Sadness and fear, but not happiness, motivate inhibitory behaviour: the influence of discrete emotions on the executive function of inhibition.

Inhibition, an executive function, is critical for achieving goals that require suppressing unwanted behaviours, thoughts, or distractions. One hypothesis of the emotion and goal compatibility theory is that emotions of sadness and fear enhance inhibitory control. Across Experiments 1-4, we tested this hypothesis by inducing a happy, sad, fearful, and neutral emotional state prior to completing an inhibition task that indexed a specific facet of inhibition (oculomotor, resisting interference, behavioural, and cognitive). In Experiment 4, we included an anger induction to examine whether valence or motivational-orientation best-predicted performance. We found support that fear and sadness enhanced inhibition except when inhibition required resisting interference. We argue that sadness and fear enhance inhibitory control aiding the detection and analysis of problems (i.e. sadness) or threats (i.e. fear) within one's environment. In sum, this work highlights the importance of identifying how negative emotions can be beneficial for and interact with specific executive functions influencing down-stream processing including attention, cognition, and memory.

Assessing cognitive impairment in SLE: examining relationships between resting glucose metabolism and anti-NMDAR antibodies with navigational performance.

OBJECTIVE: Resting Fluorine-18 fluorodeoxyglucose positron emission tomography (FDG-PET) brain imaging and neuropsychological testing were used to investigate the usefulness of a spatial navigation task (SNT) as a performance benchmark for cognitive impairment related to anti-N-methyl D-aspartate (anti-NMDA) receptor antibodies (DNRAb) in SLE. METHODS: Neuropsychological assessments, including a desktop 3-D virtual SNT, were performed on 19 SLE participants and 9 healthy control (HC) subjects. SLE participants had stable disease activity and medication doses and no history of neuropsychiatric illness or current use of mind-altering medications. Resting FDG-PET scans were obtained on all SLE participants and compared with a historical set from 25 age-matched and sex-matched HCs. Serum DNRAb titres were measured by ELISA. RESULTS: 11/19 (58%) of SLE participants failed to complete the SNT (SNT-) compared with 2/9 (22%) of HCs. Compared with 7/9 (78%) in HCs, only 2/9 (22%; p=0.037) of SLE participants with high serum DNRAb titres completed the SNT, in contrast to 6/10 (60%; p=0.810) in SLE participants with low DNRAb titres. Voxel-wise comparison of FDG-PET scans between the 8 SLE participants successfully completing the SNT task (SNT+) and the 11 SNT- SLE participants revealed increased metabolism in the SNT+ participants (p<0.001) in the left anterior putamen/caudate, right anterior putamen, left prefrontal cortex (BA 9), right prefrontal cortex (BA 9/10) and left lateral and medial frontal cortex (BA 8). Compared with HCs, the SNT+ group demonstrated increased metabolism in all regions (p<0.02) except for the right prefrontal cortex (BA 9), whereas the SNT- group demonstrated either significantly decreased or similar metabolism in these seven regions. CONCLUSIONS: SNT performance is associated with serum DNRAb titres and resting glucose metabolism in the anterior putamen/caudate and frontal cortex, suggesting compensatory neural recruitment in SNT-associated regions is necessary for successful completion of the task. The SNT therefore has potential for use as a marker for SLE-mediated cognitive impairment.

Metabolic and microstructural alterations in the SLE brain correlate with cognitive impairment.

To address challenges in the diagnosis of cognitive dysfunction (CD) related to systemic lupus erythematosus-associated (SLE-associated) autoimmune mechanisms rather than confounding factors, we employed an integrated approach, using resting-state functional (FDG-PET) and structural (diffusion tensor imaging [DTI]) neuroimaging techniques and cognitive testing, in adult SLE patients with quiescent disease and no history of neuropsychiatric illness. We identified resting hypermetabolism in the sensorimotor cortex, occipital lobe, and temporal lobe of SLE subjects, in addition to validation of previously published resting hypermetabolism in the hippocampus, orbitofrontal cortex, and putamen/GP/thalamus. Regional hypermetabolism demonstrated abnormal interregional metabolic correlations, associated with impaired cognitive performance, and was stable over 15 months. DTI analyses demonstrated 4 clusters of decreased microstructural integrity in white matter tracts adjacent to hypermetabolic regions and significantly diminished connecting tracts in SLE subjects. Decreased microstructural integrity in the parahippocampal gyrus correlated with impaired spatial memory and increased serum titers of DNRAb, a neurotoxic autoantibody associated with neuropsychiatric lupus. These findings of regional hypermetabolism, associated with decreased microstructural integrity and poor cognitive performance and not associated with disease duration, disease activity, medications, or comorbid disease, suggest that this is a reproducible, stable marker for SLE-associated CD that may be may be used for early disease detection and to discriminate between groups, evaluate response to treatment strategies, or assess disease progression.

Fear and happiness, but not sadness, motivate attentional flexibility: A case for emotion influencing the ability to split foci of attention.

One prominent and consistent effect is that negative emotions with high motivational intensity, such as fear, narrow attention. However, recent data concerning how fear influences vision may suggest that fear could make attention flexible. Thus, the goal of the present study was to examine whether fear, like happiness, enhances attentional flexibility when multiple targets are present in noncontiguous locations. Fear, happiness, or sadness was induced followed by participants completing an attentional task that required splitting foci of attention to noncontiguous regions of space in the presence (Exp. 1) or absence (Exp. 2) of distractors or both (Exp. 3). Fear and happiness enhanced the reporting of targets in unattended locations demonstrating greater attentional flexibility. Sadness facilitated the splitting of attention through the suppression of irrelevant locations. The effects were replicated in a third experiment using a within-subjects design of distractor presence and an inclusion of a neutral condition. Taken together, results suggest fear and happiness increase attentional flexibility by impairing the suppression of irrelevant locations, which may allow for faster reallocation of attention facilitating detection of potential threats/rewards in one's environment. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Happiness increases verbal and spatial working memory capacity where sadness does not: Emotion, working memory and executive control.

The effects of emotion on working memory and executive control are often studied in isolation. Positive mood enhances verbal and impairs spatial working memory, whereas negative mood enhances spatial and impairs verbal working memory. Moreover, positive mood enhances executive control, whereas negative mood has little influence. We examined how emotion influences verbal and spatial working memory capacity, which requires executive control to coordinate between holding information in working memory and completing a secondary task. We predicted that positive mood would improve both verbal and spatial working memory capacity because of its influence on executive control. Positive, negative and neutral moods were induced followed by completing a verbal (Experiment 1) or spatial (Experiment 2) working memory operation span task to assess working memory capacity. Positive mood enhanced working memory capacity irrespective of the working memory domain, whereas negative mood had no influence on performance. Thus, positive mood was more successful holding information in working memory while processing task-irrelevant information, suggesting that the influence mood has on executive control supersedes the independent effects mood has on domain-specific working memory.

Once more with feeling: On the explanatory limits of the GANE model and the missing role of subjective experience.

We applaud Mather and colleagues' model, which emphasizes the neurobiological pathways by which affective arousal tunes attention and memory. This commentary offers a friendly discussion of several potential limitations of the theory. We suggest the model is strong when predicting task-driven demands but is limited when predicting the impact of individual biases, interpretations, and experiential feelings.

Selective Impairment of Spatial Cognition Caused by Autoantibodies to the N-Methyl-D-Aspartate Receptor.

Patients with systemic lupus erythematosus (SLE) experience cognitive abnormalities in multiple domains including processing speed, executive function, and memory. Here we show that SLE patients carrying antibodies that bind DNA and the GluN2A and GluN2B subunits of the N-methyl-d-aspartate receptor (NMDAR), termed DNRAbs, displayed a selective impairment in spatial recall. Neural recordings in a mouse model of SLE, in which circulating DNRAbs penetrate the hippocampus, revealed that CA1 place cells exhibited a significant expansion in place field size. Structural analysis showed that hippocampal pyramidal cells had substantial reductions in their dendritic processes and spines. Strikingly, these abnormalities became evident at a time when DNRAbs were no longer detectable in the hippocampus. These results suggest that antibody-mediated neurocognitive impairments may be highly specific, and that spatial cognition may be particularly vulnerable to DNRAb-mediated structural and functional injury to hippocampal cells that evolves after the triggering insult is no longer present.

Emotion, working memory task demands and individual differences predict behavior, cognitive effort and negative affect.

We examined whether positive and negative affect motivates verbal and spatial working memory processes, respectively, which have implications for the expenditure of mental effort. We argue that when emotion promotes cognitive tendencies that are goal incompatible with task demands, greater cognitive effort is required to perform well. We sought to investigate whether this increase in cognitive effort impairs behavioural control over a broad domain of self-control tasks. Moreover, we predicted that individuals with higher behavioural inhibition system (BIS) sensitivities would report more negative affect within the goal incompatible conditions because such individuals report higher negative affect during cognitive challenge. Positive or negative affective states were induced followed by completing a verbal or spatial 2-back working memory task. All participants then completed one of three self-control tasks. Overall, we observed that conditions of emotion and working memory incompatibility (positive/spatial and negative/verbal) performed worse on the self-control tasks, and within the incompatible conditions individuals with higher BIS sensitivities reported more negative affect at the end of the study. The combination of findings suggests that emotion and working memory compatibility reduces cognitive effort and impairs behavioural control.

Verbal makes it positive, spatial makes it negative: working memory biases judgments, attention, and moods.

Prior research has suggested that emotion and working memory domains are integrated, such that positive affect enhances verbal working memory, whereas negative affect enhances spatial working memory (Gray, 2004; Storbeck, 2012). Simon (1967) postulated that one feature of emotion and cognition integration would be reciprocal connectedness (i.e., emotion influences cognition and cognition influences emotion). We explored whether affective judgments and attention to affective qualities are biased by the activation of verbal and spatial working memory mind-sets. For all experiments, participants completed a 2-back verbal or spatial working memory task followed by an endorsement task (Experiments 1 & 2), word-pair selection task (Exp. 3), or attentional dot-probe task (Exp. 4). Participants who had an activated verbal, compared with spatial, working memory mind-set were more likely to endorse pictures (Exp. 1) and words (Exp. 2) as being more positive and to select the more positive word pair out of a set of word pairs that went 'together best' (Exp. 3). Additionally, people who completed the verbal working memory task took longer to disengage from positive stimuli, whereas those who completed the spatial working memory task took longer to disengage from negative stimuli (Exp. 4). Interestingly, across the 4 experiments, we observed higher levels of self-reported negative affect for people who completed the spatial working memory task, which was consistent with their endorsement and attentional bias toward negative stimuli. Therefore, emotion and working memory may have a reciprocal connectedness allowing for bidirectional influence.

Conditions under which arousal does and does not elevate height estimates.

We present a series of experiments that explore the boundary conditions for how emotional arousal influences height estimates. Four experiments are presented, which investigated the influence of context, situation-relevance, intensity, and attribution of arousal on height estimates. In Experiment 1, we manipulated the environmental context to signal either danger (viewing a height from above) or safety (viewing a height from below). High arousal only increased height estimates made from above. In Experiment 2, two arousal inductions were used that contained either 1) height-relevant arousing images or 2) height-irrelevant arousing images. Regardless of theme, arousal increased height estimates compared to a neutral group. In Experiment 3, arousal intensity was manipulated by inserting an intermediate or long delay between the induction and height estimates. A brief, but not a long, delay from the arousal induction served to increase height estimates. In Experiment 4, an attribution manipulation was included, and those participants who were made aware of the source of their arousal reduced their height estimates compared to participants who received no attribution instructions. Thus, arousal that is attributed to its true source is discounted from feelings elicited by the height, thereby reducing height estimates. Overall, we suggest that misattributed, embodied arousal is used as a cue when estimating heights from above that can lead to overestimation.

Negative affect promotes encoding of and memory for details at the expense of the gist: affect, encoding, and false memories.

I investigated whether negative affective states enhance encoding of and memory for item-specific information reducing false memories. Positive, negative, and neutral moods were induced, and participants then completed a Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) false-memory task. List items were presented in unique spatial locations or unique fonts to serve as measures for item-specific encoding. The negative mood conditions had more accurate memories for item-specific information, and they also had fewer false memories. The final experiment used a manipulation that drew attention to distinctive information, which aided learning for DRM words, but also promoted item-specific encoding. For the condition that promoted item-specific encoding, false memories were reduced for positive and neutral mood conditions to a rate similar to that of the negative mood condition. These experiments demonstrated that negative affective cues promote item-specific processing reducing false memories. People in positive and negative moods encode events differently creating different memories for the same event.

Cognitive and emotional abnormalities in systemic lupus erythematosus: evidence for amygdala dysfunction.

Systemic lupus erythematosus (SLE) is a multi-system autoimmune disorder characterized by the production of autoantibodies. Approximately 30-50 % of patients produce autoantibodies directed against N-Methyl-D-aspartic acid receptors (NMDARs). Once they have gained access to brain tissue, these autoantibodies bind to the NR2A subunit of the NMDARs and synergize with glutamate to cause excitatory, non-inflammatory cell death or alter neuron function. Both humans with SLE and animal models of SLE have shown structural and functional damage to the amygdala. The amygdala is a brain region important for processing the emotional relevance of stimuli in the environment. It also serves to modulate perception, attention, and memory to facilitate the processing and learning of relevant stimuli. Research has linked amygdala damage to deficits in emotional memory and emotional behavior. Individuals with SLE often exhibit emotional dysregulation, such as lability and depression; however, the behavioral impact of possible amygdala dysfunction has yet to be studied in this population. The purpose of this review is to 1) examine possible associations between SLE, anti-NMDAR antibodies, amygdala damage, and emotional processing deficits and 2) to identify the clinical, social, and treatment implications for individuals with SLE who suffer from deficits in emotional processing.

Performance costs when emotion tunes inappropriate cognitive abilities: implications for mental resources and behavior.

Emotion tunes cognition, such that approach-motivated positive states promote verbal cognition, whereas withdrawal-motivated negative states promote spatial cognition (Gray, 2001). The current research examined whether self-control resources become depleted and influence subsequent behavior when emotion tunes an inappropriate cognitive tendency. In 2 experiments, either an approach-motivated positive state or a withdrawal-motivated negative state was induced, and then participants completed a verbal or a spatial working memory task creating conditions of emotion-cognition alignment (e.g., approach/verbal) or misalignment (e.g., approach/spatial). A control condition was also included. To examine behavioral costs due to depleted self-control resources, participants completed either a Stroop task (Stroop, 1935; Experiment 1) or a Black/White implicit association test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998; Experiment 2). Participants in the misalignment conditions performed worse on the Stroop task, and they were worse at controlling their implicit attitude biases on the IAT. Thus, when emotion tunes inappropriate cognitive tendencies for one's current environment, self-control resources become depleted, impairing behavioral control.

Affect influences false memories at encoding: evidence from recognition data.

Memory is susceptible to illusions in the form of false memories. Prior research found, however, that sad moods reduce false memories. The current experiment had two goals: (1) to determine whether affect influences retrieval processes, and (2) to determine whether affect influences the strength and the persistence of false memories. Happy or sad moods were induced either before or after learning word lists designed to produce false memories. Control groups did not experience a mood induction. We found that sad moods reduced false memories only when induced before learning. Signal detection analyses confirmed that sad moods induced prior to learning reduced activation of nonpresented critical lures suggesting that they came to mind less often. Affective states, however, did not influence retrieval effects. We conclude that negative affective states promote item-specific processing, which reduces false memories in a similar way as using an explicitly guided cognitive control strategy.

Don't look down: emotional arousal elevates height perception.

In a series of experiments, it was found that emotional arousal can influence height perception. In Experiment 1, participants viewed either arousing or nonarousing images before estimating the height of a 2-story balcony and the size of a target on the ground below the balcony. People who viewed arousing images overestimated height and target size more than did those who viewed nonarousing images. However, in Experiment 2, estimates of horizontal distances were not influenced by emotional arousal. In Experiment 3, both valence and arousal cues were manipulated, and it was found that arousal, but not valence, moderated height perception. In Experiment 4, participants either up-regulated or down-regulated their emotional experience while viewing emotionally arousing images, and a control group simply viewed the arousing images. Those participants who up-regulated their emotional experience overestimated height more than did the control or down-regulated participants. In sum, emotional arousal influences estimates of height, and this influence can be moderated by emotion regulation strategies. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2009 APA, all rights reserved).

The affective regulation of cognitive priming.

Semantic and affective priming are classic effects observed in cognitive and social psychology, respectively. The authors discovered that affect regulates such priming effects. In Experiment 1, positive and negative moods were induced before one of three priming tasks; evaluation, categorization, or lexical decision. As predicted, positive affect led to both affective priming (evaluation task) and semantic priming (category and lexical decision tasks). However, negative affect inhibited such effects. In Experiment 2, participants in their natural affective state completed the same priming tasks as in Experiment 1. As expected, affective priming (evaluation task) and category priming (categorization and lexical decision tasks) were observed in such resting affective states. Hence, the authors conclude that negative affect inhibits semantic and affective priming. These results support recent theoretical models, which suggest that positive affect promotes associations among strong and weak concepts, and that negative affect impairs such associations (Clore & Storbeck, 2006; Kuhl, 2000).

Affective Arousal as Information: How Affective Arousal Influences Judgments, Learning, and Memory.

The affect-as-information framework posits that affect is embodied information about value and importance. The valence dimension of affect provides evaluative information about stimulus objects, which plays a role in judgment and decisionmaking. Affect can also provide evaluative information about one's own cognitions and response inclinations, information that guides thinking and reasoning. In particular, positive affect often promotes, and negative affect inhibits, accessible responses or dominant modes of thinking. Affect thus moderates many of the textbook phenomena in cognitive psychology. In the current review, we suggest additionally that the arousal dimension of affect amplifies reactions, leading to intensified evaluations, increased reliance on particular styles of learning, and enhanced long-term memory for events. We conclude that whereas valenced affective cues serve as information about value, the arousal dimension provides information about urgency or importance.

On the interdependence of cognition and emotion.

Affect and cognition have long been treated as independent entities, but in the current review we suggest that affect and cognition are in fact highly interdependent. We open the article by discussing three classic views for the independence of affect. These are (i) the affective independence hypothesis, that emotion is processed independently from cognition, (ii) the affective primacy hypothesis, that evaluative processing precedes semantic processing, and (iii) the affective automaticity hypothesis, that affectively potent stimuli commandeer attention and evaluation is automatic. We argue that affect is not independent from cognition, that affect is not primary to cognition, nor is affect automatically elicited. The second half of the paper discusses several instances of how affect influences cognition. We review experiments showing affective involvement in perception, semantic activation, and attitude activation. We conclude that one function of affect is to regulate cognitive processing.

With sadness comes accuracy; with happiness, false memory: mood and the false memory effect.

The Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm lures people to produce false memories. Two experiments examined whether induced positive or negative moods would influence this false memory effect. The affect-as-information hypothesis predicts that, on the one hand, positive affective cues experienced as task-relevant feedback encourage relational processing during encoding, which should enhance false memory effects. On the other hand, negative affective cues are hypothesized to encourage item-specific processing at encoding, which should discourage such effects. The results of Experiment 1 are consistent with these predictions: Individuals in negative moods were significantly less likely to show false memory effects than those in positive moods or those whose mood was not manipulated. Experiment 2 introduced inclusion instructions to investigate whether moods had their effects at encoding or retrieval. The results replicated the false memory finding of Experiment 1 and provide evidence that moods influence the accessibility of lures at encoding, rather than influencing monitoring at retrieval of whether lures were actually presented.

Watch out! That could be dangerous: valence-arousal interactions in evaluative processing.

Seven studies involving 146 undergraduates examined the effects of stimulus valence and arousal on direct and indirect measures of evaluative processing. Stimuli were emotional slides (Studies 1 to 6) or words (Study 7) that systematically varied in valence and arousal. Evaluative categorization was measured by reaction times to evaluate the stimuli (Studies 2, 3, and 7), latencies related to emotional feelings (Study 3), and incidental effects on motor performance (Studies 4 and 5). A consistent interaction was observed such that evaluation latencies were faster if a negative stimulus was high in arousal or if a positive stimulus was low in arousal. Studies 1, 6, and 7 establish that the findings are not due to stimulus identification processes. The findings therefore suggest that people make evaluative inferences on the basis of stimulus arousal.