Measurements for the institutional cohesion dimension of the standard model of military group cohesion.

Notwithstanding the prominence of the so-called Standard Model of Military Group Cohesion (SMMGC), important parts of the model are understudied: both conceptually and empirically. In this article we, first, synthesize previous research to conceptualize and measure the overlooked institutional cohesion dimension. Second, we test the validity of the proposed full four-dimensional SMMGC model using a survey of an Italian Alpini battalion, and more rigorous methods than in previous research. Results are supportive of our proposed measurements and the validity of the four-dimensional model. We thus make a methodological and an empirical contribution to further the ongoing debate on military cohesion.

Value Stability and Change in an ISAF Contingent.

Studying an International Security Assistance Force contingent on tour in Afghanistan, the aim of the present study was to test assertions of the relative stability of personal values in a challenging environment. Three hundred twenty Swedish soldiers answered questionnaires on their values before and after a 6-month tour of Afghanistan. Value change and stability were studied via mean-level change, rank-order stability, and individual-level change methods. Regression analysis was used to study the impact of combat exposure and personality traits on change. The analysis concluded that even when experiencing such a different social context as a military mission to Afghanistan, the soldiers' values remained stable. Some minor changes occurred, in a pattern similar to a regression toward the mean. It was also shown that combat exposure--to a minor extent--predicted changes in values, whereas Big Five scores yielded stronger effects. The present findings suggest that the assertion of the stability of values is a well-founded proposition, even after radical changes in environment. However, the findings on the effects of combat exposure point to the possibility of severe life events having the power to exert change in values. Personality traits were, however, more important factors in the present context.

Global comparison of warring groups in 2002-2007: fatalities from targeting civilians vs. fighting battles.

BACKGROUND: Warring groups that compete to dominate a civilian population confront contending behavioral options: target civilians or battle the enemy. We aimed to describe degrees to which combatant groups concentrated lethal behavior into intentionally targeting civilians as opposed to engaging in battle with opponents in contemporary armed conflict. METHODOLOGY/PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: We identified all 226 formally organized state and non-state groups (i.e. actors) that engaged in lethal armed conflict during 2002-2007: 43 state and 183 non-state. We summed civilians killed by an actor's intentional targeting with civilians and combatants killed in battles in which the actor was involved for total fatalities associated with each actor, indicating overall scale of armed conflict. We used a Civilian Targeting Index (CTI), defined as the proportion of total fatalities caused by intentional targeting of civilians, to measure the concentration of lethal behavior into civilian targeting. We report actor-specific findings and four significant trends: 1.) 61% of all 226 actors (95% CI 55% to 67%) refrained from targeting civilians. 2.) Logistic regression showed actors were more likely to have targeted civilians if conflict duration was three or more years rather than one year. 3.) In the 88 actors that targeted civilians, multiple regressions showed an inverse correlation between CTI values and the total number of fatalities. Conflict duration of three or more years was associated with lower CTI values than conflict duration of one year. 4.) When conflict scale and duration were accounted for, state and non-state actors did not differ. We describe civilian targeting by actors in prolonged conflict. We discuss comparable patterns found in nature and interdisciplinary research. CONCLUSIONS/SIGNIFICANCE: Most warring groups in 2002-2007 did not target civilians. Warring groups that targeted civilians in small-scale, brief conflict concentrated more lethal behavior into targeting civilians, and less into battles, than groups in larger-scale, longer conflict.