Why is she scratching her head? Children's understanding of others' metacognitive gestures as an indicator of learning.

Successful collaborative learning is supported by the coordination of one's own learning with the learning performance of others. One type of cues that guides the understanding of others' learning performances is their metacognitive gestures. In the current study, we investigated (a) whether 3- to 7-year-old children rely on others' gestures to judge someone else's learning progress and likely learning performance (Experiment 1; N = 76), (b) whether metacognitive gesture understanding depends on cognitive and theory of mind skills (Experiment 2; N = 59), and (c) whether this knowledge would influence children's future selective learning and selective teaching choices (Experiment 3; N = 96). Results of Experiment 1 showed that by 3 years of age children can interpret gestures as an indicator of a person's future performance and that this capacity improves with age, with older children differentiating better between the types of gestures. Experiment 2 revealed that the understanding of metacognitive gestures was not modulated by either nonverbal cognitive capacities or theory of mind skills. Experiment 3 showed a developmental difference in that 5- and 7-year-olds, like adults, consistently selected that successful learners should help someone to learn and that ineffective learners should receive help, whereas 3-year-olds selected learners at chance level. Overall, the results support views that children acquire an understanding of metacognitive gestures early in life and that the translation of this knowledge into selective teaching and selective learning choices improves with age.

An ERP study on metacognitive monitoring processes in children.

Little is known about what exactly differentiates metacognitive processes from ordinary cognitive processes particularly early in development, and the underlying developmental aspects. To examine the time-course of metacognition, the present study investigated the neural underpinnings of judgments of learning (JoLs) and compared them with control judgments, using an event-related potentials (ERP) design. During ERP recording, children age seven to eight were presented with cue-target picture pairs and instructed to learn these pairs. After each pair, they either had to make a JoL (assess the likelihood of remembering the target when only presented with the cue) or a colour judgment (indicate whether the colour yellow had been present in one of the two pictures presented earlier). Results revealed a late slow wave divergence maximal pronounced from 550 ms to 950 ms post-stimulus that distinguished between JOLs and colour judgments. Over centro-parietal areas, JoLs showed a more negative going slow wave compared to the colour judgments, and this pattern was independent of performance. The results are in support of theories that assume a distinction between metacognitive and cognitive processes.

Knowledge is not enough to solve the problems - The role of diagnostic knowledge in clinical reasoning activities.

BACKGROUND: Clinical reasoning is a key competence in medicine. There is a lack of knowledge, how non-experts like medical students solve clinical problems. It is known that they have difficulties applying conceptual knowledge to clinical cases, that they lack metacognitive awareness and that higher level cognitive actions correlate with diagnostic accuracy. However, the role of conceptual, strategic, conditional, and metacognitive knowledge for clinical reasoning is unknown. METHODS: Medical students (n = 21) were exposed to three different clinical cases and instructed to use the think-aloud method. The recorded sessions were transcribed and coded with regards to the four different categories of diagnostic knowledge (see above). The transcripts were coded using the frequencies and time-coding of the categories of knowledge. The relationship between the coded data and accuracy of diagnosis was investigated with inferential statistical methods. RESULTS: The use of metacognitive knowledge is correlated with application of conceptual, but not with conditional and strategic knowledge. Furthermore, conceptual and strategic knowledge application is associated with longer time on task. However, in contrast to cognitive action levels the use of different categories of diagnostic knowledge was not associated with better diagnostic accuracy. CONCLUSIONS: The longer case work and the more intense application of conceptual knowledge in individuals with high metacognitive activity may hint towards reduced premature closure as one of the major cognitive causes of errors in medicine. Additionally, for correct case solution the cognitive actions seem to be more important than the diagnostic knowledge categories.

Neural correlates of judgments of learning - An ERP study on metacognition.

Metacognitive assessment of performance has been revealed to be one of the most powerful predictors of human learning success and academic achievement. Yet, little is known about the functional nature of cognitive processes supporting judgments of learning (JOLs). The present study investigated the neural underpinnings of JOLs, using event-related brain potentials. Participants were presented with picture pairs and instructed to learn these pairs. After each pair, participants received a task cue, which instructed them to make a JOL (the likelihood of remembering the target when only presented with the cue) or to make a control judgment. Results revealed that JOLs were accompanied by a positive slow wave over medial frontal areas and a bilateral negative slow wave over occipital areas between 350ms and 700ms following the task cue. The results are discussed with respect to recent accounts on the neural correlates of judgments of learning.

Developmental changes and the effect of self-generated feedback in metacognitive controlled spacing strategies in 7-year-olds, 10-year-olds, and adults.

The current study investigated the development of metacognitive monitoring-based control of spacing choices in children and adults. Moreover, we assessed whether metacognitive learning decisions are influenced by the effects of previous metacognitive decisions. We tested groups of 7-year-olds, 10-year-olds, and adults in a task with two learning blocks in which they needed to monitor their learning through judgments of learning (JoL) and in which they then needed to decide whether to space their study, mass it, or terminate it. Extending previous findings, our study provides the first evidence that already by 7 years of age children can make metacognitive controlled scheduling decisions. The results also revealed that adults had more clearly differentiated strategies related to their JoL. Furthermore, our study provides evidence that participants of all age groups improved their relative monitoring accuracy in the second learning block and adjusted their JoL. However, only adults changed their strategy choices.

Metacognitive monitoring of oneself and others: developmental changes during childhood and adolescence.

The current study examined the development of people's knowledge about others' learning and memory processes. To this end, participants of four different age groups (6- and 7-year-old children, 8- to 10-year-old children, 14- and 15-year-old adolescents, and adults) observed another person performing a paired associate learning task, allocating either little or more time to the paired associates. Participants were asked to estimate the likelihood of recall by giving judgments of learning (JoLs) for every item pair (Other Task). In addition, we manipulated whether participants performed an equivalent task themselves (Self Task) before or after the evaluation of the other. Our results show significant developmental effects, with the older two age groups, but not the younger two age groups, differentiating between the short and long video sequences when giving JoLs in the Other Task. Moreover, the results revealed an impact of having performed the Self Task beforehand on participants' JoLs in the Other Task, suggesting that metacognitive knowledge about the other is informed by experiential cues during the actual (i.e., firsthand), learning process.