RESUMO
The emergence of the Omicron variant in November 2021, has caused panic worldwide due to the rapid evolution and the ability of the virus to escape the immune system. Since, several Omicron sublineages (BA.1 to BA.5) and their descendent recombinant lineages have been circulating worldwide. Furthermore, in December 2022, a new Omicron subvariant XBB.1.5 characterized by an unusual mutation in the spike protein evolved in the United States and rapidly spread to the other continents. Our study reports on the first cases of XBB.1.5 sublineage among indigenous Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus-2 (SARS-COV-2) positive cases detected through the influenza sentinel surveillance system in Niger. All influenza suspected cases were tested for both influenza and SARS-COV-2 using the Centre for Disease Control and prevention (CDC) Influenza SARS-COV-2 Multiplex quantitative Reverse-Transcription Polymerase Chain Reaction (qRT-PCR) Assay. SARS-COV-2 positive samples with cycle threshold ≤28 were selected for whole genome sequencing subsequently using the Oxford Nanopore Midnight protocol with rapid barcoding on a MinIon MK1B device. A total of 51 SARS-COV-2 positive samples were confirmed between December 2022 and March 2023. We successfully obtained 19 sequences with a predominance of the XBB.1/XBB.1.5 sublineages (73.7 %). In addition, a recombinant XBD sequence was also first-ever identified in early March 2023. Our findings support the need to strengthen the influenza sentinel surveillance for routine Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) surveillance and SARS-COV-2 variants monitoring in Niger.
RESUMO
Introduction: over the last decade, insecurity in the Lake Chad Basin has triggered an unprecedented humanitarian crisis in the Niger´s Diffa Region with a significant population movement. In this humanitarian setting, we reviewed the implementation process and the contribution of temperature screening and handwashing practice at points of entry as part of non-pharmaceutical interventions against COVID-19. Methods: in Diffa, border officers were trained on the fundamentals of infection prevention and control in relation to COVID-19 readiness and response and a 14-day district response team was constituted. To examine the significance of the implementation process of temperature screening and handwashing practices at points of entry, we conducted a secondary analysis of data submitted by the six health districts of the Diffa Region between March and July 2020. Results: travellers screened for fever ranged from 10,499 (in March 2020) to 62,441 (in April 2020) with the health districts of Diffa (mean: standard error of the mean: 25,999: 9,220) and of Bosso (mean: standard error of the mean: 30.4: 19.1) accounting for the most and the least of activities during the entire period, respectively. Overall, 125/169,475 travellers presented fever and were effectively quarantined. Only the Ngourti Health District reported travellers who declined handwashing (54/169,475); this was during the first three months of the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic. Conclusion: we have documented a successful implementation of measures related to temperature screening with some unsubstantial denial of handwashing. Given the importance of border traffic due to insecurity in the Diffa Region, maintaining temperature screening and handwashing in this humanitarian setting is necessary but requires coordinated actions of all stakeholders involved in the region.
