Evaluating dysfunction in cognition and reward among offenders with antisocial personality disorder.

Antisocial personality disorder (APD) is a costly clinical condition. Previous studies identify executive dysfunction and reward sensitivity as factors contributing to APD. However, empirical evidence supporting the role of these factors in APD is mixed. The present study aimed to identify and specify APD-related dysfunction in cognitive and reward factors. In a sample of incarcerated males (N = 116), we administered three tasks targeting distinct cognitive (perception, executive functioning, and probabilistic decision-making) and reward (magnitude and consciousness) factors. APD was associated with impaired perception when high magnitude rewards were at stake, regardless of reward consciousness. APD was associated with worse executive functioning during conscious high rewards, as well as worse inhibition during high rewards when working memory demands were high. There was no APD-related performance difference during probabilistic decision-making. These findings expose the multifaceted nature of cognitive-affective dysfunction in APD, highlighting the importance of systematic research and providing insight into treatment targets. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Alternate versions of a fixed-choice, delay-discounting assessment for repeated-measures designs.

Delay discounting, reflected in the tendency to prefer immediate rewards over delayed rewards, is associated with most forms of problematic substance use. When assessed multiple times to examine within-individual changes, for example, following acute drug administration or an intervention, shifts in delay discounting simply because of repeated assessment is a concern, particularly when the assessment task is identical. This may be true for the Monetary Choice Questionnaire (MCQ), a widely used, fixed-item assessment of delay discounting. The present research examined possible within-individual difference/equivalence of MCQ indices at test/retest. This was contrasted with within-individual difference/equivalence when using an alternate version of the MCQ at retest, specifically developed to maintain the assessment structure and scoring of the original MCQ but with different choice items. Eighty-four participants completed delay discounting at test and retest with a 1-week interval; participants were randomized to complete the MCQ at both test and retest (MCQ/MCQ; n = 43) or complete the MCQ at test and an alternate version of the MCQ at retest (MCQ/MCQ-A; n = 41). Conventional hypothesis testing indicated no significant changes in delay discounting in the MCQ/MCQ condition or MCQ/MCQ-A condition. However, equivalence analysis, which is able to established whether scores are statistically equivalent, indicated that test/retest scores were not equivalent in some cases. Specifically, only 1 magnitude in the MCQ/MCQ condition was equivalent at test/retest, whereas 2 magnitudes in the MCQ/MCQ-A condition were equivalent at test/retest. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).

Impact of construal level manipulations on delay discounting.

Construal Level Theory states that psychologically proximal outcomes are construed concretely while psychologically distal outcomes are construed abstractly. Previous research suggests that the principles of Construal Level Theory can be applied to enhance self-control, as measured by delay discounting. The present studies replicate and expand on this work by examining whether theory-informed priming manipulations lead to delay discounting reductions in a repeated-measures design. Study 1 conceptually replicated previous work, with reduced delay discounting observed as a function of thinking abstractly. Studies 2 and 3 expanded on this work by reinterpreting (a) preference for immediate outcomes as preference for outcomes that are construed concretely, and (b) dispreference for delayed outcomes as dispreference for outcomes that are construed abstractly. Study 2 provided support for the first interpretation, as reduced delay discounting was observed as a function of thinking concretely about the future. Study 3 provided support for the second interpretation, as reduced delay discounting was observed as a function of thinking abstractly about the present. In studies 1 and 3, significant condition × order interactions were observed. In all three studies, the same impact of order of exposure to priming manipulation was observed, indicating specific carryover effects.

Psychopathic individuals exhibit but do not avoid regret during counterfactual decision making.

Psychopathy is associated with persistent antisocial behavior and a striking lack of regret for the consequences of that behavior. Although explanatory models for psychopathy have largely focused on deficits in affective responsiveness, recent work indicates that aberrant value-based decision making may also play a role. On that basis, some have suggested that psychopathic individuals may be unable to effectively use prospective simulations to update action value estimates during cost-benefit decision making. However, the specific mechanisms linking valuation, affective deficits, and maladaptive decision making in psychopathy remain unclear. Using a counterfactual decision-making paradigm, we found that individuals who scored high on a measure of psychopathy were as or more likely than individuals low on psychopathy to report negative affect in response to regret-inducing counterfactual outcomes. However, despite exhibiting intact affective regret sensitivity, they did not use prospective regret signals to guide choice behavior. In turn, diminished behavioral regret sensitivity predicted a higher number of prior incarcerations, and moderated the relationship between psychopathy and incarceration history. These findings raise the possibility that maladaptive decision making in psychopathic individuals is not a consequence of their inability to generate or experience negative emotions. Rather, antisocial behavior in psychopathy may be driven by a deficit in the generation of forward models that integrate information about rules, costs, and goals with stimulus value representations to promote adaptive behavior.

Impact of episodic thinking on altruism.

Episodic future thinking, which refers to the use of prospective imagery to concretely imagine oneself in future scenarios, has been shown to reduce delay discounting (enhance self-control). A parallel approach, in which prospective imagery is used to concretely imagine other's scenarios, may similarly reduce social discounting (i.e., enhance altruism). In study 1, participants engaged in episodic thinking about the self or others, in a repeated-measures design, while completing a social discounting task. Reductions in social discounting were observed as a function of episodic thinking about others, though an interaction with order was also observed. Using an independent-measures design in study 2, the effect of episodic thinking about others was replicated. Study 3 addressed a limitation of studies 1 and 2, the possibility that simply thinking about others decreased social discounting. Capitalizing on Construal Level Theory, which specifies that social distance and time in the future are both dimensions of a common psychological distance, we hypothesized that episodic future thinking should also decrease social discounting. Participants engaged in episodic future thinking or episodic present thinking, in a repeated-measures design, while completing a social discounting task. The pattern of results was similar to study 1, providing support for the notion that episodic thinking about psychologically distant outcomes (for others or in the future) reduces social discounting. Application of similar episodic thinking approaches may enhance altruism.

Exchanging the liquidity hypothesis: Delay discounting of money and self-relevant non-money rewards.

Evidence that primary rewards (e.g., food and drugs of abuse) are discounted more than money is frequently attributed to money's high degree of liquidity, or exchangeability for many commodities. The present study provides some evidence against this liquidity hypothesis by contrasting delay discounting of monetary rewards (liquid) and non-monetary commodities (non-liquid) that are self-relevant and utility-matched. Ninety-seven (97) undergraduate students initially completed a conventional binary-choice delay discounting of money task. Participants returned one week later and completed a self-relevant commodity delay discounting task. Both conventional hypothesis testing and more-conservative tests of statistical equivalence revealed correspondence in rate of delay discounting of money and self-relevant commodities, and in one magnitude condition, less discounting for the latter. The present results indicate that liquidity of money cannot fully account for the lower rate of delay discounting compared to non-money rewards.