Mitigating Simulator Adaptation Syndrome by means of tactile stimulation.

Some drivers experience Simulator Adaptation Syndrome (SAS), a condition in which nausea, disorientation, dizziness, headache, and difficulty focusing, are exhibited when driving in a simulator. To reduce this syndrome, we investigated the efficacy of tactile stimulation (TS) on mitigating Simulator Adaptation Syndrome (SAS) in a driving simulation. Fifteen drivers (eight women; mean age = 24.07 years) participated in this experiment. We compared the total scores of the Simulator Sickness Questionnaire (SSQ) across two stimulation conditions (TS condition and no stimulation condition as a baseline measure). The experimental outcomes revealed that TS seemed to decrease SAS due to attentional distraction from the symptoms and not because of an improvement in balance ability.

Mental representations of obligatory and prohibitory traffic signs.

Every traffic sign conveys a single proposition about traffic conditions. Drivers must integrate this proposition with their goals and other known facts to decide on an appropriate action in what amounts to a deduction task. For example, imagine that you are driving a car and you want to turn right at an intersection but there is a 'no right turn' sign. You have to assess the options and make a decision (reach a conclusion). Theoretical accounts from research about reasoning can be applied to how we understand traffic signs and make inferences from them. This study includes two experiments that analysed how people decide whether a situation is allowed or not, taking into account the information provided by one sign--obligatory or prohibitory--or two signs--two obligatory or two prohibitory signs. The number of signs, that is, the complexity of the driving scene, was a key factor in this study. The two experiments differ in the presentation format of the two-sign experimental condition. In the first experiment, the signs were presented as two isolated signs. In the second experiment, the two signs were embedded in one. Equivalent results were found whether two isolated signs or two embedded signs were shown. When an obligatory sign was used at the junction, faster responses were obtained for allowed manoeuvres than for those not allowed. When a prohibitory sign was used, the results were the opposite. However, the advantage of prohibitory signs in the not-allowed situation was not replicated when people had to collect information from two prohibitory signs. Results showed that people integrate two obligatory sign messages--informing where one can go--more easily than two prohibitory sign messages--informing where not to go. Therefore, it could be said that each traffic sign elicits an internal mental model elaboration in which forbidden actions are explicitly labelled by means of attached "mental footnotes" indicating the epistemic status of "prohibitory information."

Exploring task-set reconfiguration with random task sequences.

Switching between two different tasks normally results in an impairment in people's performance known as a switch cost, typically measured as an increase in reaction time (RT) and errors compared to a situation in which no task switch is required. Researchers in task switching have suggested that this switch cost is the behavioural manifestation of the task set reconfiguration processes that are necessary to perform the upcoming task. However, an examination of the literature in task switching reveals apparently contradictory results about the nature of task set reconfiguration processes. In Experiment 1, we addressed this issue by comparing participants' performance in two different experimental conditions: predictable task switching and random task switching. In the predictable switch condition the switch cost completely vanished after the first repetition of the new task. However, in the random switch condition, while the difference between switch and repetition trials was not significant, we observed a significant reduction in RT between the first and second repetition of the new task. In Experiment 2, we further investigated the pattern of task set reconfiguration in the random switch situation. The results showed a progressive reduction of participants' response latencies across repetitions of the same task. The present study demonstrates that, whereas the results in predictable switching conditions are compatible with an exogenous-reconfiguration hypothesis, random task switching produces a more gradual, decay-like switch cost reduction with task repetition.

Diferente participación de los mecanismos de control en el cambio entre tareas regular frente al cambio al azar / Different implication of control mechanism in the random and regular shift of mental set

En este estudio exploramos las diferencias entre cambios de tareas regulares y al azar, medidas mediante la magnitud en el costo residual asociado al cambio. El costo residual, es la parte del costo, originado por cambiar de tarea, que permanece tras la actuación de un proceso de reconfiguración anticipatorio de la preparación mental (Rogers y Monsell, 1995). El costo residual de tiempo, con un SOA de un segundo, se anula en la tarea dominante cuando el cambio es al azar y no se obtiene la asimetría del costo que apoya a la hipótesis de la inercia mental (Allport, Styles y Hsieh, 1994). Sin embargo, cuando el cambio es regular, se obtiene un costo residual significativo, de tiempo y error, en la tarea dominante y mantiene la asimetría del costo en la dirección de la hipótesis de la inercia mental. Concluimos que, en la condición de cambio al azar, se activa un mecanismo de control, reduciendo la inercia mental asociada con la preparación de tarea previa (AU)

In this study we explore the differences when shifting between two different tasks in two conditions: when the shift is predictable and when it occurs at random. The residual cost is the part of cost for shifting tasks which remains after the operation of an anticipatory process of task-set reconfiguration (Rogers & Monsell, 1995). The residual cost is not significant when tasks shift at random for one second SOA condition. Besides, the so-called cost asymmetry, which supports the mental inertia hypothesis (Allport, Styles and Hsieh, 1994), is not obtained, either. However, when tasks shift predictably, both a significant residual cost and a cost asymmetry (in the direction predicted by the mental-inertia hypothesis) are found. We conclude that a control mechanism becomes activated in the random-shift condition, so reducing the mental inertia associated with the previous task set (AU)