One- and two-year-olds grasp that causes must precede their effects.

Knowing the temporal direction of causal relations is critical for producing desired outcomes and explaining events. Existing evidence suggests that children start to grasp that causes must precede their effects (the temporal priority principle) by age 3; however, whether younger children also understand this has, to our knowledge, not previously been tested. Given the importance of temporal priority in making sense of the world, we explored when knowledge of this principle develops. In the present study, conducted in a lab or museum in a Canadian city, 1- and 2-year-old children observed an adult perform action A on a puzzle box (e.g., spinning a dial), following which an effect E occurred (a sticker was dispensed), following which the adult performed action B (e.g., pushing a button; A-E-B sequence). In line with the temporal priority principle, toddlers were significantly more likely to manipulate A than B (Experiment 1, N = 41, 22 female), even when A was spatially disconnected from the sticker dispenser and further from it than action B (Experiment 2, N = 42, 25 female). In Experiment 3 (N = 50, 25 female), toddlers observed an A-B-E sequence such that both actions A and B were performed prior to effect E. Here, they primarily intervened on B, which ruled out that success in Experiments 1-2 was based on a primacy effect. A lack of any age effects across experiments suggests that within the second year of life, children already grasp that causes must precede their effects, providing key insights into causal reasoning in early childhood. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Human Vision Reconstructs Time to Satisfy Causal Constraints.

The goal of perception is to infer the most plausible source of sensory stimulation. Unisensory perception of temporal order, however, appears to require no inference, because the order of events can be uniquely determined from the order in which sensory signals arrive. Here, we demonstrate a novel perceptual illusion that casts doubt on this intuition: In three experiments (N = 607), the experienced event timings were determined by causality in real time. Adult participants viewed a simple three-item sequence, ACB, which is typically remembered as ABC in line with principles of causality. When asked to indicate the time at which events B and C occurred, participants' points of subjective simultaneity shifted so that the assumed cause B appeared earlier and the assumed effect C later, despite participants' full attention and repeated viewings. This first demonstration of causality reversing perceived temporal order cannot be explained by postperceptual distortion, lapsed attention, or saccades.

Searching high and low: domestic dogs' understanding of solidity.

Physical reasoning appears central to understanding how the world works, suggesting adaptive function across the animal kingdom. However, conclusive evidence for inferential reasoning about physical objects is limited to primates. We systematically tested a central feature-understanding of solidity-in domestic dogs, by adapting a validated procedure (the shelf task) previously used to test children and non-human primates. Dogs watched a treat dropped into an apparatus with a shelf either present (treat landing on the shelf) or absent (treat landing on the bottom surface) and chose where to search for it (above or below the shelf). Across four studies (n = 64), we manipulated visual access to the treat trajectory and apparatus interior. Dogs correctly inferred the location of treats using physical cues when the shelf was present (Study 1), and learned rapidly when visual cues of continuity were limited (Study 2), and when the shelf was absent (Study 3). Dogs were at chance when the apparatus was fully occluded, and the presence and absence of the shelf varied across trials within subjects, and showed no evidence of learning (Study 4). The findings of these four studies suggest that dogs may be able to make some inferences using solidity and continuity and do not exhibit proximity or gravity biases. However, dogs did not always search correctly from Trial 1, and failed to search correctly when the rewarded location varied within-subjects, suggesting a role for learning, and possible limits to their ability to make inferences about physical objects.

Doing reliable research in comparative psychology: Challenges and proposals for improvement.

Unlike some other areas of psychology that have experienced a "reproducibility crisis," the extent to which research findings in comparative psychology are reliable is only just beginning to come under the spotlight. I outline what is known about where we as a field stand in terms of the reliability of our findings and highlight some characteristic features of our research that give may cause for concern, focusing primarily on experimental comparative cognition. I then discuss ways that we as individual researchers and a wider community can take steps to improve our current practices (and in some cases already are) and highlight the crucial role institutions and gatekeepers have to play in effecting change. By tackling potential issues head on, the field of comparative psychology can have more confidence that our research findings and the resultant claims we make about animal behavior and cognition are reliable. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

What's the point? Domestic dogs' sensitivity to the accuracy of human informants.

Dogs excel at understanding human social-communicative gestures like points and can distinguish between human informants who vary in characteristics such as knowledge or familiarity. This study explores if dogs, like human children, can use human social informants' past accuracy when deciding whom to trust. Experiment 1 tested whether dogs would behave differently in the presence of an accurate (vs. inaccurate) informant. Dogs followed an accurate informant's point significantly above chance. Further, when presented with an inaccurate point, dogs were more likely to ignore it and choose the correct location. Experiment 2 tested whether dogs could use informant past accuracy to selectively follow the point of the previously accurate informant. In test trials when informants simultaneously pointed at different locations (only one of which contained a treat), dogs chose the accurate informant at chance levels. Experiment 3 controlled for non-social task demands (e.g. understanding of hidden baiting and occlusion events) that may have influenced Experiment 2 performance. In test trials, dogs chose to follow the accurate (vs. inaccurate) informant. This suggests that like children, dogs may be able to use informants' past accuracy when choosing between information sources.

Temporal Binding, Causation, and Agency: Developing a New Theoretical Framework.

In temporal binding, the temporal interval between one event and another, occurring some time later, is subjectively compressed. We discuss two ways in which temporal binding has been conceptualized. In studies showing temporal binding between a voluntary action and its causal consequences, such binding is typically interpreted as providing a measure of an implicit or pre-reflective "sense of agency." However, temporal binding has also been observed in contexts not involving voluntary action, but only the passive observation of a cause-effect sequence. In those contexts, it has been interpreted as a top-down effect on perception reflecting a belief in causality. These two views need not be in conflict with one another, if one thinks of them as concerning two separate mechanisms through which temporal binding can occur. In this paper, we explore an alternative possibility: that there is a unitary way of explaining temporal binding both within and outside the context of voluntary action as a top-down effect on perception reflecting a belief in causality. Any such explanation needs to account for ways in which agency, and factors connected with agency, has been shown to affect the strength of temporal binding. We show that principles of causal inference and causal selection already familiar from the literature on causal learning have the potential to explain why the strength of people's causal beliefs can be affected by the extent to which they are themselves actively involved in bringing about events, thus in turn affecting binding.

The developmental profile of temporal binding: From childhood to adulthood.

Temporal binding refers to a phenomenon whereby the time interval between a cause and its effect is perceived as shorter than the same interval separating two unrelated events. We examined the developmental profile of this phenomenon by comparing the performance of groups of children (aged 6-7, 7-8, and 9-10 years) and adults on a novel interval estimation task. In Experiment 1, participants made judgements about the time interval between (a) their button press and a rocket launch, and (b) a non-causal predictive signal and rocket launch. In Experiment 2, an additional causal condition was included in which participants made judgements about the interval between an experimenter's button press and the launch of a rocket. Temporal binding was demonstrated consistently and did not change in magnitude with age: estimates of delay were shorter in causal contexts for both adults and children. In addition, the magnitude of the binding effect was greater when participants themselves were the cause of an outcome compared with when they were mere spectators. This suggests that although causality underlies the binding effect, intentional action may modulate its magnitude. Again, this was true of both adults and children. Taken together, these results are the first to suggest that the binding effect is present and developmentally constant from childhood into adulthood.

Causality influences children's and adults' experience of temporal order.

Although it has long been known that time is a cue to causation, recent work with adults has demonstrated that causality can also influence the experience of time. In causal reordering (Bechlivanidis & Lagnado, 2013, 2016) adults tend to report the causally consistent order of events rather than the correct temporal order. However, the effect has yet to be demonstrated in children. Across four preregistered experiments, 4- to 10-year-old children (N = 813) and adults (N = 178) watched a 3-object Michotte-style "pseudocollision." While in the canonical version of the clip, object A collided with B, which then collided with object C (order: ABC), the pseudocollision involved the same spatial array of objects but featured object C moving before object B (order: ACB), with no collision between B and C. Participants were asked to judge the temporal order of events and whether object B collided with C. Across all age groups, participants were significantly more likely to judge that B collided with C in the 3-object pseudocollision than in a 2-object control clip (where clear causal direction was lacking), despite the spatiotemporal relations between B and C being identical in the two clips (Experiments 1-3). Collision judgments and temporal order judgments were not entirely consistent, with some participants-particularly in the younger age range-basing their temporal order judgments on spatial rather than temporal information (Experiment 4). We conclude that in both children and adults, rather than causal impressions being determined only by the basic spatial-temporal properties of object movement, schemata are used in a top-down manner when interpreting perceptual displays. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

What factors really influence domestic dogs' (Canis familiaris) search for an item dropped down a diagonal tube? The tubes task revisited.

It has been suggested that domestic dogs-like young human children-have a "gravity bias"; they expect an unsupported object to fall straight down, regardless of any obstacles that redirect or halt its path. In the diagonal tube task, this bias is revealed by a persistent tendency to search the incorrect location directly beneath the top of the tube the item is dropped into, rather than the correct location attached to the bottom of the tube. We presented dogs (N = 112) with seven different versions of the diagonal tube task, to examine what factors influence their search behavior for an object dropped down a diagonal tube, and investigate their physical reasoning skills more generally. Contrary to previous claims, we found no evidence for dogs exhibiting a persistent, or even a Trial 1, gravity bias. However, dogs were also unable to search correctly for the reward, even when it could be heard rolling through the tube, though they succeeded when the tube was transparent (Experiments 1a-c). Experiment 2 suggested that dogs might search on the basis of proximity, but Experiments 3a-b ruled this out and showed that they prefer to commence searching at the center of the apparatus. Finally, when potential sources of bias were eliminated from the task (Experiment 4), dogs' performance was improved, but still not above chance, suggesting that they are unable to reason about the tube's physical-causal mechanism. We conclude that, on current evidence, the gravity bias might be unique to some primate species. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

When causality shapes the experience of time: Evidence for temporal binding in young children.

It is well established that the temporal proximity of two events is a fundamental cue to causality. Recent research with adults has shown that this relation is bidirectional: events that are believed to be causally related are perceived as occurring closer together in time-the so-called temporal binding effect. Here, we examined the developmental origins of temporal binding. Participants predicted when an event that was either caused by a button press, or preceded by a non-causal signal, would occur. We demonstrate for the first time that children as young as 4 years are susceptible to temporal binding. Binding occurred both when the button press was executed via intentional action, and when a machine caused it. These results suggest binding is a fundamental, early developing property of perception and grounded in causal knowledge. A video abstract of this article can be viewed at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EQC_MqjxZQQ.

Intuitive probabilistic inference in capuchin monkeys.

The ability to reason about probabilities has ecological relevance for many species. Recent research has shown that both preverbal infants and non-human great apes can make predictions about single-item samples randomly drawn from populations by reasoning about proportions. To further explore the evolutionary origins of this ability, we conducted the first investigation of probabilistic inference in a monkey species (capuchins; Sapajus spp.). Across four experiments, capuchins (N = 19) were presented with two populations of food items that differed in their relative distribution of preferred and non-preferred items, such that one population was more likely to yield a preferred item. In each trial, capuchins had to select between hidden single-item samples randomly drawn from each population. In Experiment 1 each population was homogeneous so reasoning about proportions was not required; Experiments 2-3 replicated previous probabilistic reasoning research with infants and apes; and Experiment 4 was a novel condition untested in other species, providing an important extension to previous work. Results revealed that at least some capuchins were able to make probabilistic inferences via reasoning about proportions as opposed to simpler quantity heuristics. Performance was relatively poor in Experiment 4, so the possibility remains that capuchins may use quantity-based heuristics in some situations, though further work is required to confirm this. Interestingly, performance was not at ceiling in Experiment 1, which did not involve reasoning about proportions, but did involve sampling. This suggests that the sampling task posed demands in addition to reasoning about proportions, possibly related to inhibitory control, working memory, and/or knowledge of object permanence.

Development of planning in 4- to 10-year-old children: reducing inhibitory demands does not improve performance.

Currently, there are relatively few tasks suitable for testing planned problem solving in children. We presented 4- to 10-year-old children (N=172) with two planning tasks (sequential planning and advance planning) using the paddle-box apparatus, which was originally designed to investigate the planning skills of nonhuman apes. First, we were interested in the development of children's performance in the two tasks and whether the strategies children used to succeed differed among age groups. Performance improved significantly across age groups in both tasks. Strategies for success in the advance planning task differed among age groups, with 4- and 5-year-olds performing more excess actions, and a greater proportion of irrelevant excess actions, than older children. Findings are discussed in relation to the development of performance in tower tasks, which are a commonly used test of planning ability in humans. Second, based on previous findings with apes, we predicted that introducing measures to reduce the inhibitory demands of the advance planning task would improve children's performance. Therefore, in this study we introduced two methodological alterations that have been shown to improve children's performance in other tasks with inhibitory demands: (a) imposing a short delay before a child is allowed to act and (b) replacing reward items with symbolic tokens. Surprisingly, neither of these measures improved the performance of children in any of the age groups, suggesting that, contrary to our prediction, inhibitory control might not be a key performance-limiting factor in the advance planning paddle-box task.

A novel test of planning ability: great apes can plan step-by-step but not in advance of action.

The ability to identify an appropriate sequence of actions or to consider alternative possible action sequences might be particularly useful during problem solving in the physical domain. We developed a new 'paddle-box' task to test the ability of different ape species to plan an appropriate sequence of physical actions (rotating paddles) to retrieve a reward from a goal location. The task had an adjustable difficulty level and was not dependent on species-specific behaviours (e.g. complex tool use). We investigated the planning abilities of captive orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) and bonobos (Pan paniscus) using the paddle-box. In experiment 1, subjects had to rotate one or two paddles before rotating the paddle with the reward on. Subjects of both species performed poorly, though orangutans rotated more non-food paddles, which may be related to their greater exploratory tendencies and bolder temperament compared with bonobos. In experiment 2 subjects could always rotate the paddle with the reward on first and still succeed, and most subjects of both species performed appropriate sequences of up to three paddle rotations to retrieve the reward. Poor performance in experiment 1 may have been related to subjects' difficulty in inhibiting the prepotent response to act on the reward immediately.

What cognitive strategies do orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) use to solve a trial-unique puzzle-tube task incorporating multiple obstacles?

Apparently sophisticated behaviour during problem-solving is often the product of simple underlying mechanisms, such as associative learning or the use of procedural rules. These and other more parsimonious explanations need to be eliminated before higher-level cognitive processes such as causal reasoning or planning can be inferred. We presented three Bornean orangutans with 64 trial-unique configurations of a puzzle-tube to investigate whether they were able to consider multiple obstacles in two alternative paths, and subsequently choose the correct direction in which to move a reward in order to retrieve it. We were particularly interested in how subjects attempted to solve the task, namely which behavioural strategies they could have been using, as this is how we may begin to elucidate the cognitive mechanisms underpinning their choices. To explore this, we simulated performance outcomes across the 64 trials for various procedural rules and rule combinations that subjects may have been using based on the configuration of different obstacles. Two of the three subjects solved the task, suggesting that they were able to consider at least some of the obstacles in the puzzle-tube before executing action to retrieve the reward. This is impressive compared with the past performances of great apes on similar, arguably less complex tasks. Successful subjects may have been using a heuristic rule combination based on what they deemed to be the most relevant cue (the configuration of the puzzle-tube ends), which may be a cognitively economical strategy.