How do organizational practices relate to perceived system safety effectiveness? Perceptions of safety climate and co-worker commitment to safety as workplace safety signals.

INTRODUCTION: Integrating safety climate research with signaling theory, we propose that individual perceptions of safety climate signal the importance of safety in the organization. Specifically, we expect that three work-related organizational practices (training effectiveness, procedure effectiveness, and work pressure) relate to the broader risk control system in the workplace via individual perceptions of safety climate as a broad management signal. Further, we expect this broad management signal interacts with a local environmental signal (co-worker commitment to safety) to amplify or diminish perceived system safety effectiveness. METHOD: In a field study of oil and gas workers (N = 219; Study 1), we used mediation modeling to determine the relationships between work-related organizational practices, perceived safety climate, and perceived safety system effectiveness. In a field study of railway construction workers (N = 131; Study 2), we used moderated mediation modeling to explore the conditional role of co-worker commitment to safety. RESULTS: We found that training effectiveness, procedure effectiveness, and work pressure predicted perceived system safety effectiveness indirectly via perceived safety climate (Studies 1 and 2) and that these indirect paths are influenced by co-worker commitment to safety (Study 2). CONCLUSIONS: Findings suggest that perceived safety climate is driven in part by work practices, and that perceived safety climate (from managers) and co-worker commitment to safety (from the local environment) interact to shape workplace safety system effectiveness. Practical applications: The insight that training, procedures, and work pressure are meaningful predictors of perceived safety climate as a signal suggests that organizations should be cognizant of the quality of work-related practices for safety. The insight we offer on the competing versus complimentary nature of managerial safety signals (perceived safety climate) and co-worker safety signals (co-worker commitment to safety) could also be used by safety personnel to develop safety interventions directed in both areas.

Meta-analytic connections between forgiveness and health: the moderating effects of forgiveness-related distinctions.

OBJECTIVE: We explore meta-analytic associations between health and forgiveness, testing a number of potential theoretical and methodological factors that could alter that association, including the type of forgiveness measure (e.g. state vs. trait), the type of health measure (i.e. physical vs. psychological) and the target of forgiveness (e.g. self- vs. other-forgiveness). DESIGN: Our findings below reflect the meta-analysis of 103 independent samples consisting of 606 correlations with a total sample of 26,043 participants. The final sample included papers from 17 countries. The included samples were diverse including students, older adults, divorced mothers, combat veterans and others. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Various health measures, including physical health outcomes (e.g., blood pressure, cortisol levels, bodily pain) and psychological health outcomes (e.g., depression, anxiety, PTSD). RESULTS: We found a reliable overall association between forgiveness and health outcomes. The association was stronger for psychological health than for physical health, though associations with cardiovascular health indicators (i.e. heart-rate and blood pressure) were robust. CONCLUSION: The findings provided considerable support to current theorizing about the health benefits of forgiveness. It is plausible that forgiveness might improve psychological health and reduce cardiovascular stress.

Unforgiveness: Refining theory and measurement of an understudied construct.

This research presents a multidimensional conceptualization of unforgiveness and the development and validation of the unforgiveness measure (UFM). The scale was developed based on a qualitative study of people's experiences of unforgiven interpersonal offences (Study 1). Three dimensions of unforgiveness emerged (Study 2): emotional-ruminative unforgiveness, cognitive-evaluative unforgiveness, and offender reconstrual. We supported the scale's factor structure, reliability, and validity (Study 3). We also established the convergent and discriminant validity of the UFM with measures of negative affect, rumination, forgiveness, cognitive reappraisal, and emotional suppression (Study 4). Together, our results suggest that the UFM can capture variability in victims' unforgiving experiences in the aftermath of interpersonal transgressions. Implications for understanding the construct of unforgiveness and directions for future research are discussed.

Failing to Fix What is Found: Risk Accommodation in the Oil and Gas Industry.

The present program of research synthesizes the findings from three studies in line with two goals. First, the present research explores how the oil and gas industry is performing at risk mitigation in terms of finding and fixing errors when they occur. Second, the present research explores what factors in the work environment relate to a risk-accommodating environment. Study 1 presents a descriptive evaluation of high-consequence incidents at 34 oil and gas companies over a 12-month period (N = 873), especially in terms of those companies' effectiveness at investigating and fixing errors. The analysis found that most investigations were fair in terms of quality (mean = 75.50%), with a smaller proportion that were weak (mean = 11.40%) or strong (mean = 13.24%). Furthermore, most companies took at least one corrective action for high-consequence incidents, but few of these corrective actions were confirmed as having been completed (mean = 13.77%). In fact, most corrective actions were secondary interim administrative controls (e.g., having a safety meeting) rather than fair or strong controls (e.g., training, engineering elimination). Study 2a found that several environmental factors explain the 56.41% variance in safety, including management's disengagement from safety concerns, finding and fixing errors, safety management system effectiveness, training, employee safety, procedures, and a production-over-safety culture. Qualitative results from Study 2b suggest that a compliance-based culture of adhering to liability concerns, out-group blame, and a production-over-safety orientation may all impede safety effectiveness.