Key influencing factors of vertical integration of electronic health records in medical consortiums.

BACKGROUND: Similar to other countries around the world, China has incorporated the recording of electronic health data into its national strategy. After the completion of the decentralized construction phase, the construction of electronic health records in China has reached the stages of integration, sharing, and utilization. "Vertical integration" is the premise and foundation of "shared utilization" of electronic health records within the medical consortium, but it is also a bottleneck in realizing this goal. OBJECTIVE: The main purpose of this paper is to find out the key factors affecting the vertical integration of electronic health records in the medical consortiums, and to clarify the impact mechanism of these key factors, so as to provide reference for improving relevant policies. METHODS: In this study, an index system of influencing factors is established for cross-institutional vertical integration of electronic health records within a medical consortium, identifying key influencing factors using the combined fuzzy-DEMATEL-ASIM method and revealing the influence relationship and action mechanism among the key influencing factors using a multi-layer hierarchical influence structure model. RESULTS: There are 32 factors influencing the vertical integration of electronic health records in the medical consortium, 17 of which are key factors. According to the hierarchical structure of key influencing factors, they can be divided into three categories: surface-level factors, middle-level factors and deep-level factors. CONCLUSIONS: In practice, these key factors should be prioritized for improvement and optimization to promote integration projects. In the future, we should focus on key influencing factors to precisely implement policies, such as introducing special promotion policies, unifying development planning, changing health insurance payment methods, establishing sharing standards, and raising public awareness.

Incentive mechanism for sharing and using EHR in medical consortiums based on performance evaluation.

Background: The construction of medical consortiums not only promotes active cooperation among hospitals, but also further intensifies active competition among them. The shared use of electronic health records (EHR) breaks the original pattern of benefit distribution among hospitals. Objective: The purpose of this paper is to establish an incentive mechanism for the shared use EHR, and to reveal the incentive effect and mechanism of key factors, and to put forward management suggestions for solving the real conflicts. Methods: We constructed a basic incentive model and an incentive model that introduces performance evaluation as a supervisory signal, based on analyzing the hospital cost function, the hospital benefit function, and the incentive contract function. Finally, the incentive effects of key factors before and after the introduction of performance evaluation were verified and compared using MATLAB simulation method. Results: The profit level and incentive coefficient of hospitals sharing EHR are independent of the amount of one-time government subsidies. Regardless of whether a performance evaluation supervisory signal is introduced or not, the incentive coefficients are increasing functions with respect to ρ, τ, but decreasing functions with respect to ß, δ, γ. After the inclusion of supervisory signal of performance evaluation in the model, the ability of hospitals to use EHR has a higher impact effectiveness on improving both incentive effects and benefit levels. The impact of the value-added coefficient on the level of earnings is consistently greater than it would have been without the inclusion of the performance evaluation supervisory signal. Conclusions: Enhancing the capacity of hospitals to use EHR and tapping and expanding the value-added space of EHR are 2 key paths to promote sustainable shared use of EHR. Substantive performance evaluation plays an important role in stabilizing incentive effects.