Transactional Interpretation for the Principle of Minimum Fisher Information.

The principle of minimum Fisher information states that in the set of acceptable probability distributions characterizing the given system, it is best done by the one that minimizes the corresponding Fisher information. This principle can be applied to transaction processes, the dynamics of which can be interpreted as the market tendency to minimize the information revealed about itself. More information involves higher costs (information is physical). The starting point for our considerations is a description of the market derived from the assumption of minimum Fisher information for a strategy with a fixed financial risk. Strategies of this type that minimize Fisher information overlap with the well-known eigenstates of a the quantum harmonic oscillator. The analytical extension of this field of strategy to the complex vector space (traditional for quantum mechanics) suggests the study of the interference of the oscillator eigenstates in terms of their minimization of Fisher information. It is revealed that the minimum value of Fisher information of the superposition of the two strategies being the ground state and the second excited state of the oscillator, has Fisher information less than the ground state of the oscillator. Similarly, less information is obtained for the system of strategies (the oscillator eigenstates) randomized by the Gibbs distribution. We distinguish two different views on the description of Fisher information. One of them, the classical, is based on the value of Fisher information. The second, we call it transactional, expresses Fisher information from the perspective of the constant risk of market strategies. The orders of the market strategies derived from these two descriptions are different. From a market standpoint, minimizing Fisher information is equivalent to minimizing risk.

Efficiency of Classical and Quantum Games Equilibria.

Nash equilibria and correlated equilibria of classical and quantum games are investigated in the context of their Pareto efficiency. The examples of the prisoner's dilemma, battle of the sexes and the game of chicken are studied. Correlated equilibria usually improve Nash equilibria of games but require a trusted correlation device susceptible to manipulation. The quantum extension of these games in the Eisert-Wilkens-Lewenstein formalism and the Frackiewicz-Pykacz parameterization is analyzed. It is shown that the Nash equilibria of these games in quantum mixed Pauli strategies are closer to Pareto optimal results than their classical counter-parts. The relationship of mixed Pauli strategies equilibria and correlated equilibria is also studied.

The Quantization of the E ⊗ e Jahn-Teller Hamiltonian.

The E ⊗ e Jahn-Teller Hamiltonian in the Bargmann-Fock representation gives rise to a system of two coupled first-order differential equations in the complex field, which may be rewritten in the Birkhoff standard form. General leapfrog recurrence relations are derived, from which the quantized solutions of these equations can be obtained. The results are compared to the analogous quantization scheme for the Rabi Hamiltonian.