Retracted: Risks of avian influenza (H5) in duck farms in the Ayeyarwaddy Delta region, Myanmar.

The Ayeyarwaddy delta region in the south-west of Myanmar is the main agricultural and rice-growing area. The region has a high density of duck and backyard chicken populations with low biosecurity. The objective of this study was to analyse risk factors for avian influenza (H5) in the Ayeyarwaddy delta region, Myanmar. A case­control risk factor study was conducted from April to June 2010 by individual interviews including risk factor questionnaires given to duck farmers (n = 50) in five townships in the Ayeyarwaddy delta region, Myanmar. Risk factor analyses were conducted using univariate analysis and multivariate logistic regression model with backward stepwise (wald) method. The results showed significant risk factors for AI (H5) sero-positivity in ducks were wooden egg box containers (OR = 52.7, 95% CI = 2.34-1188, P = 0.013) and water sourced from wetlands (OR = 30.7, 95% CI = 1.96-481.6, P = 0.015). Conversely, the cleaning of reusable egg containers was determined as a protective factor (OR = 0.03, 95% CI = 0.00-0.42, P = 0.01). In conclusion, this study identified risk factors for AI (H5) in duck farms and the importance of avian influenza prevention and control.

The animal-human interface and infectious disease in industrial food animal production: rethinking biosecurity and biocontainment.

Understanding interactions between animals and humans is critical in preventing outbreaks of zoonotic disease. This is particularly important for avian influenza. Food animal production has been transformed since the 1918 influenza pandemic. Poultry and swine production have changed from small-scale methods to industrial-scale operations. There is substantial evidence of pathogen movement between and among these industrial facilities, release to the external environment, and exposure to farm workers, which challenges the assumption that modern poultry production is more biosecure and biocontained as compared with backyard or small holder operations in preventing introduction and release of pathogens. An analysis of data from the Thai government investigation in 2004 indicates that the odds of H5N1 outbreaks and infections were significantly higher in large-scale commercial poultry operations as compared with backyard flocks. These data suggest that successful strategies to prevent or mitigate the emergence of pandemic avian influenza must consider risk factors specific to modern industrialized food animal production.

Geographic and temporal distribution of highly pathogenic avian influenza A virus (H5N1) in Thailand, 2004-2005: an overview.

Outbreaks of H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) occurred in various types of domestic poultry in Thailand during 2004-05. H5N1 viruses were also detected in humans and other mammalian species. Infections were mainly detected in backyard chickens and domestic ducks. The geographic distribution of the 2004 outbreaks was widespread throughout Thailand; most outbreaks occurred in the Central Region, the southern part of the Northern Region, and the Eastern Region. In 2005, the H5N1 outbreaks continued and showed a clustered pattern in four provinces in the southern part of the Northern Region and in one province in the Central Region. H5N1 HPAI outbreaks caused serious socioeconomic consequences to the poultry industry, the social community, farmers' livelihood, and human health. After key measures were implemented, the incidence of the outbreaks declined remarkably in 2005.