Las atletas intersexuales y la equidad de genéro: ¿son sexistas las normas del COI? / Intersex female athletes and gender equity: are the IOC´S new regulations sexistic?

Causó mucha sorpresa el caso de la atleta sudafricana Caster Semenya, quien - debido a sospechas acerca de su pertenencia sexual - fue suspendida por la IAFF para competir durante buena parte del año 2010, a espera de los exámenes médicos que habrían de decidir si se la consideraría o no como mujer en las competencias. Durante 2011, el COI y la IAAF determinaron que las atletas con hiperandrogenismo (niveles demasiado altos de hormonas masculinas) deberán reducir dichos niveles mediante el uso de estrógenos para hacer así más equitativas las competencias. En esta presentación cuestionamos esa reglamentación por considerarla sexista y contraria al espíritu del deporte. El entrenamiento para optimizar las aptitudes físicas y psíquicas, la alimentación etc., no difiere mucho entre los atletas de élite. En cambio, el factor que define la contienda es lo que se ha denominado lotería genética. Esa excelencia física es aceptada en el deporte de élite y genera la admiración y el reconocimiento social y económico de que goza el vencedor de una contienda deportiva. Esto es así siempre y cuando no se trate de una mujer. Porque en ese caso, la atleta que se destaque como genéticamente superior (mayor nivel de andrógenos) será compelida a reducir sus niveles hormonales naturales mediante la administración de hormonas (“¿doping al revés”?). Los dirigentes deportivos actúan como policías sexuales al pretender eliminar un factor natural en las atletas intersexuales, en vez de permitirles ser premiadas y admiradas por sus ventajas naturales, de la misma forma que lo son sus colegas masculinos (AU)

In 2010, the South-African athlete Caster Semenya was suspended from all competitions by the International Association of Athletic Federations (IAFF) due to the suspicion that she was not a woman. After a medical investigation, the International Olympic Committee and IAFF decided in 2011 to allow her to compete again. As a consequence of the Semenya case, both organizations issued later that year new regulations establishing that women athletes with hyperandrogenism (that is, too high levels of masculine hormones) won’t be allowed to compete. In this article we question those regulations as we consider them sexist and contrary to the spirit of sports. Elite athletes do not differ much regarding physical training to optimize their physical and psychic abilities, their dedication to their sport discipline, etc. Rather, what decides a sport competition is what has been called “the genetic lottery”. This physical excellence is widely accepted in elite sports and is at the basis of both the admiration and the social as well as economic recognition enjoyed by the winner of a sport contest. That is to say, provided the winner is not a woman! Because in that case the female athlete who turns out to be genetically superior (because she naturally has higher level of testosterone) will be, although indirectly, compelled to reduce her androgen level by means of medical treatment (which we characterize in our article as “reverse doping”). Sport officials act in that regard as sex police when they try to eliminate a natural factor in intersex female athletes´genetic constitution, instead of allowing them to be rewarded and admired on grounds of their natural superiority, in the same way as their (also genetically superior!) male colleagues are (AU)

The case of biobank with the law: between a legal and scientific fiction.

According to estimates more than 400 biobanks currently operate across Europe. The term 'biobank' indicates a specific field of genetic study that has quietly developed without any significant critical reflection across European societies. Although scientists now routinely use this phrase, the wider public is still confused when the word 'bank' is being connected with the collection of their biological samples. There is a striking lack of knowledge of this field. In the recent Eurobarometer survey it was demonstrated that even in 2010 two-thirds of the respondents had never even heard about biobanks. The term gives the impression that a systematic collection of biological samples can constitute a 'bank' of considerable financial worth, where the biological samples, which are insignificant in isolation but are valuable as a collection, can be preserved, analysed and put to 'profitable use'. By studying the practices of the numerous already existing biobanks, the authors address the following questions: to what extent does the term 'biobank' reflect the normative concept of using biological samples for the purposes of biomedical research? Furthermore, is it in harmony with the so far agreed legal-ethical consensus in Europe or does it deliberately pull science to the territory of a new, ambiguous commercial field? In other words, do biobanks constitute a medico-legal fiction or are they substantively different from other biomedical research protocols on human tissues?

Addict to win? A different approach to doping.

Traditionally the doping debate has been dominated by those who want to see doping forbidden (the prohibitionist view) and those who want to see it permitted (the ban abolitionist view). In this article, the authors analyse a third position starting from the assertion that doping use is a symptom of the paradigm of highly competitive elite sports, in the same way as addictions reflect current social paradigms in wider society. Based upon a conceptual distinction between occasional use, habitual use and addiction, and focusing on the physical and/or mental dependency caused by the addictive use of a certain drug, we argue that marihuana, stimulants and anabolic steroid abuse--the most frequently detected substances in doping tests--satisfies at least one, often both, of these conditions. A conclusion to be drawn from the authors' arguments is that the prohibitionist view is inappropriate for dealing with doping, as the severe sanctions attached to it will cut the doper off her/his social and professional environment, thereby risking reinforcing her/his addictive conduct. But the ban abolitionist view seems inappropriate as well. At first sight, it seems neither rational nor humane not to intervene when confronted with conduct which is highly harmful for the individual and upon which she has reduced or no control whatsoever. Instead the authors' proposal will be to contextualise dopers' conduct within sport healthcare and see it strictly in relation to each athlete's personal background. Developing preventive programmes--implemented through person-tailored counselling and eventually treatment, rather than severe sanctions or the mere lifting of the ban--seems to be a more reasonable, and probably more efficient, way of conducting 'the war against doping'.