefs are coupled with a willingness to judge, rather than leaving judgment to Allah. We conclude that only among young adult Dutch Muslims who believe it is up to them to judge homosexuality, do homonegative interpretations of Islam feed into intolerance of homosexual people.

Working class economic insecurity and voting for radical right and radical left parties.

The radical right's rise is widely assumed to go hand-in-hand with increasing economic insecurity, as manual workers are considered typical radical right voters. We question whether economic insecurity actually drives working class members to vote for radical parties, both right and left. Using European Social Survey data from 12 Western European countries (2002-2014), we tested whether less secure employment links to vote for such parties. We did this by distinguishing people in permanent employment from those in the same social class but not in permanent employment. Our outcome was surprising: whereas perceived job insecurity correlated with radical right voting, actual economic insecurity in terms of temporary employment was not associated with greater likelihood of voting for a radical right party among the working class. Instead, it was the radical left for which we found indications that it appealed more to groups of people in such an insecure economic position.

Rejecting homosexuality but tolerating homosexuals: The complex relations between religiosity and opposition to homosexuality in 9 Arab countries.

Public debates portray Arab Muslims as universally opposed to homosexuality due to Islam. Those Orientalist claims are mirrored by large-scale studies that argue Muslims oppose homosexuality more than non-Muslims. We argue that assuming religion and opposition to homosexuality are unidimensional concepts obscures how they relate to each other and why; we study both "religiosity" and "opposition to homosexuality" multidimensionally. WVS data on 9000 Arab Muslims show, first, that although most respondents reject both homosexuality and homosexuals, one in five reject homosexuality but do not object to having homosexual neighbors. A substantial minority of Arab Muslims thus "hate the sin but love the sinner". Multilevel analyses show that stronger religious attachment increases opposition to homosexuality and homosexual people. However, all other dimensions of religiosity we study (textualism, mosque attendance, and altruism) also reduce some oppositions. Consequently, the argument that Arab Muslims' religiosity only leads to opposition to homosexuality is too simplistic.

Re-Understanding Religion and Support for Gender Equality in Arab Countries.

Much is said about Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) publics opposing gender equality, often referring to patriarchal Islam. However, nuanced large-scale studies addressing which specific aspects of religiosity affect support for gender equality across the MENA are conspicuously absent. This study develops and tests a gendered agentic socialization framework that proposes that MENA citizens are not only passively socialized by religion but also have agency (within their religiosity). This disaggregates the influence of religiosity, highlights its multifacetedness, and theorizes the moderating roles that gender and sociocognitive empowerment play via gendered processes of agentic dissociations. Using 15 World Values Surveys and multilevel models, our analyses show that most dimensions of religiosity fuel opposition to gender equality. However, the salience of religion in daily life is found to increase women's support for gender equality and cushion the negative impact of religious service attendance. Also, gender and education moderate the impacts of several religiosity dimensions; for instance, women's (initially greater) support for gender equality more sharply declines with increased service attendance than men's. Altogether, this study finds that religious socialization is multifaceted and gendered, and that certain men and women are inclined and equipped to deviate from dominant patriarchal religious interpretations.