Bioterrorism preparedness. III: State and federal programs and response.

Management of a bioterrorism event will begin with early detection and intervention at the local level. Any large-scale event will require rapid state and federal assistance. Federal initiatives targeting bioterrorism have increasingly become a complex web of executive and legislative actions, frequently initiated in reaction to specific events, and often unrelated to this threat. Multiple executive and legislative branch actions have resulted in a proliferation of federal programs, and coordination of these efforts remains a significant challenge. Still, great strides have been taken to improve our defensive posture against this emerging threat, and, at all levels, governmental authorities and agencies are much better prepared to respond to such events than they were a decade ago. The events of September 11, 2001 and subsequent events are clear indicators that the timeline for preparedness has been significantly compressed. Federal emergency operations, historically designed more for recovery than response, seemed up to the task in the wake of the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks, although there was criticism of federal responsiveness to the subsequent anthrax incidents [71,72], and the timeliness of federal resources in the event of a large-scale outbreak resulting from a bioterrorism attack has yet to be truly tested. The recent establishment of the Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council holds promise that some of these inefficiencies may be rectified and overall coordination of programs will improve. Continued improvements in the effectiveness of the federal government in meeting the challenges of this and other emerging threats to homeland security will require: Establishment of consensus standards, metrics, and measures of effectiveness for all aspects of disaster, epidemic, and terrorism management at the local, regional, state, and federal levels Delineation of expected, quantifiable state and local capabilities to mitigate, prepare, respond, and recover from all disasters, including those caused by terrorist actions Development of predefined or clear and rapidly discernible criteria for deployment of state and federal emergency resources Full accountability of program costs and expenditures Continued consolidation or coordination of the many overlapping and at times redundant federal programs.

Anthrax as a biological weapon, 2002: updated recommendations for management.

OBJECTIVE: To review and update consensus-based recommendations for medical and public health professionals following a Bacillus anthracis attack against a civilian population. PARTICIPANTS: The working group included 23 experts from academic medical centers, research organizations, and governmental, military, public health, and emergency management institutions and agencies. EVIDENCE: MEDLINE databases were searched from January 1966 to January 2002, using the Medical Subject Headings anthrax, Bacillus anthracis, biological weapon, biological terrorism, biological warfare, and biowarfare. Reference review identified work published before 1966. Participants identified unpublished sources. CONSENSUS PROCESS: The first draft synthesized the gathered information. Written comments were incorporated into subsequent drafts. The final statement incorporated all relevant evidence from the search along with consensus recommendations. CONCLUSIONS: Specific recommendations include diagnosis of anthrax infection, indications for vaccination, therapy, postexposure prophylaxis, decontamination of the environment, and suggested research. This revised consensus statement presents new information based on the analysis of the anthrax attacks of 2001, including developments in the investigation of the anthrax attacks of 2001; important symptoms, signs, and laboratory studies; new diagnostic clues that may help future recognition of this disease; current anthrax vaccine information; updated antibiotic therapeutic considerations; and judgments about environmental surveillance and decontamination.

Hemorrhagic fever viruses as biological weapons: medical and public health management.

OBJECTIVE: To develop consensus-based recommendations for measures to be taken by medical and public health professionals if hemorrhagic fever viruses (HFVs) are used as biological weapons against a civilian population. PARTICIPANTS: The Working Group on Civilian Biodefense included 26 representatives from academic medical centers, public health, military services, governmental agencies, and other emergency management institutions. EVIDENCE: MEDLINE was searched from January 1966 to January 2002. Retrieved references, relevant material published prior to 1966, and additional sources identified by participants were reviewed. CONSENSUS PROCESS: Three formal drafts of the statement that synthesized information obtained in the evidence-gathering process were reviewed by the working group. Each draft incorporated comments and judgments of the members. All members approved the final draft. CONCLUSIONS: Weapons disseminating a number of HFVs could cause an outbreak of an undifferentiated febrile illness 2 to 21 days later, associated with clinical manifestations that could include rash, hemorrhagic diathesis, and shock. The mode of transmission and clinical course would vary depending on the specific pathogen. Diagnosis may be delayed given clinicians' unfamiliarity with these diseases, heterogeneous clinical presentation within an infected cohort, and lack of widely available diagnostic tests. Initiation of ribavirin therapy in the early phases of illness may be useful in treatment of some of these viruses, although extensive experience is lacking. There are no licensed vaccines to treat the diseases caused by HFVs.