Predicting the memorability of scene pictures: Improved accuracy through one's own experience.

There are conflicting findings regarding the accuracy of metamemory for scene pictures. Judgements of stimulus memorability in general (memorability judgements [MJs]) have been reported to be unpredictive of actual image memorability. However, other studies have found that judgements of learning (JOLs)-predictions of one's own later memory performance for recently studied items-are moderately predictive of people's own actual recognition memory for pictures. The current study directly compared the relative accuracy and cue basis of JOLs and MJs for scene pictures. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants completed an MJ task and a JOL task in counterbalanced order. In the MJ task, they judged the general memorability of each picture. In the JOL task, they studied pictures and made JOLs during a learning phase, followed by a recognition memory test. Results showed that MJs were predictive of general scene memorability and relied on the same cues as JOLs, but MJ accuracy considerably improved after the JOL task. Experiment 3 demonstrated that prior learning experiences drove this increase in MJ accuracy. This work demonstrates that people can predict not only their own future memory performance for scene pictures with moderate accuracy but also the general memorability of scene pictures. In addition, experiences with one's own learning and memory support the ability to assess scene memorability in general. This research contributes to our understanding of the basis and accuracy of different metamemory judgements.

Why do judgments of learning modify memory? Evidence from identical pairs and relatedness judgments.

Research has observed that monitoring one's own learning modifies memory for some materials but not for others. Specifically, making judgments of learning (JOLs) while learning word pairs improves subsequent cued-recall memory performance for related word pairs but not for unrelated word pairs. Theories that have attempted to explain this pattern of results assume that people attend to and process cue-target relatedness during learning more when making JOLs than they spontaneously do when not making JOLs. The present research directly tested this relatedness-processing assumption with unrelated and related word pairs as well as with hitherto unexamined materials: identical word pairs. In three experiments, participants studied word pairs while either making or not making JOLs. Results revealed that making JOLs improved memory for related word pairs as well as for identical word pairs, but not for unrelated word pairs. Importantly, in two of the experiments, participants were further asked to judge at test whether each cue appeared with an unrelated, related, or identical target before attempting to recall it. Results revealed that making JOLs improved the accuracy of these relatedness judgments independently from its effect on recall, thus providing direct evidence that people process cue-target relatedness when making JOLs more than they spontaneously do when not making JOLs. These findings contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of why judging one's own learning can modify memory and, more broadly, suggest that instructions to monitor learning can direct people's attention to information that is not or less processed otherwise. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

"You don't know what this means to me" - Uncovering idiosyncratic influences on metamemory judgments.

Studies of the mind often focus on general effects on cognitive processes, whereas influences of idiosyncratic interactions between participants and items evade experimental control or assessment. For instance, assessments of one's own learning and memory processes-metamemory judgments-are attributed to people's reliance on commonly shared characteristics of study materials (e.g., word frequency) or learning conditions (e.g., number of study opportunities). By contrast, few studies have investigated how idiosyncratic information such as the personal significance of items affects memory and metamemory. We propose that hitherto elusive idiosyncratic influences on metamemory can be measured by the C component of Egon Brunswik's (1952) lens model. In two experiments, we made randomly chosen items personally significant (Experiment 1) or assessed the personal significance of items (Experiment 2). Personal significance increased both metamemory judgments and memory performance. Including personal significance as a predictor in the lens model reduced C, whereas including familiarity from a previous encounter did not. Hence, at least part of the lens model's C parameter captures idiosyncratic influences on metamemory. The C parameter may serve as a useful tool for future research.

On the pervasive effect of word frequency in metamemory.

Predictions of one's future memory performance-judgements of learning (JOLs)-are based on the cues that learners regard as diagnostic of memory performance. One of these cues is word frequency or how often words are experienced in the language. It is not clear, however, whether word frequency would affect JOLs when other cues are also available. The current study aims to close this gap by testing whether objective and subjective word frequency affect JOLs in the presence of font size as an additional cue. Across three experiments, participants studied words that varied in word frequency (Experiment 1: high and low objective frequency; Experiment 2: a whole continuum from high to low objective frequency; Experiment 3: high and low subjective and objective frequency) and were presented in a large (48pt) or a small (18pt) font size, made JOLs, and completed a free recall test. Results showed that people based their JOLs on both word frequency and font size. We conclude that word frequency is an important cue that affects metamemory even in multiple-cue situations.

Hindsight bias in metamemory: outcome knowledge influences the recollection of judgments of learning.

Hindsight bias describes people's tendency to overestimate how accurately they have predicted an event's outcome after obtaining knowledge about it. Outcome knowledge has been shown to influence various forms of judgments, but it is unclear whether outcome knowledge also produces a hindsight bias on Judgments of Learning (JOLs). Three experiments tested whether people overestimated the accuracy of their memory predictions after obtaining knowledge about their actual memory performance. In all experiments, participants studied 60 cue-target word pairs, made a JOL for each word pair, and tried to recall the targets in a cued-recall test. In Experiments 1a and 1b, people recollected their original JOLs after attempting to recall each target, that is, after they obtained outcome knowledge for all items. In Experiments 2 and 3, people recollected their original JOLs in a separate phase after attempting to recall half the targets so that they had outcome knowledge for some but not all items. In all experiments, recollected JOLs were closer to actual memory performance than original JOLs for items with outcome knowledge only. Thus, outcome knowledge produced a hindsight bias on JOLs. Our results demonstrate that people overestimate the accuracy of their memory predictions in hindsight.

Metamemory for pictures of naturalistic scenes: Assessment of accuracy and cue utilization.

Memory for naturalistic pictures is exceptionally good. However, little is known about people's ability to monitor the memorability of naturalistic pictures. We report the first systematic investigation into the accuracy and basis of metamemory in this domain. People studied pictures of naturalistic scenes, predicted their chances of recognizing each picture at a later test (judgment of learning, JOL), and completed a recognition memory test. Across three experiments, JOLs revealed substantial accuracy. This was due to people basing their JOLs on multiple cues, most of which predicted recognition memory. Identified cues include intrinsic picture attributes (e.g., peacefulness of scenes; scenes with or without persons) and extrinsic aspects of the study situation (e.g., presentation frequency; semantic distinctiveness of scenes with respect to the context). This work provides a better understanding of metamemory for pictures and it demonstrates close parallels between metamemory for naturalistic scenes and verbal materials.

Effect of impoverished information on multisensory integration in judgments of learning.

According to the principle of inverse effectiveness (PIE), weaker responses to information in one modality (i.e., unisensory) benefit more from additional information in a second modality (i.e., multisensory; Meredith & Stein, 1986). We suggest that the PIE may also inform whether perceptual fluency affects judgments of learning (JOLs). If JOLs follow the PIE, the differences in JOLs for multisensory and unisensory items should increase as the unisensory study items become harder to perceive. That is, an influence of perceptual fluency should prompt a similar, interactive pattern across perceptual responses and JOLs. In 3 experiments, we systematically varied the signal intensity or noise in 1 modality to examine how responses might change with the inclusion of information in a second modality. In Experiment 1, written words in several font sizes were sometimes accompanied by spoken equivalents. In Experiments 2 and 3, spoken words in various background noise levels were sometimes accompanied by visual speech articulations. Consistent with the PIE, the multisensory benefits in response time and/or correct identification increased as responses to unisensory information decreased. Also, the multisensory formats received higher JOLs than the unisensory formats; however, unlike the predictions from PIE, this difference did not increase as study items became harder to perceive. Experiment 3 extended this finding to participants' explicit beliefs. In multisensory settings, JOLs may rely more on theory- than data-driven processes. We suggest that broadly defined processing fluency may always contribute to JOLs, but, regarding perceptual information, JOLs appear to track perceptual attributes rather than perceptual fluency. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Subjective Confidence in the Response to Personality Questions: Some Insight Into the Construction of People's Responses to Test Items.

Drawing on research on subjective confidence, we examined how the confidence and speed in responding to personality items track the consistency and variability in the response to the same items over repeated administrations. Participants (N = 57) responded to 132 personality items with a true/false response format. The items were presented five times over the course of two sessions. Consistent with the Self-Consistency Model, the confidence and speed with which an item was endorsed at its first presentation predicted the likelihood of repeating that response across the subsequent presentations of the item, thus tracking test-retest reliability. Confidence and speed also predicted the likelihood that others will make the same response, thus tracking inter-person consensus. However, confidence and speed varied more strongly with within-person consistency than with inter-person consensus, suggesting some reliance on idiosyncratic cues in response formation. These results mirror, in part, findings obtained in other domains such as general knowledge, social attitudes, and personal preferences, suggesting some similarity in the decision processes underlying the response to binary items: responses to personality items are not retrieved ready-made from memory but constructed at the time of testing, based on the sampling of a small number of cues from a larger population of cues associated with the item's content. Because confidence is based on the consistency with which the cues support a response, it is prognostic of within-person consistency and cross-person consensus. Theoretical and methodological implications are discussed.

The neurocognitive basis of metamemory: Using the N400 to study the contribution of fluency to judgments of learning.

Metamemory is crucial for monitoring, evaluating, and optimizing memory performance. The basis of metamemory, however, is a matter of considerable debate. In the present study, we examined the contribution of processing fluency-the ease of processing information during learning-to metamemory judgments. We recorded event-related potentials (ERPs) while participants studied related and unrelated word pairs across two study-test cycles in a judgment of learning (JOL) task. In the first study-test cycle, related pairs were associated with better cued recall, higher JOLs, and a reduced N400 amplitude than unrelated pairs. Crucially, between- and within subject correlational analyses indicated that reduced N400 amplitudes, indexing more fluent processing, were associated with higher JOLs. Furthermore, single-trial N400 mediated a small but significant portion of the relatedness effect on JOLs. In the second study-test cycle, relatedness still increased recall and JOLs. However, related and unrelated pairs did not differ in N400 amplitude. Rather, unrelated pairs elicited a parietal positivity in a later time window that partially mediated the relatedness effect on JOLs. Together, these results suggest that processing fluency, indexed by the N400, contributes to the relatedness effect on JOLs when novel word pairs are learned, but not when previously studied pairs are relearned. Our results also imply that aspects of fluency not captured by the N400 and/or explicit beliefs about memory contribute to JOLs. This study demonstrates the utility of ERPs in gaining new insights into the neurocognitive mechanisms of metamemory.

Cue integration in metamemory judgements is strategic.

People base judgements about their own memory processes on probabilistic cues such as the characteristics of study materials and study conditions. While research has largely focused on how single cues affect metamemory judgements, a recent study by Undorf, Söllner, and Bröder found that multiple cues affected people's predictions of their future memory performance (judgements of learning, JOLs). The present research tested whether this finding was indeed due to strategic integration of multiple cues in JOLs or, alternatively, resulted from people's reliance on a single unified feeling of ease. In Experiments 1 and 2, we simultaneously varied concreteness and emotionality of word pairs and solicited (a) pre-study JOLs that could be based only on the manipulated cues and (b) immediate JOLs that could be based both on the manipulated cues and on a feeling of ease. The results revealed similar amounts of cue integration in pre-study JOLs and immediate JOLs, regardless of whether cues varied in two easily distinguishable levels (Experiment 1) or on a continuum (Experiment 2). This suggested that people strategically integrated multiple cues in their immediate JOLs. Experiment 3 provided further evidence for this conclusion by showing that false explicit information about cue values affected immediate JOLs over and above actual cue values. Hence, we conclude that cue integration in JOLs involves strategic processes.

Metamemory viewed through the judgment lens.

Metamemory research makes extensive use of judgments, such as judgments of learning (JOLs). In a JOL, people predict their chance of remembering a recently studied item in a memory test. There is a general agreement that JOLs rely on probabilistic cues that are combined in an inference process. Accuracy as measured by the gamma correlation between JOLs and actual performance is usually mediocre, suggesting limited metacognitive abilities. In judgment and decision-making research, Brunswik's lens model is often used to decompose judgmental accuracy: A matching index G measures how adequately people's cue weights match the optimal weights, two reliability indices assess the predictability of judgments and environment, respectively, and a nonlinear component measures systematic variance not captured by the cues. We employed the lens model equation for the first time to analyze four published and one new JOL data sets. There was considerable interindividual variance in metamemory monitoring. Although gamma was on average higher than the Pearson correlation, it still underestimated metacognitive ability in terms of matching (G). Also, the nonlinear component was considerably higher than in other judgment domains, pointing to substantial item-person-interactions that we interpret as idiosyncratic encoding strategies. An exploratory cluster analysis suggests different metacognitive strategies used by subgroups of participants. We suggest the lens model as a potentially promising tool in metacognition research.

Metamemory and memory for a wide range of font sizes: What is the contribution of perceptual fluency?

Words printed in a larger 48-point font are judged to be more memorable than words printed in a smaller 18-point font, although font size does not affect actual memory. To clarify the basis of this font size effect on metamemory and memory, 4 experiments investigated how presenting words in 48 (Experiment 1) or 4 (Experiments 2 to 4) font sizes between 6 point and 500 point affected judgments of learning (JOLs) and recall performance. Response times in lexical decision tasks were used to measure perceptual fluency. In all experiments, perceptual fluency was lower for words presented in very small and very large font sizes than for words presented in intermediate font sizes. In contrast, JOLs increased monotonically with font size, even beyond the point where a large font impaired perceptual fluency. Assessments of people's metacognitive beliefs about font size revealed that the monotonic increase in JOLs was not due to beliefs masking perceptual fluency effects (Experiment 3). Also, JOLs still increased across the whole range of font sizes when perceptual fluency was made salient at study (Experiment 4). In all experiments but Experiment 4, recall performance increased with increasing font size, although to a lesser extent than JOLs. Overall, the current study supports the idea that metacognitive beliefs underlie font size effects in metamemory. As important, it reveals that people's font size beliefs have some accuracy. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).

Is all metamemory monitoring spared from aging? A dual-process examination.

Although recollection-based memory declines with age, relative metamemory monitoring is reported to be spared from aging. Based on a dual-process perspective on memory, we tested whether it is specifically the monitoring of automatic influences of memory (familiarity), but not of recollection, that is spared. In Experiment 1, we used the process-dissociation procedure (PDP) task from Undorf, Böhm, and Cüpper (2016) requiring modality-based exclusions and found older (61-83 years) adults' judgments of learning (JOLs) to predict both recollection and familiarity estimates. Comparisons to Undorf et al.'s younger-adult (18-34 years) data revealed fully spared familiarity monitoring but provided some evidence for impaired recollection monitoring, especially after study-test experience. We replicated aging-spared familiarity monitoring but impaired recollection monitoring in a second experiment, comparing the predictive value of younger (18-30 years) and older (60-87 years) adults' JOLs on a different PDP task that required recollection of the words' spatial positions. Furthermore, Experiment 2 found no evidence that mediator-based strategy use improved recollection monitoring in either age group, albeit significantly improving recollection. Taken together, the results suggest that not all metamemory monitoring is spared from aging. Instead, metamemory monitoring mirrored older adults' specific deficit in recollection whereas familiarity monitoring was fully spared. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).

The Prototypical Majority Effect Under Social Influence.

Majority views are reported with greater confidence and fluency than minority views, with the difference increasing with majority size. This Prototypical Majority Effect (PME) was attributed generally to conformity pressure, but Koriat et al. showed that it can arise from the processes underlying decision and confidence independent of social influence. Here we examined the PME under conditions that differ in social influence. In Experiment 1, a robust PME emerged in the absence of information about the majority views, but the provision sof that information increased the choice of the majority view and magnified the PME. In Experiment 2, a PME emerged in a minority-biased condition that misled participants to believe that the majority view was the minority view, but the PME was stronger in a majority-biased condition. The results were discussed in terms of a dual-process view: The PME observed under social influence may contain externally driven and internally driven components.

Simultaneous utilization of multiple cues in judgments of learning.

There is much evidence that metacognitive judgments, such as people's predictions of their future memory performance (judgments of learning, JOLs), are inferences based on cues and heuristics. However, relatively little is known about whether and when people integrate multiple cues in one metacognitive judgment or focus on a single cue without integrating further information. The current set of experiments systematically addressed whether and to what degree people integrate multiple extrinsic and intrinsic cues in JOLs. Experiment 1 varied two cues: number of study presentations (1 vs. 2) and font size (18 point vs. 48 point). Results revealed that people integrated both cues in their JOLs. Experiment 2 demonstrated that the two word characteristics concreteness (abstract vs. concrete) and emotionality (neutral vs. emotional) were integrated in JOLs. Experiment 3 showed that people integrated all four cues in their JOLs when manipulated simultaneously. Finally, Experiment 4 confirmed integration of three cues that varied on a continuum rather than in two easily distinguishable levels. These results demonstrate that people have a remarkable capacity to integrate multiple cues in metacognitive judgments. In addition, our findings render an explanation of cue effects on JOLs in terms of demand characteristics implausible.

The puzzle of study time allocation for the most challenging items.

Learners often allocate more study time to challenging items than to easier ones. Nevertheless, both predicted and actual memory performance are typically worse for difficult than for easier items. The resulting inverse relations between people's predictions of their memory performance (judgments of learning; JOLs) and self-paced study time (ST) are often explained by bottom-up, data-driven ST allocation that is based on fluency. However, we demonstrate robust inverted U-shaped relations between JOLs and ST that cannot be explained by data-driven ST allocation alone. Consequently, we explored how two models of top-down, strategic ST allocation account for curvilinear JOL-ST relations. First, according to the Region of Proximal Learning model, people stop quickly on items for which they experience too little progress in learning. Second, according to the Diminishing Criterion Model, people set a time limit and stop studying when this time limit is reached. In three experiments, we manipulated motivation with different methods and examined which model best described JOL-ST relations. Consistent with the Diminishing Criterion Model but not with the Region of Proximal Learning model, results revealed that curvilinearity was due to people setting a time limit.

Intuition and metacognition: The effect of semantic coherence on judgments of learning.

The idea that two distinct modes of thought affect human cognition and behavior has received considerable attention in psychology. In the domain of metacognition, it is assumed that metacognitive judgments are based on both nonanalytic, experience-based processes and analytic, theory-based processes. This study examined whether the experience-based process of intuition underlies people's predictions of their future memory performance (judgments of learning; JOLs). In four experiments, people made JOLs and took a test on compound remote associates, that is, groups of 3 words that were either remote associates of a single solution word (coherent triads) or had no common associate (incoherent triads). Previous research has shown that increased fluency of processing coherent triads produces brief positive affects that may underlie judgments. In all experiments, JOLs were higher for coherent than for incoherent triads. The same was true for recognition memory and free recall performance. Moreover, Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrated that coherent triads were processed more fluently (i.e., read more quickly) than incoherent triads. Finally, Experiments 3 and 4 showed that the effect of semantic coherence on JOLs occurred for participants who were aware and unaware of relations between all three triad words, but was more pronounced for aware participants. In sum, this study demonstrates that intuition impacts JOLs over and above theory-based processes.

Do judgments of learning predict automatic influences of memory?

Current memory theories generally assume that memory performance reflects both recollection and automatic influences of memory. Research on people's predictions about the likelihood of remembering recently studied information on a memory test, that is, on judgments of learning (JOLs), suggests that both magnitude and resolution of JOLs are linked to recollection. However, it has remained unresolved whether JOLs are also predictive of automatic influences of memory. This issue was addressed in 3 experiments. Using the process-dissociation procedure, we assessed the predictive accuracy of immediate and delayed JOLs (Experiment 1) and of immediate JOLs from a first and from a second study-test cycle (Experiments 2 and 3) for recollection and automatic influences. Results showed that each type of JOLs was predictive of both recollection and automatic influences. Moreover, we found that a delay between study and JOL improved the predictive accuracy of JOLs for recollection, while study-test experience improved the predictive accuracy of JOLs for both recollection and automatic influences. These findings demonstrate that JOLs predict not only recollection, but also automatic influences of memory. (PsycINFO Database Record

The relatedness effect on judgments of learning: A closer look at the contribution of processing fluency.

The cue-utilization view to judgments of learning (JOLs) assumes that both ease of processing during study and people's beliefs about memory may contribute to people's predictions on the likelihood of remembering recently studied information. However, a recent study (Mueller, Tauber, & Dunlosky, Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 20(2), 378-384, 2013; Experiment 3) found that processing fluency does not contribute to the effect of pair relatedness on JOLs, that is, to higher JOLs for related paired associates as compared to unrelated paired associates. We investigated whether this finding primarily depends on specific aspects of the paired associates employed or on the measure of processing fluency used in the previous study. In our first two experiments, participants therefore studied lists with (a) uniformly high associative strengths versus (b) a wide range of associative strengths. Results showed that processing disfluency--operationalized as number of trials to acquisition in Experiment 1 and as self-paced study time in Experiment 2--partially mediated the effect of relatedness on JOLs for both types of lists. Finally, in Experiment 3, the contribution of processing fluency to the relatedness effect increased with study-test experience. Unlike Mueller et al., we thus found that processing fluency contributes to the relatedness effect on JOLs. These findings are consistent with the assumption that ease of processing is an important basis for JOLs.

Separation of encoding fluency and item difficulty effects on judgements of learning.

The fluency of information encoding has frequently been discussed as a major determinant of predicted memory performance indicated by judgements of learning (JOLs). Previous studies established encoding fluency effects on JOLs. However, it is largely unknown whether fluency takes effect above and beyond the effects of item difficulty. We therefore tested whether encoding fluency still affects JOLs when numerous additional cues indicating the difficulty of an item are available as well. In three experiments, participants made JOLs for another participant while observing his or her self-paced study phase. However, study times were swapped in one experimental condition, so that items with short study times (indicating high fluency) were presented for long durations, whereas items with long study times (indicating low fluency) were presented for short durations. Results showed that both item difficulty and encoding fluency affected JOLs. Thus, encoding fluency in itself is indeed an important cue for JOLs that does not become redundant when difficulty information is available in addition. This observation lends considerable support to the ease-of-processing hypothesis.