Words of agency: Executed and observed vocal actions induce a temporal binding effect.

Humans generally experience a sense of agency over the outcomes produced by their motor actions. This has been well established in the case of manual actions that directly affect the physical environment. Vocalizations are also actions, but they typically have only indirect effects on the environment. In the present research, we explore whether the outcomes produced by vocalizations also elicit a sense of agency. In three experiments, using an interval reproduction task, we find that performing a vocal action that produced an auditory outcome caused participants to underestimate the amount of elapsed time between actions and outcomes (i.e., temporal binding), an implicit index of the sense of agency (Experiment 1). We also show that observing others produce vocal actions elicits temporal binding, but only when the observer has direct visual access to the vocal action being executed (Experiments 2 and 3). Taken together, our findings suggest that direct observation of an action is necessary to experience a temporal binding effect for actions performed by others, and that audio-visuomotor information may play a role in the generation of temporal compression experienced over observed actions (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

From Gaze Perception to Social Cognition: The Shared-Attention System.

When two people look at the same object in the environment and are aware of each other's attentional state, they find themselves in a shared-attention episode. This can occur through intentional or incidental signaling and, in either case, causes an exchange of information between the two parties about the environment and each other's mental states. In this article, we give an overview of what is known about the building blocks of shared attention (gaze perception and joint attention) and focus on bringing to bear new findings on the initiation of shared attention that complement knowledge about gaze following and incorporate new insights from research into the sense of agency. We also present a neurocognitive model, incorporating first-, second-, and third-order social cognitive processes (the shared-attention system, or SAS), building on previous models and approaches. The SAS model aims to encompass perceptual, cognitive, and affective processes that contribute to and follow on from the establishment of shared attention. These processes include fundamental components of social cognition such as reward, affective evaluation, agency, empathy, and theory of mind.

The N170 event-related potential differentiates congruent and incongruent gaze responses in gaze leading.

To facilitate social interactions, humans need to process the responses that other people make to their actions, including eye movements that could establish joint attention. Here, we investigated the neurophysiological correlates of the processing of observed gaze responses following the participants' own eye movement. These observed gaze responses could either establish, or fail to establish, joint attention. We implemented a gaze leading paradigm in which participants made a saccade from an on-screen face to an object, followed by the on-screen face either making a congruent or incongruent gaze shift. An N170 event-related potential was elicited by the peripherally located gaze shift stimulus. Critically, the N170 was greater for joint attention than non-joint gaze both when task-irrelevant (Experiment 1) and task-relevant (Experiment 2). These data suggest for the first time that the neurocognitive system responsible for structural encoding of face stimuli is affected by the establishment of participant-initiated joint attention.

Eyes that bind us: Gaze leading induces an implicit sense of agency.

Humans feel a sense of agency over the effects their motor system causes. This is the case for manual actions such as pushing buttons, kicking footballs, and all acts that affect the physical environment. We ask whether initiating joint attention - causing another person to follow our eye movement - can elicit an implicit sense of agency over this congruent gaze response. Eye movements themselves cannot directly affect the physical environment, but joint attention is an example of how eye movements can indirectly cause social outcomes. Here we show that leading the gaze of an on-screen face induces an underestimation of the temporal gap between action and consequence (Experiments 1 and 2). This underestimation effect, named 'temporal binding,' is thought to be a measure of an implicit sense of agency. Experiment 3 asked whether merely making an eye movement in a non-agentic, non-social context might also affect temporal estimation, and no reliable effects were detected, implying that inconsequential oculomotor acts do not reliably affect temporal estimations under these conditions. Together, these findings suggest that an implicit sense of agency is generated when initiating joint attention interactions. This is important for understanding how humans can efficiently detect and understand the social consequences of their actions.

Social orienting in gaze leading: a mechanism for shared attention.

Here, we report a novel social orienting response that occurs after viewing averted gaze. We show, in three experiments, that when a person looks from one location to an object, attention then shifts towards the face of an individual who has subsequently followed the person's gaze to that same object. That is, contrary to 'gaze following', attention instead orients in the opposite direction to observed gaze and towards the gazing face. The magnitude of attentional orienting towards a face that 'follows' the participant's gaze is also associated with self-reported autism-like traits. We propose that this gaze leading phenomenon implies the existence of a mechanism in the human social cognitive system for detecting when one's gaze has been followed, in order to establish 'shared attention' and maintain the ongoing interaction.