Binding and retrieval of temporal action features: Probing the precision level of feature representations in action planning.

The duration of action can be critical to accomplishing specific goals. Empirical findings and theoretical considerations suggest that different stages of action planning and execution require different specification levels of action features. It is assumed that at first only crude categorical features are integrated into action plans, which are then specified by subsequent sensorimotor processes during action execution based on situational conditions. In two experiments, we investigated if the integration of action duration into action plans indeed relies exclusively on categorical duration representations or also on continuous-metric representations. Participants responded to visual prime and probe stimuli with short and long key presses. The duration of the prime response was indicated by a previous response cue, and the duration of the probe response was indicated by the shape of the probe stimulus. Analyses of response durations revealed that for response category repetitions from prime to probe, the actual durations of the repeated responses were more similar for shape repetitions than for shape switches. This indicates that continuous temporal information is integrated into an action plan and subsequently retrieved by stimulus repetition. Our results suggest that action duration is integrated into the action plan in a relatively precise form at an early stage of action planning. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Post-interval potentials in temporal judgements.

Research suggests that post-stimulus positive deflections could be associated with timing. We compared offset-locked potentials N1, P2, N1P2, and late positive component (LPC) in temporal generalization and temporal bisection-with visual probe intervals. In both tasks, the LPC amplitude decreased with the duration of the current probe interval. A larger LPC was found after shorter intervals, whereas other ERP amplitudes did not change between tasks or across durations. We also found that the LPC for different responses indicates subjective time. We discussed our findings in relation to theories of human timing.

Investigating time-based expectancy beyond binary timing scenarios: evidence from a paradigm employing three predictive pre-target intervals.

When the duration of a pre-target interval probabilistically predicts the identity of the target, participants typically form time-based expectancies: they respond faster to frequent interval-target combinations than to infrequent ones. Yet, previous research investigating the cognitive time-processing mechanisms underlying time-based expectancy assessed time-based expectancy always in situations with a binary set of intervals (i.e. short vs. long). Here we aim to test whether time-based expectancy transfers to more complex settings with three different predictive time intervals (short, medium, long) in which each predicts one of three different target stimuli with 80% probability. In three experiments we varied how the medium interval was computed (arithmetic mean, geometric mean, or in between both). Our results showed that participants were able to learn the time-event contingencies for the short and the long as well as for the medium interval, and were, thus able to flexibly redirect their target expectancy two times during the course of a trial. The evidence concerning the impact of the manipulation of the medium intervals' absolute duration on time-based expectancy was, however, mixed, as time-based expectancy for the medium interval could only be observed in one of three reported experiments. In sum, the findings of the present study suggest a previously unknown cognitive flexibility underlying time-based expectancy and offer important theoretical implications, challenging future research on the timing mechanisms involved in time-based expectancy.

Time-based task expectancy: perceptual task indicator expectancy or expectancy of post-perceptual task components?

The temporal predictability of upcoming events plays a crucial role in the adjustment of anticipatory cognitive control in multitasking. Previous research has demonstrated that task switching performance improved if tasks were validly predictable by a pre-target interval. Hence, far, the underlying cognitive processes of time-based task expectancy in task switching have not been clearly defined. The present study investigated whether the effect of time-based expectancy is due to expectancy of post-perceptual task components or rather due to facilitation of perceptual visual processing of the coloured task indicator. Participants performed two numeric judgment tasks (parity vs. magnitude), which were each indicated by two different colours. Each task was either more or less frequently preceded by one of two intervals (500 ms or 1500 ms). Tasks were indicated either by colours that were each more frequently (or in Exp. 1 also less frequently) paired with the interval or by colours that were equally frequent for each interval. Participants only responded faster when colour and task were predictable by time (expected colour), not when the task alone was predictable (neutral colour). Hence, our results speak in favour of perceptual time-based task indicator expectancy being the underlying cognitive mechanism of time-based expectancy in the task switching paradigm.

Leisure walks modulate the cognitive and affective representation of the corona pandemic: Employing Cognitive-Affective Maps within a randomized experimental design.

In response to the corona pandemic, many leisure activities have been restricted while walking has been explicitly endorsed by health authorities. We investigated how leisure walking affects individuals' attitudes to the pandemic. We used Cognitive-Affective Maps (CAMs) to measure individual's cognitive and affective attitudes toward the corona pandemic and related issues. In a controlled randomized experiment, we asked (N = 66) participants to draw a CAM before and after a walk. Participants in a control group drew CAMs before and after any self-chosen activity at home. We found that walking led to a more negative evaluation of the pandemic itself, likely due to a more intense reflection, while in everyday routines one has already adapted to it. In further qualitative post hoc assessments of the CAMs, we observed that negative concepts other than corona disappeared after walking. We conclude that leisure walks have complex effects on individuals' cognitive and affective conceptualization of the corona pandemic. Hence, the exact mechanisms of these effects need to be examined in future research. Our study has also shown that CAMs are a promising tool for measuring experimental interventions in health psychology.

Time-Based Transition Expectancy in Task Switching: Do We Need to Know the Task to Switch to?

Recent research has shown that humans are able to implicitly adapt to time-transition contingencies in a task-switching paradigm, indicated by better performance in trials where the task transition (switch vs. repetition) is validly predicted by the pre-target interval compared to trials with invalidly predicted transitions. As participants switched between only two different tasks, not only the transition, but also the specific task was predictable; at least indirectly when taking into account the temporally predicted transition in the current trial together with the task in the previous trial. In order to investigate if the time-based expectancy effect for transition in previous studies was due to a specific task preparation or due to an unspecific transition preparation, three different tasks were used in the present study. One of two possible pre-target intervals (500 and 1500 ms) predicted a task switch in the upcoming trial with 90 % probability, whereas the other interval predicted a task repetition with 90 % probability. Results revealed that participants were able to prepare both upcoming repetition as well as switch requirements based on predictive pre-target intervals. This means that humans seem to be able to prepare a task switch in a rather unspecific manner, most likely by inhibiting the task just performed in the previous trial. By suggesting a two-stage preparation model in which switches as well as repetitions benefit both from time-based transition expectancy, although apparently with different cognitive processes being involved, the present study provides important impulses for future research on the cognitive processes underlying human task-switching behavior.

How does positive mood modulate time-based event expectancy?

In the present study, we investigated how positive mood affects the formation of time-based event expectancies. After positive or neutral mood inductions, participants performed a binary choice response task in which two target stimuli (circle and square) and two pre-target intervals (800 and 1600 ms) appeared equally often. One of the targets was paired with the short interval and the other target with the long interval in 90% of the trials. We found that participants from the positive and neutral groups showed markedly different behavioral patterns of time-based expectancy. The time-based expectancy was restricted to shorter intervals for the positive group and to longer intervals for the neutral group. We propose that positive mood increases attentional prioritization of information that is temporally closer to us.

Early posterior negativity indicates time dilation by arousal.

We investigated whether Early Posterior Negativity (EPN) indicated the subjective dilation of time when judging the duration of arousing stimuli. Participants performed a visual temporal bisection task along with high-level and low-level arousing auditory stimuli, while we simultaneously recorded EEG. In accordance with previous studies, arousing stimuli were temporally overestimated and led to higher EPN amplitude. Yet, we observed that time dilation and EPN amplitude were significantly correlated and this effect cannot be explained by confounds from stimulus valence. We interpret our findings in terms of the pacemaker-accumulator model of human timing, and suggest that EPN indicates an arousal-based increasing of the speed of our mental clock.

Only time will tell the future: Anticipatory saccades reveal the temporal dynamics of time-based location and task expectancy.

Humans form associations between time intervals and subsequent events and thus develop time-based expectancies that enable time-based action preparation. For instance, when each of two foreperiods (short vs. long) is frequently paired with one specific task (e.g., number magnitude judgment vs. number parity judgment) and infrequently with the alternative task, participants are faster to respond to frequent rather than infrequent foreperiod-task combinations. Here, we investigated the time course of time-based task expectancy by measuring eye movements toward a left and right target location. Foreperiods predicted target locations with 100% validity and tasks with 90% validity. In 2 experiments, without having any explicit knowledge about the foreperiod-location or foreperiod-task contingencies, participants first moved their eyes to the location associated with the short foreperiod and then looked toward the location of the long foreperiod (if no stimulus had been presented after the short foreperiod had passed). That is, they proactively moved their eyes to optimize perception in line with the specific time and location they expected an event to occur at. Importantly, these eye movements reflected not only time-based location expectations, but also time-based task expectations. We discuss new insights in time-based expectancy and its temporal dynamics obtained from anticipatory eye movements and highlight spontaneous eye movements as a window into cognitive processes that cannot be assessed via behavioral response measures. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Humans derive task expectancies from sub-second and supra-second interval durations.

Recent studies in the field of task switching have shown that humans can base expectancies for tasks on temporal cues. When tasks are predictable based on the duration of the preceding pre-target interval, humans implicitly adapt to this predictability, indicated by better performance in trials with validly compared to invalidly predicted tasks. Yet, it is not clear which internal timing mechanisms are involved. Previous research has suggested that intervals from the sub- and supra-second range are processed by distinct cognitive timing systems. As earlier studies on temporally predictable task switching have used predictive intervals stemming from both ranges, it was not yet clear if the time-based expectancy effect was driven by just one of the two internal timing systems. The present study used clearly sub-second intervals (10 ms and 500 ms) in Experiment 1, while clearly supra-second intervals (1500 ms and 3000 ms) were used in Experiment 2. Substantial adaptation effects were observed in both experiments, showing that sub- as well as supra-second timing systems are involved in time-based expectancies for tasks. The present findings offer important implications for our theoretical understanding of the internal timing mechanisms involved in time-based task expectancy.

Acting and reacting: Is intentional binding due to sense of agency or to temporal expectancy?

Intentional Binding (IB) refers to the phenomenon that we perceive effects we caused by a voluntary action earlier compared to stimuli we did not cause by our action. Although IB has been investigated in numerous studies and is routinely employed as an implicit measure for Sense of Agency, its underlying mechanisms are not yet clear. We investigated whether IB is based on Sense of Agency or on temporal expectancy. To this end, we compared how delay duration (250 ms vs. 600 ms) and duration predictability (valid vs. invalid) influence IB regarding Sense of Agency, measured as agency judgment (AJ), and temporal expectancy, measured as reaction time benefit (RTB). Results pattern were quite similar for IB and AJ but different for IB and RTB: IB and AJ decreased for longer delay durations, whereas the RTB increased for longer delay durations. An additional interaction of delay duration and duration predictability was only significant for AJ and RTB. Yet, the interactional pattern of delay duration and duration predictability on AJ did not differ from the result pattern of IB. Overall, results indicate IB to be rather driven by Sense of Agency than by temporal expectancy. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Sequence Knowledge on When and What Supports Dual-Tasking.

The constraints in overlapping response selection have been established in dual-tasking studies with random sequence of stimuli and responses as well as random stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA). While this approach makes it possible to control for advance activation of upcoming stimuli or responses, it leaves open whether such preparatory processing can indeed influence dual-task performance. We investigated whether and how the sequence of stimuli and responses and the sequence of SOAs can be learned and used under dual-tasking. In each trial, participants (N = 28 in Experiment 1 and N = 30 in Experiment 2) were first presented with a random two-choice task followed by a four-choice Serial Reaction Time Task (SRTT), presented in a sequence of length four (position sequence). The SOA (timing) sequence also had length four. In test phases, one or both of the sequences were randomized. Results showed that both position and timing sequences were learned and supported dual-task performance, suggesting that predictive processing with respect to timing and identity of stimuli and responses can help to circumvent the response selection bottleneck constraints. Furthermore, in contrast to previous work on acquisition of interval sequences in single tasking, we found that the sequence of what (i.e. stimulus) and the sequence of when (i.e. interval between two tasks) contributed independently to performance.

Children with autism spectrum disorder show increased sensitivity to time-based predictability.

Objectives: We studied timed-based expectancy as well as general perceptual-motor speed in children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD). Methods: In Experiment 1, 11 children with ASD and 11 typically developing children (TD) (6-13 years) completed a binary choice response task in which foreperiod duration predicted the response target's location with a probability of 0.8. In Experiment 2, we compared performance between 10 children with ASD (6-11 years) and 10 TD children by using a simple reaction time test. Results: Employing a binary forced choice task where the duration of a pre-target interval (800 or 1400 ms) probabilistically predicted the target, we found that children with ASD were sensitive to the temporal regularity, whereas TD children were not. Children with ASD were faster for expected combinations of interval and target location but they were also less accurate for those combinations. Results from an additional simple reaction time test indicate that the development of general perceptual-motor processes was delayed in children with ASD. However, the ability for children with ASD to form time-based expectancies was not correlated with their performance in the simple reaction time test. Conclusion: Children with ASD show significantly greater sensitivity towards time-based predictability than TD children. However, the development of general perceptual-motor processes was impaired in children with ASD.

Intentional binding of visual effects.

When an action produces an effect, the effect is perceived earlier in time compared to a stimulus without preceding action. This temporal bias is called intentional binding (IB) and serves as an implicit measure of sense of agency. Typically, IB is investigated by presenting a rotating clock hand while participants execute an action and perceive a resulting tone. Participants are asked to estimate the time point of tone onset by referring to the clock hand position. This time point estimate is compared to a time point estimate of a tone in a condition in which the tone occurs without preceding action. Studies employing this classic clock paradigm employed auditory action effects. We modified this paradigm to investigate potential IB of visual action effects, and, additionally, to investigate how IB differs for visual action effects (Experiment 1) in comparison to auditory action effects (Experiment 2). Our results show that, like the IB of an auditory effect, the time point of a visual action effect is shifted toward the causing action, and that the size of the IB depends on the delay duration of the effect. Comparable to auditory action effects, earlier action effects showed stronger IB compared to later action effects. Yet overall IB of the visual effects was weaker than IB of the auditory effects. As IB is seen as an indicator of sense of agency, this may have important implications for the design of human-machine interfaces.

Visuomotor and motorvisual priming with different types of set-level congruency: evidence in support of ideomotor theory, and the planning and control model (PCM).

Perception can prime action (visuomotor priming), and action can prime perception (motorvisual priming). According to ideomotor theory both effects rely on the overlap of mental representations between perception and action. This implies that both effects get more pronounced the more features they share. We tested this hypothesis by employing in a motorvisual (Exp. 1) and in a visuomotor (Exp. 2) setting, three different pairs of left/right target stimuli (hand pictures, arrows, and words) varying in how strongly they overlap with the pair of left/right responses. For two stimulus pairs (hands and words) the hypothesis was confirmed: hand pictures share more features with the responses than words, consequently hand pictures produced a stronger visuomotor and a stronger motorvisual priming effect than words. However, arrow stimuli showed a different pattern: the temporal dynamics of both priming effects, as well as the direction of the effect seen in motorvisual priming, were significant but opposite to that of the hand and word stimuli. This suggests that the arrows' representations were not involved in ideomotor processes, and we propose instead that they were represented in a spatial or scalar fashion, outside the representations assumed in ideomotor theory. The results are discussed in the context of ideomotor theory, and the planning and control model of motorvisual priming.

Timing affect: Dimension-specific time-based expectancy for affect.

Affective information in our environment is often predictable by time; for example, positive answers are typically given faster than negative ones. Here we demonstrate, for the first time, that humans can implicitly adapt to time-based affect predictability. Participants were asked to categorize words, with the words' irrelevant valences being predictable by the timing of their occurrence. Adaptation to this pattern became evident by better performance for typical combinations of time and valence, relative to atypical combinations (Experiment 2). A comparable adaptation was observed for predictable activation (another affective dimension, Experiment 4), but not for predictable imageability (a nonaffective dimension, Experiment 3). In none of the experiments did participants become aware of the time-based predictability. These findings have significant implications for our theoretical understanding of human time-based expectancy, as well as important implications for the scheduling of system delays in artificial interaction and communication environments. (PsycINFO Database Record

Transfer of time-based task expectancy across different timing environments.

Recent research on time-based expectancy has shown that humans base their expectancies for responses on representations of temporal relations (e.g., shorter vs. longer duration), rather than on representations of absolute durations (e.g., 500 vs. 1000 ms). In the present study, we investigated whether this holds also true for time-based expectancy of tasks instead of responses. Using a combination of the time-event correlation paradigm and the standard task-switching paradigm, participants learned to associate two different time intervals with two different tasks in a learning phase. In a test phase, the two intervals were either globally prolonged (Experiment 1), or shortened (Experiment 2), and they were no longer predictive for the upcoming task. In both experiments, performance in the test phase was better when expectancy had been defined in relative terms and worse when expectancy had been defined in absolute terms. We conclude that time-based task expectancy employs a relative, rather than an absolute, representation of time. Humans seem to be able to flexibly transfer their time-based task expectancies between different global timing regimes. This finding is of importance not only for our basic understanding of cognitive mechanisms underlying time-based task expectancy. For human-machine applications, these results mean that adaptation to predictive delay structures in interfaces survives globally speeding up or slowing down of delays due to different transmission rates.

Intentional binding of two effects.

An action that produced an effect is perceived later in time compared to an action that did not produce an effect. Likewise, the effect of an action is perceived earlier in time compared to a stimulus that was not produced by an action. Despite numerous studies on this phenomenon-referred to as Intentional Binding effect (IB)-the underlying mechanisms are still not fully understood. Typically, IB is investigated in settings where the action produces just one single effect, whereas in everyday action contexts, it rather causes a sequence of effects before leading to the desired outcome. Therefore, we investigated IB of two consecutive effects. We observed substantially more IB of a first effect tone compared to a second tone. This pattern was observed for second tones that were temporally predictable (Exp. 1) or not (Exp. 2 and 3). Interestingly, the second tone yielded stronger IB when it was less delayed (Exp. 4). Thus, also an event occurring later in an unfolding action-effect sequence can be bound to its causing action, but it might be less bound to the action than a first effect. Instead of the fact that it is the second of two consecutive effects, this, however, rather seems to be influenced by the longer delay of a second and, therefore, later occurring effect.

Time-based expectancy in temporally structured task switching.

In many situations, people have to switch between different tasks. Previous research has shown that task switching leads to relatively slow responses and high error rates. In many real-life task-switching contexts, tasks are not randomly distributed over time, but the temporal distribution of tasks carries information. Often the delay before a task predicts to some degree which task it will be, like when a longer browser loading time for a website makes the search for an alternative more likely. The present study investigated whether and how humans adapt to such temporal regularities. In a series of five experiments, intertask delays predicted with different probabilities the task in the upcoming trial, or whether the task switches in the upcoming trial. Participants adapted their response behavior to the predictability of the task, for all tested degrees of predictability (70%, 80%, 90%), but only for the degree of 90% predictability when the task transition was temporally predictable. The adaptation was implicit and task repetitions as well as switches, both benefitted from this adaptation. Likewise, performance after 500 ms and 1,500 ms delays was facilitated by time-based predictability. The results are discussed in the context of previous findings on nontemporal task predictability. (PsycINFO Database Record

What is a task? An ideomotor perspective.

Although multitasking has been the subject of a large number of papers and experiments, the term task is still not well defined. In this opinion paper, we adopt the ideomotor perspective to define the term task and distinguish it from the terms goal and action. In our opinion, actions are movements executed by an actor to achieve a concrete goal. Concrete goals are represented as anticipated sensory consequences that are associated with an action in an ideomotor manner. Concrete goals are nested in a hierarchy of more and more abstract goals, which form the context of the corresponding action. Finally, tasks are depersonalized goals, i.e., goals that should be achieved by someone. However, tasks can be assigned to a specific person or group of persons, either by a third party or by the person or the group of persons themselves. By accepting this assignment, the depersonalized task becomes a personal goal. In our opinion, research on multitasking needs to confine its scope to the analysis of concrete tasks, which result in concrete goals as anticipated sensory consequences of the corresponding action. We further argue that the distinction between dual- and single-tasking is dependent on the subjective conception of the task assignment, the goal representation and previous experience. Finally, we conclude that it is not the tasks, but the performing of the tasks, i.e. the actions that cause costs in multitasking experiments.